中觀論疏 5.19

5.19

初段又二：第一正破三相、第二段次破法體。初又二：前總破三相、次別破。總別各三。總中三者，初為無為門破、次聚散門破、三窮無窮門破。若直立三相，即以六門責之。若諸部有此六計者，三偈即破此六人也。「三相無決定」者，一意云：佛破常病故說三相，常病既捨三亦不留，故三非決定。二者依下偈明此三相，如夢如幻無有定相，汝不應言決定有三。三者由所相故有能相，即能不自能故無能，所以無定。四者三相互相因待，即知無自性，故不可得也。五如下為無為聚散等門求之不得，故無定也。初偈上半就有為中求生不得、下半就無為中求生不得，即畢竟無生，故為無為空，後明畢竟空。又上半破生是有為，此破毘曇、成實及曇摩崛部義；下半破生是無為，破毘婆闍婆提義也。生是有為即有二失：一者法體是有為既具三相，生是有為亦具三相，即三中之一復更具三，是即無窮。二者生具三相即自相違，相違即都無三也。下半破生是無為有三失：一者無相破，有為有差別可得具三，無為無差別即無有三。既無有三，用何物作有為相，二者彼計無為有別體，能為有為作相；今明止生故名無生，如瓶破名無瓶，無有別物為他作相。三者非相破，無為法自可為無為作相，不應為有為作相。若無為為有為作相，有為應為無為作相。又無為為有為作相，如馬為牛作相、水為火作相，此墮非相過也。又上半明生是有為，得有為而墮無窮及相違；下半明生是無為，免無窮及相違而招前三失，故進退墮負厝情無地。第二聚散破來者，亦得通破為無為。汝言三相是無為者，為聚為散？若無為不可聚散，亦無為不可生滅。若別義者，從此竟品但破有為、不破無為，以計有為者多是小乘根本義，又符大小乘經，又盛行天竺也。又論破二種人：一不曾學問，但知自身有生老病死、外物生住變壞，於此內外起貪嗔癡，故造三有業受生老病死。論主直為此說無三相。汝言有三相者，為是有為、為是無為？乃至聚之與散，以一切門求無從，即知內外諸法皆畢竟空。其人即便見實相、生正觀、斷煩惱。此是淨器人，翻易悟也。二者為內外學理之人，種種推斥求並無從。以學問之流執有三相，不知無三說三，亦不知說三為明無三，故不得二智、不入佛知見、不得成佛。論主憐愍諸部求三無從，而說有三者此是無三說三，說三意在無三，即生二智、入佛知見。三世十方佛出世大意如此，四依出世大意亦然，以是故開諸門破三相也。又執有三相多是小乘人，聞說三作三解；今破三明三相無，三相無故有為無，有為無故無為亦無，即諸法畢竟空是佛行處。令小乘人迴小入大，悟三相畢竟空得實智，即知佛昔於小乘中說有三是方便得權智，具解開方便顯真實也。又《智度論》云「昔說五眾是無常生滅，今說五眾是非常非無常分。」則大小乘教經中直唱非常非無常，而利根者即悟，學大乘人鈍根者未了，今廣釋之，求三相有為不得，非無常；無為亦無，故非常。令始行菩薩悟解大乘非常非無常，識中道發生正觀，是故破三相。

