中觀論疏 5.17

5.17

有此品來者，從〈因緣〉竟於〈染染〉者，明無所相法，今此一品明無能相，以能相所相不可得則有為空，有為空故無為亦空，為無為空故一切法畢竟空，即是諸法實相，令因此實相發生正觀、滅諸煩惱，故得解脫。所以有此品也。問：正得何解脫耶？答：既明畢竟空，即是佛行處，故《智度論》云「畢竟空是佛所行」。而此論正明一切眾生並令成佛，但畢竟空觀未明故有菩薩，故序云「於菩薩之行、道場之照朗然懸解矣。」二者就薩婆多義明法有三種：一者色法、二者心法、三者非色非心法。因緣已來破色、染者破心，今破三相，破非色非心。三聚名有為，滅此三名無為。有為無為此是法體，有法體故有名字；法體既無，則名亦不立，故名無得物之功、物無應名之實。名無得物之功則非名，物無應名之實即非物，非名非物，名物安在？不知何以目之，強稱實相。因實相生實觀，為眾生故還如實說，故有正觀論三名也。三者上來六情五陰名為別法，三相通遷情陰，稱為通法。上求別法無從、今明通相非有，通別既無即諸法皆畢竟空。所以明畢竟空者，此是十方三世諸佛出世為一大事因緣，即是示真實相。而有三相不同者，此是如幻如夢，隨凡夫故說耳，即是開方便門。三世十方佛唯有示真實、開方便，龍樹正申此二意。所以明此二者，即令識權實二智、入佛知見，故得成佛也。〈三相〉一品既明實權二事，二十七品及三論一切佛法皆亦如是。但今品一周觀行既竟，故寄此品論耳。四者依三解脫門來者，〈六種〉破身相、〈染染者品〉破心相，此二破於所相；今一品次破能相，即眾相都寂。又〈六種〉破空相，〈染品〉及〈三相品〉破於有相，破空有二相即一切相空。五者〈因緣品〉就四緣求生不得，釋八不無生；今此品觀三相不可得，亦為成無生。所以始終皆明無生者，為欲顯七品是一周大乘觀行已竟，都為顯無生故也。六者言次相接，從〈染者品〉生者，〈染品〉明無世間之因，外云三相是一切有為法因，今既有三相即有萬化之果，故有此品來也。問：云何為三相耶？答：薩婆多云離法體外別有三相，故法體通於三聚。而三相但是非色非心，屬行陰攝。成實、僧祇等云：離法體外無別有相，即法起為生、法停為住、法謝稱滅也。問：三相為是有為、為是無為？答：數論同云三相是有為法。毘婆闍提云：有為之法體不自固，何能相他？遂能相他，當知三相是無為法，猶如虛空能生萬化。次曇摩崛云：生住二相是有為法，滅相是無為法，故三相亦有為亦無為也。問：三相為一時、為前後？答：譬喻部云前生、次住、後滅，故三相前後。《成實論》文云「三有為法，皆在現在。」《淨名經》云「汝等比丘即時亦生亦老亦死。」觀此經論是一時有。阿毘曇云：體即同時，用有前後。如三相與法必俱，法在未來相亦未來、法起現在相亦現在、法謝過去相亦同謝，故有為法必與相共俱，故言體同時，而生用之時未有住用、住用之時生用已廢，故用前後也。問：三相為是時名、為是法稱？答：諸部並計三相是法。但開善言：三相既能生法，是時名也。小莊嚴榮法師云：三相是法體名，而時無別體。莊嚴云：三相非法非時，是時中精義。問：三相為當體受名、為從用為目？答：一云三相能生、法體是所生，從所生作名也。次云：從用受名，以有能生他之用故名生也。《婆沙》「問云：若一切眾生悉有滅相者，一切眾生並應有死屍現。答：若根法滅、非根法生，即有死屍現。今根法滅、還根法生，故尸不現。二者眾生業力持，故尸不現。」問：何故破三相耶？答：有四義。一者執三相者多是小乘，唯得生空、不得法空，謂決定有三相；今令其信諸法空，故破三相。二者復有小乘人如成實等亦得法空，但不知三相本性空；今令其信三相本性自空，故破三相也。三者大小內外作三相義互相破斥，義自不成；今顯其不成之相，是故云破耳。其還是立相者自破，非論主破也，如執無別體者破有別體、執有別體者破無別體。四者有所得小乘人名半字教，所以然者，佛說生滅令遠離二邊、不著中道，名為滿字。而有所得人雖破於常，而著三相無常，故是半字。如呵迦旃延云「無以生滅心行說實相法」。不生不滅是無常義，佛說無常為破於常，亦捨生滅無常，故不生不滅是無常義也。問：佛說無常破常，復捨生滅無常。今何故偏云不生不滅是無常義也？答：迦旃延已知無有於常。而未達無有生滅無常。今欲令其進捨生滅無常，故云不生不滅是無常義也。《智度論》與此意同，故云「若無方便破常而著無常，若有方便即破常不著無常。」龍樹破外人，如淨名呵旃延不異。又諸部有二種失：一得語不得意、二語意俱失。得語不得意者，佛說三相令捨常，不著無常乃至亦常無常、非常非非常，心無依止即便得道。而諸部但知捨常、不能捨無常，故失佛意。二者語意俱失，非但不能兩捨，於三相中種種推斥，更起愛見增長煩惱，是故失也。論主今直觀三相畢竟不可得，三相既去不三亦去，乃至此去無所去，即便得道。離上二失，故破三相也。問：佛凡有言說悉依二諦，論主隨佛學亦依二諦，今就何諦明無三相？答：若就二諦門，即破二種三相：一破性實三，明世諦中道；二破假三，明真諦中道也。

As for why this chapter follows: from Chapter [1 on] "Causes and Conditions" through Chapter [6 on] "Passion and the Impassioned", the object of characterization was explained as non-existent. Now this single chapter explains that the characterizing mark does not exist. Because characterizing mark and object of characterization are unattainable, conditioned phenomena are empty; because conditioned