中觀論疏 5.28

5.28

「是故三相雖是有為」下，第三結成二義也。「答曰」下，二偈為二：初偈破小生生大，破其上半，即有為義壞；次偈破大生生小，破其下半，即破有窮不成，故還墮二難矣。初偈牒其上半，即以其下半難之。第二偈牒其下半，即以上半難之。初偈難大，意明小乘羅漢心麁，不覺言自相害。夫論能生他也則不從他，若從他也即不能生他，二義不並。而小乘人謂能生他、復從他生，是故不覺其相害。今捉其從他，難其生他也。小生既從大生生，即不能生大；若能生大，即不從大也。又云小生若具三義，可能生於大生：一者小生自有體、二者在大生之前、三者不由大生而有。若具此三義，可許小能生大。而小生一不能自有、二不在大生之前、三由大生而有，闕此三義，何能生大生耶？長行云「生生法應生本生」者，一有重生之名、一無重名，有重名尚不生，況無重名耶？二者小生生大生、大生生小生，此義是同。今已破小不能生大，即是破大不生於小。汝已知小不生大，云何言大能生小？三者小是大生之本，應生於大；今尚不能生大，而大是其末，云何生小？四者生生從本生生，即未有自體，故不能生大，大豈能生小耶？後正意也。問：既云生生法應生本生，結時應言是生生不能生本生，何因乃云本生不能生生生？答：只生生不能生本生，故無本生。既無本生，將何生生生？故云本生不能生生生也。問：何故論主破生生耶？答：昔羅什法師至關，初翻《智度論》竟，未有人作序，姚興天子時附書請匡山遠法師作序。遠前抄《智度論》為二十卷稱為問論，而制論序。末睿師作序云「夫萬化本於生生，而生生者無生。變化肇乎物始，而始始者無始。無生無始蓋是物之性也。」此語具破二家義。小乘以生生為萬物本，由生生故有大生，有大生故有有為。今求生生不可得，故云生生者無生。《老子》以無名為萬物始，有名為萬物母，故以有始為萬物本。今破此義，故云始始者無始。無生無始畢竟空，乃是諸法實體。論主今欲論諸法實體，破小乘橫謂，所以破生生也。

From "Therefore, although the three characteristics are conditioned" downward, the third part concludes the establishment of the two meanings. From "The reply is" downward, the two verses form two parts: the first verse refutes minor production producing the major, refuting the first half [of their verse], whereby the meaning of [being] conditioned is destroyed; the next verse refutes major production producing the minor, refuting the second half [of their verse], whereby the refutation of the infinite regress is not established, and they fall back into the two difficulties. The first verse takes up their first half and questions it using their second half. The second verse takes up their second half and questions it using their first half. The first verse questions the major: the intention is to clarify that the minds of the Hīnayāna arhats are coarse, and they do not realize that their words contradict themselves. In general, when considering what can produce another, it does not depend on that other; if it depends on that other, it cannot produce that other. The two meanings cannot stand together. Yet the Hīnayāna adherents claim that it can produce another and is also produced from another; therefore, they do not realize that they contradict each other. Now we grasp their dependency on the other to question their producing of the other: since minor production is produced from major production, it cannot produce the major; if it could produce the major, it would not depend on the major. It is also said that if minor production possessed three meanings, it might be able to produce major production: first, minor production would have its own entity; second, it would exist before major production; third, it would not exist dependent on major production. If it possessed these three meanings, one could grant that the minor can produce the major. But minor production, first, cannot exist by itself; second, is not before major production; and third, exists dependent on major production. Lacking these three meanings, how could it produce major production? When the prose says, "The phenomenon of the production of production should produce root production," first, one has a doubled name of "production" and one does not have a doubled name; if that with the doubled name does not even produce, how much less that without the doubled name? Second, minor production producing major production and major production producing minor production are identical in meaning. Now that we have already refuted that the minor cannot produce the major, this refutes that the major does not produce the minor. Since you already know that the minor does not produce the major, how can you say that the major can produce the minor? Third, the minor is the root of major production and should produce the major; now it cannot even produce the major, and since the major is its branch, how could it produce the minor? Fourth, since the production of production is produced from root production, it does not yet have its own entity, and therefore cannot produce the major; how could the major produce the minor? This latter is the correct intention. Question: Since it says "the phenomenon of the production of production should produce root production," at the conclusion it should say "this production of production cannot produce root production"; why does it instead say "root production cannot produce the production of production"? Answer: Precisely because the production of production cannot produce root production, there is no root production. Since there is no root production, by means of what could the production of production be produced? Therefore it says, "Root production cannot produce the production of production." Question: Why does the treatise master refute the production of production? Answer: Formerly, when Dharma Master Kumārajīva arrived at the Pass, he had just completed translating the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, but no one had yet written a preface. Emperor Yao Xing at the time sent a letter requesting Master Huiyuan of Mount Kuang to write a preface. Huiyuan had previously abridged the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* into twenty fascicles, which was called the *Wenlun*, and composed a treatise preface. Later, Master Sengrui composed a preface that said: "Now the myriad transformations are rooted in the production of production, yet that which produces production is without production. Changes and transformations begin with the origin of things, yet that which originates the origin is without origin. Being without production and without origin is indeed the nature of things." These words completely refute the doctrines of the two schools. The Hīnayāna takes the production of production as the root of the myriad things: due to the production of production there is major production, and due to major production there are conditioned phenomena. Now, seeking the production of production, it cannot be found; hence it says "that which produces production is without production." Laozi takes the nameless as the beginning of myriad things and the named as the mother of myriad things, thus taking having a beginning as the root of myriad things. Now this meaning is refuted, hence it says "that which originates the origin is without origin." Being without production and without origin, ultimate emptiness, is indeed the real entity of all phenomena. The treatise master now wishes to discuss the real entity of all phenomena and refute the arbitrary assumptions of the Hīnayāna, which is why he refutes the production of production.