中觀論疏 5.24

5.24

問：今聚散門求三相不得，佛大小乘經為說聚、為說散？答：昔羅什未度，未有正人之與正法。羅什至關，人法既來，諸方勝人一時雲聚。匡山遠法師不來，遣使問羅什三相聚散等義。羅什答云：佛直說內身生老病死念念不住，外物萎黃彫落亦非恒有，令人不起常見厭世修道耳，實不說一時異時。異時一時，此是旃延等意，云何將所破義來見問耶？今更責此言。《無量義經》三重明四相，初直說四相、次明念念不住、次明即時生住異滅。《淨名》亦云「即時生老病死」。此是佛說四相一時，云何羅什言非佛說？答：佛經明即時生住滅者，亦不立四相一時並起，但為破眾生保常心耳。眾生若聞一念暫住，即一念之常，即計常心不盡；今明無一念住，即計常心盡，是故明即時生滅耳。佛意既明無有常，寧有無常耶？即令悟非常非無常，二見永息也。又既明無一念住，即是說無生義。夫論有一念住即有物，既無一念住即無物，無物即畢竟空，故云不生不滅是無常義。即佛一言之中常無常並破，上根者聞便得道，不達者便謂四相一時，是故為論主破。又論主破即是申一念不住之言，令諸部解佛經意也。上半牒而總非、下半作難釋也。破聚正破薩婆多義，以有為必三相扶共起故也；破散破譬喻部三剎那立三相義也。又此一偈並破毘曇，毘曇師二說：一云體同時、用前後，用前後是散、體同時是聚。二云體用同時，但當生用時生用即強，餘相用弱耳。故此偈具破之也。「云何於一處」，釋上散義。一處者，一所相法處，不得三相前後生也。若所相法處三相前後生者，即有不備三相過。如一念法，若有生時未有滅用，生用若廢即一念法便廢。當知此一念法但有於生，遂不經於住滅，故此一念法不備三相。然有為法必備三相，而今不備，故非有為。又前念法體與生俱廢，後念滅起便無所滅。既無所滅之法，云何有能滅之相耶？又正意是破其三相不備三相義。當一剎那唯有生，即此生相不備三相。然有為法無有不備三相，汝生是有為，云何不備三耶？若三相一時，此即相違，俱無三也。又若體同時起，得相扶之義而墮相違；若前後生，乃免相違而招法體不備三相之失，亦進退墮負。問：數論師云體同時故勉不備三相，用前後故離相違失，具此二門乃成彼義。云何破耶？今問：體同時為有三相起、為未起耶？若其已起，即應已違；若未相違，即應未起。若言體起而用未起，亦應體違而用未違。又問：體起時為來現在、為未來現在？若來現在即是有用，何名為體？若未來現在，即生是現在、滅是未來，何名同時？又問：既一剎那時，云何有體起而用未起？此乃是三剎那，何名為一？彼答云：一剎那中有三分，初分為生、次分為住、後分為滅，故得為三相。問：剎那初名生者，初有中後、為未有耶？若初未有中後，即生時無住無滅，云何言三有為法皆現在耶？若皆現，即皆初；若不皆初，即不現。又無住滅即無中後，無中後即無初。又若初是生而中後非生，亦應初有而中後非有。又三相無異時，何故生前滅後，不云滅前生後？又汝滅相已能扶生，即應已能滅生；未能滅即未能扶也。又能滅生方有滅，未能滅生即無有滅。如《十二門論》云「若能識即有識，不能識即無識。能熱故有火，不能熱即無火」也。長行釋一處。云何於一處，或有有相或有無相。問：譬喻部立三相前後，不避此責，何以過之？答：偈中已顯一意竟。然薩婆多立三相盛行天竺，五百羅漢評而用之。所以立一時者，彼云有為無獨起必須相扶。故《雜心》云「至竟無能生，用離等侶故。」又與佛經多相應，《淨名》云「汝今即時亦生亦老亦死」，《無量義經》云「菩薩又觀一切法即時生住異滅」。成實亦云：三有為法皆在現在，即知三相是同時義。今借同時，破其前後。汝若言三相前後者，即生時無有住滅，何得經言生時即有住滅耶？以違大小乘經即是破也。又前後者云何得相扶起耶？

Question: Now, seeking the three marks through the approaches of conjunction and disjunction fails. Do the Buddha's Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras teach conjunction, or do they teach disjunction? Answer: In the past, before Kumārajīva crossed over [to China], there were neither the right person nor the right Dharma. When Kumārajīva arrived at the pass, with both the person and the Dharma having arrived, eminent persons from all quarters gathered at once like clouds. Master Huiyuan of Mount Kuang did not come, but sent an envoy to ask Kumārajīva about the meaning of the conjunction and disjunction of the three marks, and so on. Kumārajīva replied: "The Buddha simply stated that in the internal body, birth, old age, sickness, and death do not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment, and that external things wither, yellow, and fall, not existing permanently either, only so as to cause people not to give rise to views of permanence, to become weary of the world, and to cultivate the Path. He truly did not speak of simultaneousness or different times. Different times and simultaneousness are the notions of Kātyāyana and others. Why do you bring positions that are to be refuted and ask me about them?" Now we further examine these words. The *Sūtra of Immeasurable Meanings* explains the four marks in three layers: first, it simply states the four marks; next, it clarifies that they do not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment; next, it clarifies that at the very same moment there are birth, abiding, change, and cessation. The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* also says: "At the very same moment there are birth, old age, sickness, and death." This is the Buddha teaching that the four marks are simultaneous. Why did Kumārajīva say it was not spoken by the Buddha? Answer: When the Buddha's sūtras clarify simultaneous birth, abiding, and cessation, they also do not establish the four marks arising simultaneously together; it is merely to demolish sentient beings' mindset of clinging to permanence. If sentient beings hear of a single thought-moment momentarily abiding, that is the permanence of a single thought-moment, and their mindset of calculating permanence would not be exhausted. Now by clarifying that not a single thought-moment abides, the mindset of calculating permanence is exhausted; therefore, he merely clarifies simultaneous birth and cessation. Since the Buddha's intention clarified that there is no permanence, could there be impermanence? He immediately brings them to awaken to neither permanence