中觀論疏 4.3

4.3

問：二十七品為有次第、為無次第？若無次第則顛倒說法，若有次第何故次有〈去來品〉？答：一切經論必有次第，但次第有二：一隨義次、二隨根次。隨根次者凡有三義，隨義次第則有七門，合十意也。隨根次有三義者：一歷法次第，令此觀心於一切法通徹無礙。前雖觀能生所生而不得，今次歷觀去來乃至涅槃。二者眾生取悟不同，自有聞破生滅不能得道，觀去來即便了悟，乃至二十七條義亦如是，以根性不同，是故論主開張諸觀。三者欲釋大乘中要觀，經中或就無生無滅明中道觀行、或就無去來明中道觀行，但佛在世時眾生根利聞略說即得道，末世鈍根聞經略說未解，故論主廣釋之方乃取悟。隨義次第凡有七門者：一明八不為論大宗，〈因緣品〉釋八不之始謂不生不滅、此品解八不之終辨不來不去，始終既明則中間可領，故次因緣以明來去。二者上破四緣，遍破一切法名為總觀，今觀去來，去來是舉足下足色名為別觀，故前以明總、今次別觀也。三者破於去來為成無生。外云因謝滅即是去、果續起即是來，既有去來寧無生滅？數人但有一種三世，謂從未來來現在，從現在謝過去。論人有二種三世：一實法三世，略同數；二假名轉變三世，從過去來現在、現在轉作未來。若無四緣之生，寧有三世來去？故舉去來以成生義，今破去來為成無生觀也。四者有二種觀：一約於事觀。事觀者，觀即目所見動靜去來明無所有；二理觀者，直觀四緣無有生義。問：何故作事理二觀耶？答：青目二周釋八不，作事理二觀釋之。龍樹釋八不，始終亦作二觀，良由事理總該萬化故也，又逐緣所宜也。五者望成實義，前品破生，求實法無從；此撿無去，明假名相續不可得。六者上〈因緣品〉末結無能生之緣、所生之果。外人云：若因果相生畢竟無者，何故現見有去來耶？故次前品末生此章也。七者上品求生不可得，外人便謂：生病息則是去、無生觀生則是來。故生滅之執乃傾，而去來之病便起，故次破去來明本無生病，何所論去？既無生可去，豈有無生可來耶？

Question: Do the twenty-seven chapters have an ordered sequence, or do they lack an ordered sequence? If they lack an ordered sequence, then the teaching of the Dharma would be disordered; if they have an ordered sequence, why is this followed next by the "Examination of Motion"? Answer: All sūtras and treatises must have an ordered sequence, but ordered sequence is of two kinds: first, sequence according to meaning; second, sequence according to faculties. Sequence according to faculties has three meanings, and sequence according to meaning has seven headings, totaling ten points. That sequence according to faculties has three meanings [is as follows]: First, proceeding through the order of dharmas causes this contemplating mind to penetrate all dharmas without obstruction. Although previously contemplating producing causes and produced effects yielded nothing, now in succession one proceeds through the contemplation of motion and rest up to nirvāṇa. Second, sentient beings differ in grasping awakening; some naturally fail to attain the Way upon hearing the refutation of arising and cessation, yet upon contemplating motion and rest they immediately achieve complete awakening, and so on up to the twenty-seven meanings, which are also like this; because their faculties and dispositions differ, the author of the treatise unfolds these various contemplations. Third, wishing to explain the essential contemplations in the Mahāyāna: the sūtras explain the contemplative practice of the middle way either in terms of non-arising and non-cessation, or explain the contemplative practice of the middle way in terms of non-motion. However, when the Buddha was in the world, the faculties of sentient beings were sharp, and hearing an abbreviated exposition they immediately attained the Way; in the degenerate age, those of dull faculties hear an abbreviated exposition in the sūtras and do not understand, so the author of the treatise extensively explains it before they grasp awakening. As for the sequence according to meaning having seven headings: First, explaining that the eight negations are the great core of the treatise: the "Examination of Conditions" explains the beginning of the eight negations, namely non-arising and non-cessation; this chapter explains the end of the eight negations, discerning neither coming nor going. Since the beginning and end are already clarified, the middle can be comprehended; therefore, following conditions, motion and rest are clarified. Second, previously refuting the four conditions comprehensively refuted all dharmas, which is called the general contemplation; now contemplating motion and rest—motion and rest being the forms of raising the foot and lowering the foot—is called the particular contemplation. Thus, previously the general was clarified, and now the particular contemplation follows. Third, refuting motion and rest is done to establish non-arising. Outsiders say that the waning and cessation of the cause is going, and the continuing arising of the effect is coming; since there are going and coming, how could there not be arising and cessation? The Sarvāstivādins have only one kind of three times, saying that from the future one comes to the present, and from the present one passes away into the past. The Sautrāntikas have two kinds of three times: first, the three times of real dharmas, broadly similar to the Sarvāstivādins; second, the three times of transformational provisional designation, coming from the past into the present, and the present transforming into the future. If there were no arising through the four conditions, how could there be coming and going across the three times? Therefore, they cite coming and going to establish the meaning of arising; now refuting coming and going establishes the contemplation of non-arising. Fourth, there are two kinds of contemplation: first, contemplation based on concrete phenomena. Contemplation of concrete phenomena contemplates movement and stillness, coming and going, seen right before one's eyes, clarifying that they do not exist. Second, contemplation of principle directly contemplates the four conditions as lacking the meaning of arising. Question: Why engage in both contemplations of concrete phenomena and principle? Answer: Piṅgala, in two rounds of explaining the eight negations, engaged in the two contemplations of concrete phenomena and principle to explain them. Nāgārjuna, in explaining the eight negations from beginning to end, also engaged in both contemplations, precisely because concrete phenomena and principle comprehensively encompass the myriad transformations, and also in accord with what suits conditions. Fifth, viewed from the perspective of the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, the previous chapter refuted arising, so searching for real dharmas yielded no ground; here examining the absence of going clarifies that the continuity of provisional designations cannot be found. Sixth, the end of the previous "Examination of Conditions" concluded that there are no conditions capable of producing nor effects that are produced. An outsider asks: If mutual production of cause and effect is ultimately non-existent, why do we visibly perceive coming and going? Therefore, following the end of the previous chapter, this section arises. Seventh, the previous chapter searched for arising and it could not be found, so an outsider immediately said: The subsiding of the disease of arising is going, and the arising of the contemplation of non-arising is coming. Thus, the attachment to arising and cessation fell, but the disease of coming and going arose; therefore, next refuting coming and going clarifies that originally there was no disease of arising, so what going could be discussed? Since there is no arising that can go, how could there be non-arising that can come?