The first section also has two parts: first, properly refuting the three marks; second, next refuting the substance of phenomena (dharmas). The first also has two parts: first, a general refutation of the three marks; next, a specific refutation. The general and the specific each have three [aspects]. Among the general, the three are: first, refutation through the gateway of conditioned and unconditioned; next, refutation through the gateway of aggregation and dispersion; third, refutation through the gateway of finitude and infinitude. If one merely posits the three marks, one takes them to task through six gateways. If the various schools hold these six views, the three verses then refute these six kinds of people. Regarding 'the three marks have no determinate status': in one sense, it means that the Buddha spoke of the three marks in order to refute the illness of permanence; since the illness of permanence has already been relinquished, the three are not retained either, and therefore the three are not determinate. In the second sense, according to the verses below, these three marks are like dreams and illusions, having no determinate mark; you should not say that the three determinately exist. In the third sense, because of the marked there is that which marks; thus that which marks is not of itself that which marks, and so there is no mark-maker; therefore there is no determinateness. In the fourth sense, the three marks are mutually interdependent; thus one knows they are devoid of intrinsic nature, and therefore they cannot be apprehended. In the fifth sense, as sought below through the gateways of conditioned, unconditioned, aggregation, dispersion, and so forth, they cannot be apprehended, and therefore they are not determinate. The first half of the first verse seeks arising in what is conditioned and does not apprehend it; the second half seeks arising in what is unconditioned and does not apprehend it; thus there is ultimately no arising, and therefore both the conditioned and unconditioned are empty, subsequently clarifying ultimate emptiness. Furthermore, the first half refutes that arising is conditioned, which refutes the doctrines of the Abhidharma, the Tattvasiddhi, and the Dharmaguptaka school; the second half refutes that arising is unconditioned, which refutes the doctrine of the Vibhajyavādin. If arising is conditioned, there are two errors: first, since the substance of phenomena is conditioned and already possesses the three marks, if arising is also conditioned it must likewise possess the three marks; then one of the three would again possess three more, and this would result in an infinite regress. Second, if arising possesses the three marks, it is self-contradictory; being contradictory, none of the three exist at all. The second half refutes that arising is unconditioned, which entails three errors: first, refutation by being devoid of marks: conditioned things have distinctions and can possess the three, whereas the unconditioned has no distinctions and therefore does not have the three. Since it does not have the three, by what entity could it serve as the mark of the conditioned? Second, they hold that the unconditioned has a distinct substance that can serve as a mark for the conditioned; here we clarify that merely stopping arising is called non-arising, just as the breaking of a vase is called the absence of a vase, and there is no distinct entity that serves as a mark for another. Third, refutation by not being a mark: unconditioned phenomena might naturally serve as a mark for the unconditioned, but they should not serve as a mark for the conditioned. If the unconditioned served as a mark for the conditioned, the conditioned ought to serve as a mark for the unconditioned. Furthermore, if the unconditioned served as a mark for the conditioned, it would be like a horse serving as a mark for an ox, or water serving as a mark for fire; this falls into the error of not being a mark. Furthermore, the first half clarifies that if arising is conditioned, one obtains the conditioned but falls into infinite regress and contradiction; the second half clarifies that if arising is unconditioned, one avoids infinite regress and contradiction but incurs the previous three errors; therefore, in progressing or retreating, one falls into defeat, leaving one's intentions with no ground to stand on. The second refutation, that of aggregation and dispersion, can also generally refute the conditioned and unconditioned. If you say that the three marks are unconditioned, are they aggregated or dispersed? If the unconditioned cannot be aggregated or dispersed, the unconditioned also cannot arise or cease. In a specific sense, from this to the end of the chapter it only refutes the conditioned and does not refute the unconditioned, because those who hold to the conditioned are mostly the foundational doctrine of the Hīnayāna, and it also accords with both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras, and was widely prevalent in India. Furthermore, the treatise refutes two kinds of people: the first kind has never studied; they merely know that their own bodies have birth, old age, sickness, and death, and external objects have arising, abiding, alteration, and destruction. Regarding these internal and external things, they give rise to greed, anger, and delusion, and so they create the karma of the three realms of existence and undergo birth, old age, sickness, and death. The treatise master straightforwardly speaks of the non-existence of the three marks for them. If you say there are three marks, are they conditioned or are they unconditioned? Down to whether they are aggregated or dispersed: seeking through all gateways yields no basis, and one immediately knows that all internal and external phenomena are ultimately empty. That person immediately sees the true reality of phenomena, gives rise to correct contemplation, and cuts off defilements. This is a person of pure capacity, who on the contrary awakens easily. The second kind consists of people who study principles internally and externally; through various kinds of deduction and refutation, their seeking yields no basis at all. Because such scholars grasp onto the existence of the three marks, failing to know that the three are spoken of in the absence of three, and failing to know that speaking of three is to clarify the absence of three, they do not attain the two wisdoms, do not enter the Buddha's vision and knowledge, and cannot attain Buddhahood. The treatise master has pity on the various schools whose seeking of the three yields no basis; that he speaks of the existence of the three is speaking of three where there are no three, and the intention in speaking of three lies in there being no three, so that they will give rise to the two wisdoms and enter the Buddha's vision and knowledge. Such is the great intention of the Buddhas of the three periods of time and the ten directions in appearing in the world, and such is the great intention of the four reliances in appearing in the world; therefore, he opens various gateways to refute the three marks. Furthermore, those who grasp onto the three marks are mostly people of the Hīnayāna, who hear the three spoken of and understand them as three; here we refute the three to clarify that the three marks do not exist. Because the three marks do not exist, the conditioned does not exist; because the conditioned does not exist, the unconditioned also does not exist; thus the ultimate emptiness of all phenomena is the sphere of the Buddha's practice. He causes people of the Hīnayāna to turn from the small and enter the great, to awaken to the ultimate emptiness of the three marks and attain the real wisdom, thereby knowing that the Buddha's past teaching of the three in the Hīnayāna was an expedient means, and so they attain the expedient wisdom, fully understanding the opening of expedients to reveal the real. Furthermore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'In the past it was said that the five aggregates are impermanent, arising and ceasing; now it is said that the five aggregates are non-permanent and non-impermanent.' Thus in the teachings and sūtras of both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, it is directly proclaimed that they are non-permanent and non-impermanent; those of sharp faculties immediately awaken, but those of dull faculties who study the Mahāyāna do not yet understand. Now it is explained extensively: seeking the three marks as conditioned is impossible, hence they are not impermanent; the unconditioned is also non-existent, hence they are not permanent. This causes beginning bodhisattvas to awaken to and understand that the Mahāyāna is non-permanent and non-impermanent, to recognise the middle way, and to give rise to correct contemplation; therefore, he refutes the three marks.