nor impermanence, so that the two views cease forever. Furthermore, since he clarifies that not a single thought-moment abides, this is expounding the meaning of non-arising. For if one maintains that there is the abiding of a single thought-moment, then there is a thing; since not a single thought-moment abides, there is no thing; having no thing is ultimate emptiness. Thus it is said that non-arising and non-cessation is the meaning of impermanence. That is, within a single word of the Buddha, both permanence and impermanence are refuted together: those of superior faculties hear it and immediately attain the Path, while those who do not understand claim that the four marks are simultaneous. Therefore, they are refuted by the author of the treatise. Furthermore, the author of the treatise's refutation is precisely elucidating the words "not abiding for a single thought-moment," causing the various sects to understand the Buddha's intention in the sūtras. The first half [of the verse] recites and generally rejects [the opponent's view], while the second half raises objections and explains. Refuting conjunction directly refutes the Sarvāstivāda view, because conditioned phenomena must arise supported together by the three marks. Refuting disjunction refutes the Dārṣṭāntika view of establishing three marks in three kṣaṇas. Moreover, this single verse refutes the Abhidharma as well. Abhidharma masters have two theories: first, they say substance is simultaneous while function is sequential—function being sequential is disjunction, and substance being simultaneous is conjunction. Second, they say substance and function are simultaneous, but at the time of the function of birth, the function of birth is strong and the functions of the other marks are weak. Therefore, this verse refutes both completely. "How, in a single locus" explains the meaning of disjunction above. "A single locus" means the locus of a single characterized phenomenon; the three marks cannot arise sequentially. If in the locus of the characterized phenomenon the three marks were to arise sequentially, there would be the fault of not being equipped with the three marks. Take a phenomenon of a single thought-moment: if at the time it has birth it does not yet have the function of cessation, once the function of birth ceases, that phenomenon of a single thought-moment would then cease. One should know that this phenomenon of a single thought-moment would only have birth and never undergo abiding and cessation; therefore, this phenomenon of a single thought-moment is not equipped with the three marks. Yet conditioned phenomena must be equipped with the three marks, and now it is not equipped with them, so it is not conditioned. Furthermore, when the substance of the phenomenon of the preceding thought-moment ceases along with birth, when cessation arises in the subsequent thought-moment, there is nothing left to cease. Since there is no phenomenon to be ceased, how could there be a mark capable of ceasing it? Moreover, the direct intention is to refute their thesis that the three marks are not equipped with the three marks. When in a single kṣaṇa there is only birth, this mark of birth is not equipped with the three marks. Yet among conditioned phenomena there are none not equipped with the three marks; your birth is conditioned, so why is it not equipped with the three? If the three marks were simultaneous, this would be contradictory, and neither would have the three. Furthermore, if the substances arise simultaneously, one obtains the meaning of mutual support but falls into contradiction; if they arise sequentially, one avoids contradiction but incurs the fault that the substance of the phenomenon is not equipped with the three marks. Thus, advancing or retreating, one falls into defeat. Question: The Abhidharma masters say that because substances are simultaneous, they avoid not being equipped with the three marks, and because functions are sequential, they are free from the fault of contradiction; possessing both approaches establishes their doctrine. How do you refute it? Now we ask: