中觀論疏 3.29

3.29

「答曰」下，第三破四緣生義。余聽師講及自講已來，恒恨分此品文句不好。既是舊說，不敢改之；今依論意，宜別科也。破中為三：第一破四緣能生果，果不從四緣生義。第二明非緣不能生果，果不從非緣生義。第三雙結二門，結果不從緣非緣生故無果，果無故結緣非緣亦無。詳論文正爾，至後當現也。就初又三：初三偈總破四緣生義、次四偈別破四緣生、後一偈結破四緣生。前三偈為二：初偈雙定二關、後兩偈俱設兩難。就初雙定二關，即為二別：上半定果，明破果義；下半定緣，明破緣義。所以知爾者，長行云「若謂有果，是果為從緣生、為從非緣生」，明知上半定果明破果義，下半亦然。問：外人前偈云四緣生諸法，即是立果從四緣生義。云何更定為從緣、為從非緣？答：有三義。一者外人雖立果從緣生，不立非緣；今責其緣成非緣，即謂非緣生義。今欲明緣與非緣並不能生，故須雙定，此即是帶破定也。二者內人立果從緣生，外道立果從非緣生，如八謬等；今欲遍破內外，故雙定二關。三者論主雙定兩關者，大意欲使執生見摧、無生義顯，不必須問答相對也。又恐破緣不成緣，轉執非緣，則逆防人，所以雙定。問：緣非緣有幾種？答：凡有三種。一者一法名緣非緣，如責外人緣義不得成於非緣。二者二法明緣非緣，如乳是酪緣、非是瓶緣。三者內外明緣非緣，內人立四緣是緣，外道八謬是非緣。下半是定緣破緣，縱外人是緣能生果，故就緣內責之。問：為是二關定一執、二關定兩執？答：若外人但立緣能生果，論主即開有無二關破其生果一執；若立二世有無，即設二關雙定兩計。長行為三：一者雙定、二者雙非、三者雙釋。一定如文。「二俱不然」者，第二雙非。有三種二，並皆不然。一者上半定果、下半定緣，則緣果二俱不然；二者上半有緣非緣二；三者下半有果無果二也。「何以故」下，第三雙釋，發起後偈也。「因是法生果」下，第二兩偈俱設二難。講者多謂初偈釋前偈上半破緣、次偈釋前偈下半破果，蓋是見近不見遠，作此釋之。今明初偈釋前偈上半明破果義、次偈釋前偈下半破緣義。問：此偈文正是難外緣成非緣，正是破緣，云何破果耶？答：須長觀偈意。外人云：果從緣生，是故有果。破云：果未生時有緣，果可從緣生，是故有果。果未生時不名緣，云何果從緣生而有果耶？果未生時非緣，非緣云何能生果而有果耶？故是正破果矣。就偈為二：上半作緣無定性破、下半作緣成非緣破。上半緣無定性破，得緣名而失前後；下半緣成非緣破，得前後而失緣名。故進退墮負也。上半有三意：一者緣若有定性，應不由果有緣；由果有緣無定性，緣無定性是故無緣。二者破緣定在果前義。汝由緣有果，緣前而果後；亦由果有緣，則果前而緣後。三者破緣能生果義。汝由緣有果，緣生果者，亦由果有緣，則果生於緣。下半緣成非緣破，還翻上半三義：一者緣有定性則不由果有緣，則不名緣，應名非緣。二者若果不在緣前，而緣在果前，則緣不由果，何得名緣？三者若緣生於果，果不生緣，則不由果有緣，亦名非緣。此偈具得破數論大乘等前因後果義。如毘曇云：報無記果未起時，云何名善惡為因，大乘佛果未起時，云何名金剛心萬行為因耶？又並之，未生果已名緣者，生果竟應名非緣。又並，汝若未生果已名緣，緣不由果者，亦未有緣時已有果，果應不由緣也。

