中觀論疏 4.13

4.13

「問曰無去無去者應有住住者」，第二以三時門破住。破住二意：一先破動、今破靜，令悟四儀宛然而未曾動靜；二破住為成破去。上就去門破去，今就住門破去。既其見住則去心必生，今破其住則無靜對動，則去心都息。就中有二：前問、次答。問有二：初領前無去、次問後有住。作此問者凡有三義：一者外人雖知無去而未解無住，故請問之；二者欲舉住證去；三欲有無相待以無去對有住，則是有無相對也。答中三偈四章：初偈明三時門無住；次偈偏釋初門無住；三上半偈重以三時門破去者住、次下半偈類破餘法。初偈上半明二門中無住、下半明無第三門。「去者則不住」，此是正去則無有住。「不去者不住」，無去可待，故無有住。又世間有二種住：一者未住、二者本住。本住者，不去稱之為住，亦是去前住。未住者，息去然後住，亦是去後住。去者不住，破其未住。若正法即有去者而不得住，若其息去即無復去者，令誰住耶？如息五指即無捲可住。次句破本住，易知。第二偈破去者住，偏釋初門。又例上破去，具通別，初門通破住、此門別破住也。又例上應有縱奪門，上奪、今縱也。上半牒而不受、下半正破。破意云：離去法無去人，若有去人即有去法，便不得住。若息去法，即無復去人，令誰住耶？故人義若成便不得住，住義若成即無復有人，進退屈也。又離法無人，汝欲息法令人住者，亦應息人而法住耶？眾事推之，畢竟無住。「去未去無住」，第三舉三時門重破去者住。上是奪門，明去者不得住。今縱，汝必言去者息去法而住者，於何時中住？已去中是已滅，即無住；未去則未有住；去時還墮二門。此猶是捉上三時門破住。至此已來凡四過，用三時門破也。「所有行止法」者，第四類破餘法。問：行止是何法耶？答：生死流轉相續為行，涅槃滅生死流動為止。上以破動靜二儀，今破生死、涅槃兩法，即一切諸法畢竟無遺也。問：品題破去來而不破於來，不題破住及行止，何故破耶？答：品欲釋八不之末，故以去來相對。但去來更無兩體，此望為去、彼觀為來，故破去即破來也。今欲遍窮萬法，故動靜二儀、生死涅槃兩法皆不可得。問：今此破意在何耶？答：令悟此身不動不靜，非生死流轉，亦非涅槃止息，即是以觀發中、因中發觀，於此身心不起凡夫二乘有所得心，常與道合也。

"Question: If there is no going and no goer, there should be staying and a stayer." Second, refuting staying via the approach of the three periods of time. There are two purposes in refuting staying: first, having previously refuted motion, now refuting rest, to cause [one] to realize that while the four deportments are manifest, there has never been motion or rest; second, refuting staying is to complete the refutation of going. Above, going was refuted through the approach of going; now, going is refuted through the approach of staying. Since seeing staying necessarily gives rise to the thought of going, now refuting staying leaves no rest contrasted with motion, and thus thoughts of going cease entirely. Within this there are two [parts]: first the question, next the reply. In the question there are two [parts]: first, accepting the previous non-existence of going; next, asking about the subsequent existence of staying. There are three meanings altogether in asking this question: first, although the opponent knows there is no going, they do not yet understand that there is no staying, hence they ask; second, they wish to present staying to prove going; third, they wish being and non-being to depend on each other, contrasting the non-existence of going with the existence of staying, which sets being and non-being in opposition. In the reply, there are three verses and four sections: the first verse clarifies that there is no staying in the approach of the three periods of time; the second verse specifically explains that there is no staying in the first approach; third, the first half-verse again refutes a goer's staying via the approach of the three periods of time; next, the second half-verse analogously refutes the remaining phenomena. In the first verse, the first half clarifies that there is no staying in two approaches, and the second half clarifies that there is no third approach. "A goer does not stay": this means that when precisely going, there is no staying. "A non-goer does not stay": there is no going to be depended upon, therefore there is no staying. Furthermore, in the world there are two kinds of staying: the first is not-yet-staying, and the second is prior staying. As for "prior staying," not going is termed "staying," which is also staying before going. As for "not-yet-staying," resting from going and then staying, which is also staying after going. "A goer does not stay" refutes their not-yet-staying. If there is a goer at the time of the action itself, they cannot stay; if they rest from going, then there is no longer a goer—who would be made to stay? Just as when relaxing the five fingers, there is no longer a fist to remain. The next line refutes prior staying, which is easy to understand. The second verse refutes a goer's staying, specifically explaining the first approach. Furthermore, following the pattern of the refutation of going above, it contains both general and specific: the first approach generally refutes staying, while this approach specifically refutes staying. Furthermore, following the pattern above, there should be the approaches of concession and denial: above was denial, now is concession. The first half cites without accepting; the second half directly refutes. The intention of the refutation is: apart from the phenomenon of going there is no person who goes; if there is a person who goes, there is the phenomenon of going, and then they cannot stay. If the phenomenon of going ceases, then there is no longer a person who goes—who would be made to stay? Therefore, if the meaning of the person is established, they cannot stay; if the meaning of staying is established, then there is no longer a person: they are defeated whether advancing or retreating. Furthermore, apart from the phenomenon there is no person; if you wish the phenomenon to cease and make the person stay, should you also cease the person and have the phenomenon stay? Examining it through all matters, there is ultimately no staying. "Neither gone nor not-yet-gone stays": third, adducing the approach of the three periods of time to again refute a goer's staying. Above was the approach of denial, clarifying that a goer cannot stay. Now conceding: if you insist that a goer rests from the phenomenon of going and stays, in which of the periods of time do they stay? In the already-gone, it is already perished, so there is no staying; in the not-yet-gone, there is not yet staying; the presently-going still falls into the two approaches. This still seizes upon the approach of the three periods of time from above to refute staying. Up to this point, there are four faults in total, refuted using the approach of the three periods of time. "All phenomena of moving and halting": fourth, analogously refuting the remaining phenomena. Question: What phenomena are "moving and halting"? Answer: The continuous succession of the transmigration of birth-and-death is "moving"; nirvāṇa's extinguishing the flow of birth-and-death is "halting." Above, the two deportments of motion and rest were refuted; now the two phenomena of birth-and-death and nirvāṇa are refuted, so that all phenomena whatsoever are completely exhausted without remainder. Question: The chapter title refutes going and coming, but does not refute coming, nor does the title mention refuting staying or moving and halting; why are these refuted? Answer: The chapter intends to explain the end of the eight negations, and therefore sets going and coming in opposition. However, going and coming do not have two separate substances: viewed from here it is going, observed from there it is coming; therefore refuting going is refuting coming. Now, wishing to comprehensively exhaust the myriad phenomena, both the two deportments of motion and rest and the two phenomena of birth-and-death and nirvāṇa are unfindable. Question: Now, what is the intention of this refutation? Answer: To cause one to realize that this body is neither in motion nor at rest, neither transmigrating in birth-and-death nor ceasing in nirvāṇa; that is, disclosing the middle through contemplation, and generating contemplation from the middle, so that with respect to this body and mind, one does not give rise to the grasping mind of ordinary beings or the two vehicles, but is constantly united with the Way.