phenomena are empty, unconditioned phenomena are also empty; because conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are empty, all phenomena are ultimately empty, which is the true nature of all phenomena. Causing right contemplation to arise and all defilements to be extinguished in reliance upon this true nature, liberation is thereby attained. This is why this chapter follows.
Question: Exactly what liberation is attained?
Answer: Since ultimate emptiness has been elucidated, this is the sphere of the Buddha's practice. Therefore the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: "Ultimate emptiness is the sphere practiced by the Buddha." And this treatise directly explains that all sentient beings are equally caused to attain Buddhahood; it is only because the contemplation of ultimate emptiness has not yet been clarified that there are bodhisattvas. Hence the preface states: "Regarding the practice of bodhisattvas and the illumination of the site of awakening, [their significance] was clearly and profoundly resolved."
Second, in terms of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine, phenomena are explained to be of three kinds: first, material phenomena; second, mental phenomena; third, phenomena that are neither material nor mental. From [the chapter on] "Causes and Conditions" onward, material phenomena were refuted; [the chapter on] "The Impassioned" refuted mental phenomena; now, refuting the three marks refutes what is neither material nor mental. The three aggregates are termed "conditioned"; the extinction of these three is termed "unconditioned". Conditioned and unconditioned—these are the essences of phenomena. Because there are essences of phenomena, there are names; since the essence of a phenomenon is non-existent, the name also cannot be established. Therefore, names lack the capacity to capture things, and things lack the reality to correspond to names. When names lack the capacity to capture things, they are not names; when things lack the reality to correspond to names, they are not things. Neither name nor thing—where do name and thing reside? Not knowing how to designate it, one forcibly calls it "the true nature". In reliance upon the true nature, true contemplation arises; for the sake of sentient beings, it is in turn explained in accord with reality. Therefore, there are the three names of "treatise of right contemplation".
