中觀論疏 3.31

3.31

長行為二：一雙非、二雙釋。「不生餘物故」者，此有三意：一者泥中無瓶亦無餘物，若二俱無，即二俱不生。二者二俱是無，二俱應生。三者俱無，不生餘物而生瓶者，亦可生於餘物而不生瓶。「問曰以總破一切因緣」下，第二別破四緣。曇影法師云：「龍樹論意無總別破，但前四偈破因緣、後三偈破三緣。」四偈破因緣為三：初偈開章門雙定、次兩偈釋章門雙難、後一偈結破也。問：何故獨以四偈破因緣、後三偈各破一緣耶？答：次第緣冥昧世所希知，緣緣、增上疎而少計，故須略破。四偈偏破因緣，凡有五義：一者因緣在初。二者因緣攝因廣，謂攝五因：一者相應因，心王與心數同起同緣不相違背；二者共有因，心王心數與四相等同時共起，名共有因；三自分因，善還生善，惡無記亦然；四遍因，十一偏使生一切煩惱，故名為遍；五報因，善惡之法能生苦樂果報，為報為因。攝此五因為緣，故言因緣廣也。三者因緣親密，三緣即疎。四者因緣事顯。五者眾生多計。是以四偈破之。下三緣不爾，故但一偈破也。問：青目何所見聞開於總別？答：見下文云「廣略眾緣中」，即知結於總別。又見三偈各破三緣，即知一偈別破因緣。影師云：「青目勇於取類、劣於尋文。」今撿《智度論》，應如影師所說。影師又言：「假令有總別意者，因緣一偈入於總中，下三偈各破也。」今且依青目以三偈為總、四偈為別。四偈破四緣為四章。第一偈就有無門破、第二三時門破、第三實相門破、第四無性門破。然此四門可有二義：一者互用、二者合用。合用者，四門共破一也。互用者，既得有無門破因緣，亦得有無門破次第緣；既得三時破次第緣，亦得三時破因緣，但逐義便。彼計泥能生瓶、穀能生牙，是因緣義，故宜以有無責之。彼計前心滅、後心生，為次第緣義，宜以三時責之。彼計凡之與聖並以心是能緣、境是所緣，宜以實相絕於能所責之也。彼計萬法有性，能為他作緣，故以無性門破。所言因緣者，品初以釋。又解云：攝五因為因緣，故名因緣。有人言：親者為因，如穀子；疎者為緣，如地水，故名因緣。又言：即因是緣，但約義異，無而辨有。於果有親生力故為因，果可生之義故緣也。偈中上三句總非，下一句結破。所以總非者，可有三義：一者前偈已破有無，今不須破，故直非之。二者因緣之法名為甚深，即是中道，豈得定有定無。彼今乃計於有無、不計因緣，此之有無乃因緣家障，故但非之。三者有之與無乃是外道之類，如二世有義可類僧佉、二世無義方類於衛世、亦有亦無同勒沙婆部。問：二世有無，親是佛說，云何同外道耶？答：外道前興已計有無，今諸部後執，何名為異？若云異者，今請責之。既稱二世有者，為作因時方有果性、未作因時已有果性？若作因時方有果性，未作因時即無果性，當知果性團無為有，即是二世無義。若言未作因時已有果性，此是本來常有如涅槃，又未作五逆已有五逆性、未作十善已有十善性。問：但有性、未有事，有何過？答：後當破之。問：若言二世無者，因云何引果起耶？若：引果起即有果可引，何謂無耶？若引無者，無法是無，云何可引？故師子吼云「空中無刺，云何言拔？」若言雖復是無，而有有義。今問：有義為出有異無、為未出有未異無耶？若出有異無，此即是有，何謂二世無耶？若未出有未異無，何所論有義？故知兩計同彼外道。

The prose consists of two parts: first, a dual negation; second, a dual explanation. Regarding 'Because it does not produce other things': this has three meanings. First, in the clay there is no vase, nor are there other things; if both are non-existent, then neither should be produced. Second, since both are non-existent, both ought to be produced. Third, since both are non-existent, if it does not produce other things but produces a vase, it might just as well produce other things and not produce a vase.

From 'Question: By generally refuting all causes and conditions' downward: this is the second section, specifically refuting the four conditions. Master Tanying said: 'Nāgārjuna's intention in the treatise is not to make a general and specific refutation; rather, the first four verses refute the causal condition, and the subsequent three verses refute the other three conditions.' The four verses refuting the causal condition comprise three parts: the first verse opens the chapter topic with a dual determination; the next two verses explain the chapter topic with dual dilemmas; and the final verse concludes the refutation. Question: Why use four verses solely to refute the causal condition, and only one verse each for the subsequent three conditions? Answer: The immediate condition is subtle and obscure, rarely known in the world; the object condition and the sovereign condition are remote and seldom posited; hence they only need a brief refutation. There are five reasons why four verses specifically refute the causal condition:
1. The causal condition comes first.
2. The causal condition encompasses causes broadly, encompassing five causes: first, the associated cause, where the main mind and mental factors arise together with the same object-referent without conflict; second, the co-existent cause, where the main mind, mental factors, and the four characteristics arise together simultaneously, called the co-existent cause; third, the homogeneous cause, where good produces good, and evil or indeterminate [produce] the same; fourth, the universal cause, where the eleven pervasive defilements produce all afflictions, hence called universal; fifth, the retributive cause, where wholesome and unwholesome phenomena can produce suffering or pleasant karmic retribution, serving as retribution and cause. Encompassing these five causes as conditions, the causal condition is therefore broad.
3. The causal condition is intimate, whereas the other three conditions are remote.
4. The function of the causal condition is obvious.
5. Sentient beings mostly cling to it. Therefore, four verses refute it. The three conditions below are not like this, so only one verse each refutes them.

