中觀論疏 10.6

10.6

「諸佛依二諦」下，第二明外人不解二法，故興邪難也。以不知有宛然而無所有，故不知第一義；不知雖無所有宛然而有，故不識世諦，是以興上邪難也。問：外人何時失二諦耶？答：從論初至〈四諦〉之前，執諸法有實性，不信畢竟空，故不知第一義。從〈四諦品〉執畢竟空，謂無三寶四諦，不識世諦。又敘說二諦來，還釋成上三法。上云不知空者，不知第一義本性空也。空因緣者，諸佛住二諦中，為眾生說法，為著有者說空、為著空者說有。空義者，正是第一義諦空，非世諦空也。又敘二諦來者，外人著空失於世諦，既失世諦亦失第一義，如〈因緣品〉中敘之。今對外人無二諦，故明有二諦，所以今文述二諦也。又敘說二諦即是論主自免過。我有二諦義，第一義則空無三寶、世諦則有三寶。汝若就第一義難，則成我義；若就世諦難，我世諦有三寶，復何得作無三寶難耶？又敘說二諦意，上來明空者，無汝所見因果等法，故言無耳；非無佛法因緣二諦也。又此品明四諦，二諦是諦之流類，故明二諦也。三偈即開為三別：初偈明論主識佛依二諦說法，故無上過；第二偈明外人不識二諦，故於空有中並皆有失；第三偈明釋疑難。初上半正明依二諦說法、下半列出二諦名。問：何故云佛依二諦說法？答：依世諦說法，則三寶四諦宛然不失，故無上過，即顯外人不知世諦故橫生過。以依第一義說法故，我上來明一切空，即顯外人執法有性失第一義。問；云何稱依二諦義耶？答：於凡聖所解空有皆實，故稱二諦。依此二實而說，故所說皆實，故云依二諦說也。問：云何是二於諦？云何是教諦？答：所依即是二於諦。以於凡聖皆是實，故秤二於諦。亦是於二諦，謂色未曾空有，於二解是實，故云二於諦。《百論》引棗㮈望苽皆不虛，《智度論》引無名指形有名指皆實也。能依即是教諦，佛依此二諦為物說法，皆是誠諦之言，故稱為實也。問：能依有異不？答：依第一義說，此是真實說；依俗說者，此是方便隨宜說也。問：說人天及二乘是方便說，今說大乘人法等，云何依俗說法皆是方便？答：實相不可說，方是真實；凡一切言說皆是方便也。問：二於諦為是失、為是得？答：一往二於俱是得，於凡是實故於凡為得，於聖是實故於聖稱得。若以凡聖相望，則凡失聖得也。問：叵有凡聖皆失不？答：若言一色未曾空有，空有自出二情，則凡聖俱失。今文是總判凡聖，故以凡為失、以聖為得。又三句：一但失非得，謂凡於也。二但得非失，謂佛於也。如《涅槃》云「一切世諦，若於如來即是第一義諦。」三亦得亦失，即二乘之聖形凡為得，望大士為失也。講此文多有異說，慎勿信也，宜以長行為正也。下半明二諦名。而世俗稱諦者，此於世俗人是實，故稱世俗諦。亦勿信人語也。第一義則有二實：一者體是諸法實相，故名為實；二於聖人了達，有於實解，復是真實。世俗體非真實，但有於凡是實，故二諦實義異也。問：俗但有於情為實，亦有法體實耶？答：就俗之中亦有因果，不可差異，故名為實。但望第一義，皆是妄謂、皆是不實。亦第二偈顯得失者，外人不識空有二諦故失三利，謂自利、他利、共利；論主識二諦故具三利，以解第一義故生波若、了世俗故生方便、有波若方便則生三世諸佛。故《淨名》云「智度菩薩母，方便以為父。一切眾導師，無不由是生」也。自悟二諦名為自利，令他解謂他利，俱解即共利。又解第一義生實慧為自利，解世俗生方便為他利，具了為共利。問：長行釋世諦，何故舉本性空？答：欲釋成於義，明理實性空，但於凡謂有，故名為諦也。又欲辨由空故有，所以釋有而舉空也。下釋第一義，亦舉有釋空。賢聖了六道顛倒本性空，故於聖為實是諦。「若謂一切法不生」下，第三明二諦相資。若望《百論》，釋疑故來。外人云：第一義有二實，一道理是實相故名實、二於聖人得如實解故名實，具此二實可得是諦。又佛可依之說法，以三世十方佛皆欲令人得實利故也。俗有二義故非實，一非實境、二非實解，云何名諦？佛復何故依之說法耶？問：第一義二實，文出何處耶？答：前文云「於聖是實」，此是解實。今文云「一切法本不生是第一義」，此是境實。第一義既二實，世俗二不實可知也。偈上半正答問。世俗雖是二不實，但要因世俗為方便得顯第一義耳。如理雖無三，要因三為方便得悟一。問，云何世俗為方便耶？答：一切言皆是世俗，因世俗言得無言，故以無言言為世俗、言無言為第一義也。問：有幾種言耶？答：有二種言。一者說世俗中言，如瓶衣等，亦表第一義無言之道。故《涅槃》云「欲令眾生深識第一義，故宣說世諦耳。」二者以言言於無言，即為第一義立名，名為第一義。因此言欲顯無言，若不言於無言，眾生何由識理無言耶？問：二言之中今用何言？答：後意為正。若依《百論》答者，俗雖具二不實，但於凡是實，故稱諦也。若依今文生起此偈來者，我已知俗是凡諦，但應立聖諦，何須立凡俗諦耶？問：此與舊何異？答：舊是龍樹義，云何乃問與舊何異？問：他亦作此釋，云何異耶？答：須知世諦雖說而未嘗言，真雖無言而教彌法界。下半云「不得第一義則不得涅槃」者，亦異釋云云。今明以見第一義生波若，滅諸煩惱故得有餘涅槃，滅報身得無餘涅槃。問：涅槃與第一義何異？答：不敢信人慢語。〈涅槃品〉云「亦名如、法性、實際、涅槃」，則知涅槃是第一義異名耳；但對世故名第一義，對生死故名涅槃也。

From "The Buddhas rely on the two truths" downward is the second [section], which explains that because the outsider does not understand the two dharmas, he therefore raises perverse objections. Because he does not know that while being [phenomenally] manifest, it is nonexistent, he therefore does not know the ultimate truth; because he does not know that though nonexistent, it is [phenomenally] manifest as existent, he therefore does not recognise the conventional truth; thus he raised the perverse objections above. Question: At what point does the outsider lose the two truths? Answer: From the beginning of the treatise up to before the [Chapter on the] Four Truths, he clings to all phenomena as having real intrinsic nature and does not believe in ultimate emptiness; therefore, he does not know the ultimate truth. From the "Chapter on the Four Truths", he clings to ultimate emptiness and asserts that there are no Three Jewels or Four Truths; thus he fails to recognise conventional truth. Furthermore, the exposition of the two truths serves to explain and substantiate the aforementioned three dharmas: What was previously called "not knowing emptiness" means not knowing the intrinsic emptiness of the ultimate truth; "causes and conditions of emptiness" means that the Buddhas abide in the two truths to expound the Dharma for sentient beings, preaching emptiness for those attached to existence and preaching existence for those attached to emptiness; "the meaning of emptiness" is precisely the ultimate truth's emptiness, not the conventional truth's emptiness. Furthermore, as for introducing the two truths: the outsider attaches to emptiness and loses conventional truth; having lost conventional truth, he also loses the ultimate truth, as set forth in the "Chapter on Causes and Conditions". Now, in response to the outsider's lack of the two truths, [the treatise] clarifies that there are two truths; this is why the present text expounds the two truths. Furthermore, expounding the two truths is the author of the treatise clearing himself of fault: "I possess the doctrine