From "Answer" onward is the third part, refuting the meaning of production from the four conditions. Ever since I listened to my master's lectures and lectured myself, I have always regretted that the division of the sentences and phrases in this chapter was not good. Since it was the old explanation, I did not dare alter it; but now, relying on the intent of the treatise, it is appropriate to outline it differently. In this refutation there are three parts: First, refuting that the four conditions can produce a fruit, meaning that the fruit does not arise from the four conditions. Second, clarifying that non-conditions cannot produce a fruit, meaning that the fruit does not arise from non-conditions. Third, jointly concluding the two approaches: concluding that because the fruit does not arise from conditions or non-conditions, there is no fruit; and because there is no fruit, concluding that conditions and non-conditions are also nonexistent. A careful examination of the treatise text shows it is precisely this, as will become apparent later. Under the first, there are again three parts: the first three verses comprehensively refute the meaning of production from the four conditions; the next four verses specifically refute production from the four conditions; the final verse concludes the refutation of production from the four conditions. The first three verses have two parts: the first verse jointly establishes two dilemmas, and the subsequent two verses both pose two difficulties. Regarding the first verse jointly establishing two dilemmas, there are two distinct parts: the first half determines the fruit, clarifying the refutation of the fruit; the second half determines the conditions, clarifying the refutation of the conditions. How this is known: the prose says, 'If one says there is a fruit, does this fruit arise from conditions, or does it arise from non-conditions?' Thus we know clearly that the first half determines the fruit to clarify the refutation of the fruit, and the second half is likewise. Question: The opponent's previous verse stated that the four conditions produce all dharmas, which establishes the proposition that the fruit arises from the four conditions. Why further determine whether it is from conditions or from non-conditions? Answer: There are three meanings. First, although the opponent posits that the fruit arises from conditions and does not posit non-conditions, now, by interrogating them, their 'conditions' turn into 'non-conditions,' which would mean arising from non-conditions. Now, wishing to clarify that neither conditions nor non-conditions can produce, it is necessary to determine both; this is a determination that entails refutation. Second, Buddhists establish that the fruit arises from conditions, while non-Buddhists establish that the fruit arises from non-conditions, as in the eight fallacies and so forth; now, wishing to refute both Buddhists and non-Buddhists comprehensively, the two dilemmas are jointly established. Third, the treatise master's joint establishment of the two dilemmas primarily intends to crush the view clinging to production and make manifest the meaning of non-production, not necessarily requiring a rigid question-and-answer correspondence. Furthermore, fearing that when conditions are refuted and shown not to be conditions, they will shift to clinging to non-conditions, he preemptively safeguards against this; hence he jointly establishes both. Question: How many kinds of 'conditions and non-conditions' are there? Answer: There are three kinds in all. First, a single dharma is called condition and non-condition, as when questioning the opponent where the meaning of 'condition' fails and becomes a 'non-condition.' Second, two dharmas clarify condition and non-condition, as milk is the condition for curd, but not the condition for a jar. Third, internal and external clarify condition and non-condition: Buddhists establish that the four conditions are conditions, while the non-Buddhist eight fallacies are non-conditions. The second half determines conditions to refute conditions: granting that the opponent's 'conditions' can produce a fruit, he interrogates them within the condition itself. Question: Do the two dilemmas determine one clinging, or do the two dilemmas determine two clingings? Answer: If the opponent merely posits that conditions can produce a fruit, the treatise master opens the two dilemmas of existence and nonexistence to refute that single clinging to the production of a fruit; if they posit existence and nonexistence in the two times, he sets up the two dilemmas to jointly determine both views. The prose has three parts: first, the joint determination; second, the joint negation; third, the joint explanation. The determination is as in the text. 'Both are not so' is the second part, the joint negation. There are three kinds of 'both,' and all of them are not so: first, the upper half determines the fruit and the lower half determines the condition, so both condition and fruit are not so; second, in the upper half there are the two of condition and non-condition; third, in the lower half there are the two of fruit existing and fruit nonexisting. From 'Why is this so?' onward is the third part, the joint explanation, which introduces the subsequent verses. From 'A fruit arises based on these dharmas' onward is the second part, where the two verses both pose two difficulties. Lecturers mostly say that the first verse explains the upper half of the preceding verse to refute conditions, and the second verse explains the lower half of the preceding verse to refute the fruit; this is seeing what is near and failing to see what is far in making such an explanation. Now we clarify that the first verse explains the upper half of the preceding verse to clarify the refutation of the fruit, and the second verse explains the lower half of the preceding verse to clarify the refutation of conditions. Question: The text of this verse precisely challenges the opponent that conditions become non-conditions, which is precisely a refutation of conditions; how is it a refutation of the fruit? Answer: One must view the overall intent of the verse. The opponent says: 'The fruit arises from conditions, therefore there is a fruit.' The refutation says: 'If conditions exist when the fruit has not yet arisen, the fruit could arise from conditions, and therefore there would be a fruit. But before the fruit arises, they are not called conditions; how then could the fruit arise from conditions so that there is a fruit? Before the fruit arises, they are non-conditions; how could non-conditions produce a fruit so that there is a fruit?' Therefore, it is precisely a refutation of the fruit. In terms of the verse, there are two parts: the upper half refutes by showing that conditions have no fixed intrinsic nature; the lower half refutes by showing that conditions become non-conditions. The upper half, refuting through conditions lacking fixed intrinsic nature, retains the name of condition but loses the before-and-after; the lower half, refuting through conditions becoming non-conditions, retains the before-and-after but loses the name of condition. Thus, whether advancing or retreating, they fall into defeat. The upper half has three meanings: First, if conditions had a fixed intrinsic nature, they should not depend on the fruit to become conditions; because they depend on the fruit to become conditions, they lack a fixed intrinsic nature, and lacking a fixed intrinsic nature, there are no conditions. Second, it refutes the proposition that conditions are definitely prior to the fruit. According to you, the fruit exists because of conditions, so conditions are before and the fruit is after; but conditions also exist because of the fruit, so the fruit is before and conditions are after. Third, it refutes the proposition that conditions can produce a fruit. According to you, the fruit exists because of conditions and conditions produce the fruit; then conditions also exist because of the fruit, so the fruit would produce the conditions. The lower half, refuting by showing that conditions become non-conditions, conversely inverts the three meanings of the upper half: First, if conditions had a fixed intrinsic nature and did not depend on the fruit to become conditions, then they would not be called conditions, but should be called non-conditions. Second, if the fruit is not prior to the conditions while conditions are prior to the fruit, then conditions do not depend on the fruit; how could they be called conditions? Third, if conditions produce the fruit and the fruit does not produce conditions, then conditions do not depend on the fruit to become conditions, and are also called non-conditions. This verse can fully refute the prior-cause and posterior-fruit theories of the Sarvāstivādins, Sāṃkhyas, and Mahāyāna. For example, as the Abhidharma says: before the indeterminate retribution fruit has arisen, how can good and evil be called causes? And before the Mahāyāna Buddha-fruit has arisen, how can the adamantine mind and the myriad practices be called causes? Furthermore, by parallel reduction: if before producing the fruit they are already called conditions, then after producing the fruit they should be called non-conditions. Furthermore, by parallel reduction: if according to you they are already called conditions before producing the fruit, so that conditions do not depend on the fruit, then before there were conditions there was already a fruit, and the fruit should not depend on conditions either.