When substances are simultaneous, have the three marks arisen, or have they not yet arisen? If they have already arisen, they should already be in contradiction; if they are not yet in contradiction, they should not yet have arisen. If you say substance arises but function has not yet arisen, then substance should also be in contradiction while function is not yet in contradiction. Again we ask: When the substance arises, has it arrived at the present, or has it not yet arrived at the present? If it has arrived at the present, then it has function, so how could it be called "substance"? If it has not yet arrived at the present, then birth is present and cessation is future; how can they be called simultaneous? Again we ask: Since it is the time of a single kṣaṇa, how can substance arise while function has not yet arisen? This would be three kṣaṇas; how could it be called one? They reply: In a single kṣaṇa there are three parts: the first part is birth, the middle part is abiding, and the final part is cessation; hence they constitute three marks. We ask: If the beginning of the kṣaṇa is called birth, does the beginning have a middle and an end, or does it not yet have them? If the beginning does not yet have a middle and an end, then at the time of birth there is no abiding and no cessation; how can you say that the three conditioned phenomena are all present? If all are present, then all are the beginning; if not all are the beginning, then they are not present. Furthermore, if there are no abiding and cessation, there is no middle and end; if there is no middle and end, there is no beginning. Furthermore, if the beginning is birth while the middle and end are not birth, then the beginning should also exist while the middle and end do not exist. Furthermore, if the three marks do not exist at different times, why is birth prior and cessation posterior, instead of saying cessation is prior and birth posterior? Furthermore, if your mark of cessation were already able to support birth, it should already be able to cease birth; if it is not yet able to cease it, it is not yet able to support it. Furthermore, only when it can cease birth is there cessation; if it cannot yet cease birth, there is no cessation. As the *Dvādaśamukha-śāstra* says: "If it can cognize, there is consciousness; if it cannot cognize, there is no consciousness. Because it can heat, there is fire; if it cannot heat, there is no fire." The prose explains "a single locus." How, in a single locus, could there sometimes be a mark and sometimes no mark? Question: The Dārṣṭāntikas establish that the three marks are sequential and do not avoid this objection; how do you overcome them? Answer: One meaning has already been made clear in the verse. However, the Sarvāstivāda's establishment of the three marks was widespread in India, evaluated and adopted by the five hundred arhats. The reason they established simultaneity is that they said conditioned phenomena do not arise alone and must support each other. Hence the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* says: "Ultimately nothing can produce, because function is separated from its companions." Moreover, this accords well with the Buddha's sūtras: the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* says, "You now, at the very same moment, are born, grow old, and die"; the *Sūtra of Immeasurable Meanings* says, "The bodhisattva further observes all phenomena at the very same moment being born, abiding, changing, and ceasing." The *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* also says: "The three conditioned phenomena are all in the present." From this we know that the three marks mean simultaneity. Now, borrowing simultaneity, we refute their sequence. If you say that the three marks are sequential, then at the time of birth there are no abiding and cessation; how then can the sūtra say that at the time of birth there are abiding and cessation? Because it contradicts the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras, this is a refutation. Furthermore, how could sequential ones support each other in arising?