of the two truths: in the ultimate truth, it is empty and devoid of the Three Jewels; in conventional truth, there are the Three Jewels. If you object in terms of the ultimate truth, that merely establishes my position; if you object in terms of the conventional truth, in my conventional truth the Three Jewels exist—how then can you raise the objection that there are no Three Jewels?" Furthermore, the intention of expounding the two truths is that the preceding explanations of emptiness meant the absence of the causes, conditions, and other phenomena seen by you—hence we said they are absent; it does not mean the absence of the two truths of dependent origination in the Buddha-Dharma. Furthermore, this chapter clarifies the Four Truths, and the two truths belong to the same category of truths; hence the two truths are clarified. The three verses are divided into three distinct parts: The first verse clarifies that the author of the treatise recognises that the Buddha preaches the Dharma relying on the two truths, and is therefore free from the aforementioned fault; the second verse clarifies that because the outsider does not recognise the two truths, he errs in both emptiness and existence; the third verse explains and resolves doubts and objections. The first half-verse directly clarifies preaching the Dharma relying on the two truths; the second half-verse lists the names of the two truths. Question: Why is it said that the Buddha preaches the Dharma relying on the two truths? Answer: Preaching the Dharma relying on conventional truth, the Three Jewels and the Four Truths are manifestly not lost; hence there is none of the aforementioned fault, which reveals that the outsider raises faults arbitrarily because he does not know conventional truth. Because the Dharma is expounded relying on the ultimate truth, my previous clarification of the emptiness of all things reveals that the outsider, clinging to phenomena as having intrinsic nature, loses the ultimate truth. Question: Why is it called "relying on the two truths"? Answer: What is understood by ordinary beings and by noble ones—emptiness and existence—are both real [to them]; therefore, they are called two truths. Preaching in reliance on these two realities, what is preached is in each case real; therefore, it is said to "preach relying on the two truths". Question: What are the two "truths-with-respect-to"? What are the truths of teaching? Answer: That which is relied upon is the two "truths-with-respect-to". Because they are real with respect to both ordinary beings and noble ones, they are called the two "truths-with-respect-to". They are also called "truths with respect to the two": that is, form has never been empty or existent; with respect to the two understandings, each is real, and thus they are called the two "truths-with-respect-to". The Śata-śāstra cites the jujube and crabapple, which relative to a melon are both not false; the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa cites the ring finger, which relative to the index finger is real. That which relies is the truth of teaching: the Buddha relies on these two truths to preach the Dharma for living beings, all of which are sincere and true words; therefore, it is called real. Question: Is there a distinction in that which relies? Answer: Preaching relying on the ultimate truth is a true preaching; preaching relying on the conventional is an expedient preaching according with what is appropriate. Question: Preaching [the vehicles of] humans, gods, and the two vehicles is expedient preaching; now when preaching the persons and phenomena of the Mahāyāna, why is preaching relying on the conventional entirely expedient? Answer: The true character [of phenomena] is ineffable—only that is genuine reality; all verbal expressions whatsoever are expedient. Question: As for the two "truths-with-respect-to", are they errors or attainments? Answer: At first glance, both are attainments: because it is real with respect to the ordinary person, it is an attainment for the ordinary person; because it is real with respect to the noble one, it is called an attainment for the noble one. If ordinary beings and noble ones