中觀論疏 5.40

5.40

「問曰無住應有滅」下，第三次破滅。釋滅相有二家：一云現滅說滅、二云應滅說滅。然現滅說滅墮相違過，以生時即有滅故，若應滅說滅，《成論》文云「三有為法悉在現在」，若應滅者，即二相在現而滅在未來，故並非也。破滅七偈，為二：初四偈一周破滅、次三偈復一周破滅。四偈即四：初三時門破滅、次住不住門破滅、次就一時異時破滅、次就相待門破滅。初二偈及第四相待門並易見，不須釋也。問：已滅法是滅，何因云法已滅不滅？答：外人計滅相是有，今法已滅是空無之滅。既其已無，滅何所滅？故云法已滅不滅也。「是法於是時」下，第三一時異時破。上半牒一破一、下半牒異破異。是法者，今隨寄一法，且就《成論》五陰作之，「是法」謂識心之法也。「於是時」，正是識取實法時也。「不於是時滅」者，既正是識取實法時，云何得識心時滅耶？「是法於異時」，此是想取假名時，非復取實法時，故名異時。既是想取假名時，云何得言識滅耶？以非復識取實法時，不得言識滅。如是斷無明作明、變金剛為佛，並作二關責之。成實師金剛有實法義，即滅假名相續即轉作佛，具轉滅二義，故以今二義責滅。滅不得滅，轉亦爾。攝論師各執轉滅，亦以二義責之也，即一切義不得也。復次「若法是有者」，第二周三偈重破滅。初偈明法體是有，不得有滅相，有滅相即法體非有也。又若有一毫物有，即有自體，便是常，常云何有滅？無自體即無物，滅何所滅也？第二偈明法體是無，無無所滅；若有所滅，不得稱無。此二偈舉法體破相也。第三偈舉生相破滅相。生相展轉不展轉二關責既不成，即滅亦如是，並易見也。

From "Question: If there is no abiding, there should be cessation" downwards is the third [part], refuting cessation. Two schools explain the characteristic of cessation: one says that it is designated as cessation when it currently ceases, and the other says that it is designated as cessation when it ought to cease. However, stating that it is cessation when it currently ceases incurs the fault of mutual contradiction, because when there is arising, there is cessation. If it is designated as cessation when it ought to cease, the text of the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* states that "the three conditioned phenomena all exist in the present"; if it ought to cease, then two characteristics are in the present while cessation is in the future, so both are incorrect.

The seven verses refuting cessation comprise two [parts]: the first four verses form one cycle refuting cessation, and the subsequent three verses form another cycle refuting cessation. The four verses are four [approaches]: first, refuting cessation by the gateway of the three periods of time; second, refuting cessation by the gateway of abiding and non-abiding; third, refuting cessation with respect to simultaneous and distinct times; fourth, refuting cessation by the gateway of mutual dependence. The first two verses and the fourth on mutual dependence are all easy to see and need no explanation.

Question: A ceased phenomenon is cessation; why say that a phenomenon already ceased does not cease?
Answer: The heterodox master posits that the characteristic of cessation exists; here, a phenomenon already ceased is the cessation of empty non-existence. Since it is already non-existent, what cessation could cessation effect? Therefore, it is said that a phenomenon already ceased does not cease.

From "This phenomenon at this time" downwards is the third, refuting via simultaneous and distinct times. The first half adduces the same and refutes the same; the second half adduces the distinct and refutes the distinct. "This phenomenon" here conditionally relies on a single phenomenon, analyzed for now according to the five aggregates of the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*: "this phenomenon" refers to the phenomenon of the discerning mind. "At this time" is precisely when consciousness grasps the real phenomenon. "Does not cease at this time": since it is precisely when consciousness grasps the real phenomenon, how could it cease at the time of the discerning mind? "This phenomenon at a distinct time": this is when conception grasps the provisional designation, no longer when it grasps the real phenomenon, hence called "a distinct time." Since it is when conception grasps the provisional designation, how could it be said that consciousness ceases? Because it is no longer when consciousness grasps the real phenomenon, it cannot be said that consciousness ceases.

In this way, severing ignorance to produce clarity, or transforming the vajra-[mind] into the Buddha, are both interrogated with these two dilemmas. For the *Tattvasiddhi* masters, the vajra has the sense of a real phenomenon, which then ceases the continuity of the provisional designation and transforms into the Buddha, possessing both meanings of transformation and cessation; therefore, cessation is challenged here by these two senses. Cessation cannot be cessation, and transformation is also like this. The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* masters each adhere to transformation and cessation, and are likewise challenged by these two meanings, so that all their positions cannot stand.

Furthermore, "If a phenomenon exists" is the second cycle of three verses reiterating the refutation of cessation. The first verse explains that if the entity of the phenomenon exists, it cannot possess the characteristic of cessation; if it possesses the characteristic of cessation, the entity of the phenomenon does not exist. Moreover, if a hair's breadth of a thing exists, it possesses its own intrinsic entity and would thus be permanent; how could the permanent have cessation? If it has no intrinsic entity, then there is no thing; what cessation could cessation effect? The second verse explains that the entity of the phenomenon is non-existent, and non-existence has nothing to cease; if there is something to cease, it cannot be called non-existent. These two verses adduce the entity of the phenomenon to refute its characteristics. The third verse adduces the characteristic of arising to refute the characteristic of cessation. Since the two dilemmas of reciprocal and non-reciprocal arising have already failed, cessation is also like this; these are all easy to see.