Third, heretofore the six sense organs and the five aggregates were called particular phenomena; the three marks universally alter the sense organs and aggregates, and are called universal phenomena. Above, seeking particular phenomena yielded no basis; now, universal marks are explained to be non-existent. Since universal and particular are both non-existent, all phenomena are ultimately empty. The reason why ultimate emptiness is explained is that this is the one great cause and condition for which the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three times appear in the world, which is to reveal the real mark. As for the difference in the three marks, this is like an illusion or a dream, spoken merely in accommodation of ordinary persons, which is opening the gate of expedients. The Buddhas of the three times and ten directions only reveal the real and open the expedient; Nāgārjuna precisely elucidates these two intentions. The reason for explaining these two is to cause one to recognize the two wisdoms of expedient and real, enter the Buddha's knowledge and vision, and thereby attain Buddhahood. Just as the single chapter on "The Three Marks" explains the two matters of the real and expedient, so too are the twenty-seven chapters and all the Buddhist teachings of the three treatises. It is only because one round of meditative contemplation is concluded in this chapter that this discussion is lodged here.
Fourth, proceeding according to the three gates of liberation: Chapter [5 on] "The Six Elements" refuted the marks of the body; Chapter [6 on] "Passion and the Impassioned" refuted the marks of the mind. These two refuted the object of characterization. Now this one chapter next refutes the characterizing mark, so that all marks are entirely silenced. Furthermore, "The Six Elements" refuted the mark of emptiness; the chapter on "Passion" and the chapter on "The Three Marks" refute the mark of existence. Refuting the two marks of emptiness and existence means that all marks are empty.
Fifth, the chapter on "Causes and Conditions" sought origination with respect to the four conditions and could not find it, explaining the "non-arising" of the eight negations. Now this chapter contemplates the three marks as unattainable, also to establish non-arising. The reason why non-arising is explained from beginning to end is to show that these seven chapters complete one round of Mahāyāna meditative contemplation, all for the purpose of revealing non-arising.
Sixth, connecting the sequence of words as arising from the chapter on "The Impassioned": the chapter on "The Impassioned" explained that worldly causes do not exist. An opponent says that the three marks are the cause of all conditioned phenomena, and now that there are the three marks, there are the fruits of myriad transformations; therefore this chapter follows.
Question: What are the three marks?
Answer: The Sarvāstivādins say that apart from the essence of a phenomenon there exist separate three marks; thus the essence of a phenomenon pervades the three aggregates, while the three marks are merely neither material nor mental, subsumed under the aggregate of formations. The *Tattvasiddhi*, Mahāsāṃghika, and others say: Apart from the essence of a phenomenon there are no separate marks; the arising of the phenomenon is origination, the enduring of the phenomenon is abiding, and the passing away of the phenomenon is called cessation.
Question: Are the three marks conditioned or unconditioned?
Answer: The Abhidharmakośa and treatises agree in saying that the three marks are conditioned phenomena. The Vibhajyavādins say: The essence of a conditioned phenomenon is not self-secure; how could it characterize another? Since it can characterize another, one should know that the three marks are unconditioned phenomena, just as space can produce myriad transformations. Next, the Dharmaguptakas say: The two marks of origination and abiding are conditioned phenomena, while the mark of cessation is an unconditioned phenomenon; thus the three marks are both conditioned and unconditioned.
Question: Do the three marks occur simultaneously or sequentially?
Answer: The Dārṣṭāntikas say: First origination, next abiding, and later cessation; hence the three marks are sequential. The text of the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* says: "The three conditioned phenomena are all present in the current moment." The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra* says: "You monks at that very moment also originate, also grow old, and also die." Considering this sūtra and treatise, they exist simultaneously. The Abhidharma says: Their essences are simultaneous, but their functions are sequential. For instance, the three marks and the phenomenon are necessarily concurrent: when the phenomenon is in the future, the marks are also in the future; when the phenomenon arises in the present, the marks are also in the present; when the phenomenon passes into the past, the marks also pass away with it. Therefore conditioned phenomena are necessarily concurrent with the marks; hence it is said that their essences are simultaneous. But at the time of the function of origination, the function of abiding does not yet exist; at the time of the function of abiding, the function of origination has already ceased. Thus their functions are sequential.
Question: Are the three marks designations for time, or appellations for phenomena?
Answer: The various schools all posit that the three marks are phenomena. But Master Kaishan said: Since the three marks can produce phenomena, they are designations for time. Dharma Master Rong of Xiao Zhuangyan said: The three marks are names for the essences of phenomena, and time has no separate essence. Zhuangyan said: The three marks are neither phenomena nor time; they are the essential meaning within time.