are compared with each other, then the ordinary person errs and the noble one attains. Question: Could it be that both ordinary beings and noble ones err? Answer: If one says that a single form has never been empty or existent, and that emptiness and existence arise from two subjective sentiments, then ordinary beings and noble ones both err. The present text is a general adjudication of ordinary beings and noble ones; hence it treats the ordinary person as erring and the noble one as attaining. Furthermore, there are three positions: First, only erring and not attaining, which refers to the perspective of the ordinary person. Second, only attaining and not erring, which refers to the perspective of the Buddha. As the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "All conventional truths, with respect to the Tathāgata, are precisely the ultimate truth." Third, both attaining and erring: that is, the noble ones of the two vehicles, compared with ordinary beings, attain, but compared with the Great Beings (bodhisattvas), they err. In lectures on this text there are many divergent theories; be careful not to believe them, and take the prose [commentary] as correct. The second half-verse clarifies the names of the two truths. Now, conventional [reality] is called a "truth" because this is real with respect to conventional people; hence it is called conventional truth. Do not believe other people's words on this either. The ultimate truth, on the other hand, possesses two realities: First, its substance is the true character of all phenomena; hence it is named real. Second, with respect to the noble person's complete comprehension, there is an understanding of reality; this is also real. Conventional [truth]'s substance is not real; it is only real with respect to ordinary beings. Hence, the meaning of "real" in the two truths differs. Question: Is the conventional real only with respect to sentiment, or does it also possess a real substance of phenomena? Answer: Within the conventional, cause and effect also exist without disparity; hence it is called real. But relative to the ultimate truth, they are all false suppositions, entirely unreal. Moreover, that the second verse demonstrates gain and loss means that because the outsider does not recognise the two truths of emptiness and existence, he loses the three benefits—namely, benefit for oneself, benefit for others, and mutual benefit. Because the author of the treatise recognises the two truths, he possesses all three benefits: by understanding the ultimate truth, prajñā is generated; by comprehending the conventional, expedient means are generated; and possessing prajñā and expedient means generates the Buddhas of the three times. Thus the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "Wisdom is the mother of the bodhisattva, and expedient means is the father; of all leaders of the assembly, there are none who are not born from these." One's own awakening to the two truths is called benefit for oneself; causing others to understand is called benefit for others; both understanding is mutual benefit. Furthermore, understanding the ultimate truth gives rise to real wisdom, which is benefit for oneself; understanding the conventional gives rise to expedient means, which is benefit for others; fully comprehending both is mutual benefit. Question: In the prose explaining conventional truth, why is intrinsic emptiness adduced? Answer: It aims to explain and establish the meaning of "with respect to": clarifying that according to principle, it is truly empty of intrinsic nature, but with respect to the ordinary person it is considered existent; hence it is called a truth. Furthermore, it aims to discern that existence is due to emptiness; hence in explaining existence, it adduces emptiness. Below, in explaining the ultimate truth, it also adduces existence to explain emptiness. The wise and noble comprehend that the inversions of the six destinies are intrinsically empty by nature; therefore, with respect to the noble one, it is real and is a truth. From "If one says that all phenomena are unarisen" downward is the third [section], clarifying the mutual support of the two