Question: Based on what did Piṅgala understand and divide this into general and specific? Answer: Seeing the text below say 'in multiple conditions, whether detailed or brief,' he knew this concluded the general and specific. Furthermore, seeing that three verses each refuted three conditions, he knew that one verse specifically refuted the causal condition. Master Tanying said: 'Piṅgala was eager in drawing analogies, but inferior in investigating the text.' Now, examining the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, it should be as Master Tanying stated. Master Tanying also said: 'Even if there were a general and specific intention, the one verse on the causal condition would enter into the general, while the subsequent three verses would each refute [one].' For now, we follow Piṅgala in taking the three verses as general and the four verses as specific. The four verses refuting the four conditions form four sections: the first verse refutes via the approach of existence and non-existence; the second via the approach of the three times; the third via the approach of the true nature of phenomena; the fourth via the approach of naturelessness.

However, these four approaches admit of two meanings: first, reciprocal application; second, combined application. Combined application means the four approaches jointly refute one. Reciprocal application means: having obtained the approach of existence and non-existence to refute the causal condition, one can also use the approach of existence and non-existence to refute the immediate condition; having used the three times to refute the immediate condition, one can also use the three times to refute the causal condition, following whatever meaning is expedient. Their positing that clay can produce a vase and grain can produce a sprout is the meaning of the causal condition, so it is appropriate to challenge them via existence and non-existence. Their positing that the preceding thought ceases and the subsequent thought arises is the meaning of the immediate condition, so it is appropriate to challenge them via the three times. Their positing that ordinary and noble persons alike take the mind as that which cognizes and the object as that which is cognized is appropriately challenged via the true nature of phenomena, which transcends subject and object. Their positing that myriad phenomena have an intrinsic nature that can serve as conditions for others is refuted via the approach of naturelessness.

As for 'causes and conditions', this was explained at the beginning of the chapter. Another explanation is: encompassing the five causes as causal conditions, it is therefore called 'causes and conditions'. Someone said: what is intimate is the cause, like a seed of grain; what is remote is the condition, like earth and water; hence they are called 'causes and conditions'. Another said: the cause itself is the condition, distinguished only by contextual meaning, discerning existence from non-existence. Because it has the power of intimate generation regarding the effect, it is the cause; because it has the aspect that the effect can be produced, it is the condition. In the verse, the first three lines generally negate, and the final line concludes the refutation. There are three reasons for this general negation:
1. The preceding verse already refuted existence and non-existence, so there is no need to refute them now, and thus they are directly negated.
2. The phenomenon of causes and conditions is called profound, which is precisely the middle way; how could it be determinately existent or determinately non-existent? They now cling to existence and non-existence rather than causes and conditions; this existence and non-existence is an obstruction to causes and conditions, so they are simply negated.
3. Existence and non-existence are of the type of non-Buddhists: the doctrine of existence in two times is comparable to the Sāṃkhya; the doctrine of non-existence in two times is comparable to the Vaiśeṣika; both existence and non-existence is the same as the Rṣabha school.

Question: Existence and non-existence in the two times was spoken directly by the Buddha; how can it be identical to non-Buddhists? Answer: The non-Buddhists arose earlier and had already posited existence and non-existence; now that the various Buddhist schools cling to them later, how can they be called different? If you say they are different, let us now challenge them: since they claim existence in two times, does the nature of the effect exist only when acting as a cause, or does the nature of the effect already exist before acting as a cause? If the nature of the effect exists only when acting as a cause, then before acting as a cause there is no nature of the effect; one should know that the nature of the effect suddenly turns from non-existence to existence, which is precisely the doctrine of non-existence in two times. If you say that before acting as a cause the nature of the effect already exists, this means it is fundamentally eternal like nirvāṇa; also, before committing the five heinous offenses, the nature of the five heinous offenses would already exist, and before doing the ten wholesome actions, the nature of the ten wholesome actions would already exist.

Question: If there is only the nature and not yet the concrete phenomenon, what fault is there? Answer: This will be refuted later. Question: If one says there is non-existence in the two times, how does the cause lead to the arising of the effect? If it leads to the arising of the effect, then there is an effect that can be led forth, so how could it be non-existent? If it leads forth a non-existent, a non-existent phenomenon is nothing, so how could it be led forth? Therefore, Siṃhanāda said: 'When there is no thorn in empty space, how can one speak of pulling it out?' If one says that although it is non-existent, it has the characteristic of existence, we now ask: does the characteristic of existence emerge as different from non-existence, or has it not emerged and is not different from non-existence? If it emerges as different from non-existence, this is simply existence, so why call it non-existence in two times? If it has not emerged and is not different from non-existence, what characteristic of existence can be discussed? Therefore, we know that both views are identical to those non-Buddhists.