Question: Do the three marks receive their names from their essences, or are they designated based on their functions?
Answer: One [view] says: The three marks are what can produce, and the essence of the phenomenon is what is produced; their names are made based on what is produced. Another says: They receive their names based on their functions; because they possess the function of being able to produce others, [one] is named origination.
The *Mahāvibhāṣā* "asks: If all sentient beings entirely possess the mark of cessation, all sentient beings should simultaneously manifest as corpses. Answer: If sensory-faculty phenomena cease and non-faculty phenomena arise, a corpse is manifested. Now, when sensory-faculty phenomena cease, sensory-faculty phenomena arise in turn, and so corpses do not manifest. Second, because the karmic power of sentient beings sustains them, corpses do not manifest."
Question: Why are the three marks refuted?
Answer: There are four reasons. First, those who grasp at the three marks are mostly of the Hīnayāna; they only attain the emptiness of persons and do not attain the emptiness of phenomena, asserting that there definitely exist three marks. Now, to cause them to believe in the emptiness of all phenomena, the three marks are refuted. Second, there are also Hīnayāna people, such as in the *Tattvasiddhi*, who also attain the emptiness of phenomena, but do not know that the three marks are intrinsically empty by their original nature. Now, to cause them to believe that the three marks are by their original nature empty, the three marks are refuted. Third, the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, Buddhists and non-Buddhists, formulate doctrines of the three marks and mutually refute each other, so their doctrines fail on their own; now, displaying the characteristics of their failure is why it is called 'refutation'. It is simply that those who establish the marks refute themselves; it is not the treatise master's refutation. It is like those who hold there is no separate essence refuting those who hold there is a separate essence, and those who hold there is a separate essence refuting those who hold there is no separate essence. Fourth, Hīnayāna practitioners with acquisition are called the half-letter teaching. Why is this? The Buddha taught origination and cessation to cause one to leave behind the two extremes and not grasp at the middle way; this is called the full letter. But practitioners with acquisition, although they refute permanence, grasp at the impermanence of the three marks; hence it is the half letter. As when Kātyāyana was admonished: "Do not explain the Dharma of the true nature with a mind that engages in origination and cessation." Neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence. The Buddha taught impermanence to refute permanence, and also to abandon origination-and-cessation impermanence; therefore neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence.
Question: The Buddha taught impermanence to refute permanence, and also abandoned origination-and-cessation impermanence. Why is it now specifically said that neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence?
Answer: Kātyāyana already knew that permanence does not exist, but had not yet realized that origination-and-cessation impermanence does not exist. Now, wishing to cause him to advance and abandon origination-and-cessation impermanence, it is said that neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* agrees with this idea, saying: "If one lacks expedients, one refutes permanence and grasps at impermanence; if one has expedients, one refutes permanence and does not grasp at impermanence." Nāgārjuna's refutation of non-Buddhists is no different from Vimalakīrti's admonishment of Kātyāyana. Furthermore, the various schools have two kinds of faults: first, obtaining the words but not obtaining the meaning; second, losing both words and meaning. As for obtaining the words but not obtaining the meaning: the Buddha taught the three marks to cause one to abandon permanence, not grasp at impermanence, and so forth up to both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor non-permanent; when the mind has no reliance, one immediately attains the Way. Yet the various schools only know how to abandon permanence and cannot abandon impermanence; hence they lose the Buddha's meaning. As for losing both words and meaning: not only are they unable to abandon both, but within the three marks they make various deductions and refutations, further giving rise to craving and views, increasing defilements; this is why they are lost. The treatise master now directly contemplates the three marks as ultimately unattainable: once the three marks are removed, the non-three is also removed, and so forth up to this going having nowhere to go, whereupon one immediately attains the Way. Leaving behind the above two faults, he therefore refutes the three marks.
Question: Whenever the Buddha has spoken, it has entirely relied upon the two truths; the treatise master, following and learning from the Buddha, also relies upon the two truths. Now, with respect to which truth is the non-existence of the three marks explained?
Answer: In terms of the gate of the two truths, two kinds of three marks are refuted: first, refuting the real intrinsic three, elucidating the middle way of conventional truth; second, refuting the provisional three, elucidating the middle way of ultimate truth.