truths. Relative to the Śata-śāstra, it comes to resolve a doubt. The outsider says: "The ultimate truth possesses two realities: first, principle is the true character, hence named real; second, with respect to the noble person, one attains understanding in accord with reality, hence named real. Possessing these two realities, it can be a truth. Furthermore, the Buddha can rely on it to preach the Dharma, because the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions all wish to lead people to attain real benefit. The conventional possesses two aspects and is therefore not real: first, it is not a real object; second, it is not a real understanding. How can it be called a truth? And why would the Buddha preach the Dharma relying on it?" Question: Where in the text do the two realities of the ultimate truth appear? Answer: The earlier text says, "with respect to the noble one, it is real"—this is the reality of understanding. The present text says, "that all phenomena are fundamentally unarisen is the ultimate truth"—this is the reality of the object. Since the ultimate truth has two realities, the two non-realities of the conventional truth can be known. The first half of the verse directly answers the question. Although conventional truth has two non-realities, one must rely on conventional truth as an expedient means to reveal the ultimate truth. Just as according to principle there are not three [vehicles], yet one must rely on the three as an expedient means to awaken to the One [Vehicle]. Question: How is the conventional truth an expedient means? Answer: All speech is conventional; by relying on conventional speech, wordlessness is attained. Hence, speaking of the wordless is conventional, while the wordless that is spoken of is the ultimate truth. Question: How many kinds of speech are there? Answer: There are two kinds of speech. First, speaking words within the conventional, such as 'vase', 'cloth', and the like, which also indicate the wordless Way of the ultimate truth. Thus the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "Wishing to lead sentient beings to deeply recognise the ultimate truth, we therefore proclaim the conventional truth." Second, using words to speak of the wordless: that is, establishing a name for the ultimate truth, naming it 'ultimate truth'. Relying on these words, one wishes to reveal the wordless; if one did not speak of the wordless, how would sentient beings recognise that principle is wordless? Question: Between these two speeches, which speech is used here? Answer: The latter meaning is the correct one. If one answers according to the Śata-śāstra, although conventional truth possesses the two non-realities, it is real with respect to the ordinary person; hence it is called a truth. If according to the present text this verse is introduced, [the opponent implies:] "I already know that the conventional is the truth of the ordinary person; one should only establish the truth of the noble, so why is it necessary to establish the conventional truth of the ordinary?" Question: How does this differ from the old interpretation? Answer: The old is Nāgārjuna's meaning—how can you ask how it differs from the old? Question: Others also give this explanation; how does it differ? Answer: One must know that although the conventional truth is spoken, it has never uttered a word; although the true [truth] is wordless, its teaching fills the Dharma realm. As for the second half-verse saying, "Without attaining the ultimate truth, one does not attain nirvāṇa", there are also various interpretations. Now we clarify that by seeing the ultimate truth, prajñā is generated; eradicating all afflictions, one attains nirvāṇa with remainder; shedding the retribution body, one attains nirvāṇa without remainder. Question: How does nirvāṇa differ from the ultimate truth? Answer: I dare not believe people's arrogant talk. The "Chapter on Nirvāṇa" says: "It is also named Suchness, Dharma-nature, the limit of reality, and nirvāṇa." Thus we know that nirvāṇa is merely an alternative name for the ultimate truth. It is simply named ultimate truth in contrast to the conventional, and named nirvāṇa in contrast to saṃsāra.