中觀論疏 5.6

5.6

「問曰若無有有應當有無」者，自上已來五偈破空是有竟，今第二破虛空是無。此問有四義：一者上破毘曇、外道虛空是有，今破《成論》虛空是無。成實明虛空是無法，然終有此法；若無此無法，謗無三無為應不得罪。又上破小乘計虛空是有，今破大乘計虛空是無。二者因論主第五偈生，第五偈云「無相無可相，離相可相外，更亦無有物。」外人云即是此空也。若有相可相等物非謂為空，無此諸物故得此空。三者自上已來就本宗立義，今外人捉論主破即以為立，故未被破即執有、聞論主破即著無，以無始來煩惱罪重不能無所依。故《涅槃經》云「眾生如步屈虫，要因有起無見。因無生有見也。然眾生於一切法中起有無見。」今於虛空一法起有無見，起有無即障中道之本，又是諸見之根。何者？本借虛空喻佛性法身一乘波若，今虛空既成斷常，則佛性法身皆是斷常、皆是見根，悉成障道本，即道與非道並是非道。此所傷事，深宜須破洗也。四者如開善義，明虛空是二諦所攝，虛空是世諦故名為有。聞論主上破無空，謂真諦遣故無，是故立有無也。「答曰」下，然破無凡有二種：一者若有無異體，無有可待，即無有於無。二者有無一體，有有故有無，若無有即無無。有無既已無，自上已來破虛空法竟，今第二次破空所成人。如《成論》云「四大圍空，識在其中，假名為人。」今檢空義不可得，即四大無所圍。既無四大，識無依附，假何名為人？故上破能成之法，今破所成之人。以無法故名法無生，以無人故眾生無生，具二無生得無生忍。二者破境智義。上半破無所知之境，下半破無能知之智，故有無並夷、緣觀俱寂。肇師用此明涅槃義，故云：「法無有無之相，聖無有無之知。」法無有無之相，即無數於外；聖無有無之知，即無心於內。於外無數、於內無心，彼此寂滅浩然大均，乃曰涅槃。又所以破知者，虛空實非有無，但想知謂有無，故破想知者使虛空義寂。「是故知虛空」下，第二類破五種。上三句舉虛空、下一句類五種。「非有」者，結破上有，即五偈也。「非無」者，結破上無，半行偈也。「非相」者，結破相，第三偈也。「非可相」，結破可相品初二偈也。有人言：此是解正虛空義。邪計虛空是有是無，正虛空即非有非無。今明斥病，得作此伴。對數論解虛空墮二邊故，今明虛空是中道。是以眾經將空喻法身，即中道法身、中道波若等也。問：中假師非為非非為非於有，若非有者本自無有，非何所非？若非非者，既言非有，豈得非非？又問：有對無不？汝信有對無。有既不成，無即不成。今非有非無對於有無，有無既非，則非有非無並不成也。故肇公云：「言其非有者，明其非是有，非謂是非有。言其非無者，明其非是無，非謂是非無。」既結非有非無，亦結非遍不遍、非常不常、非記無記，此即遠離二邊不著中道，即知虛空絕四句乃是正虛空。將此空喻法身、佛性、波若、一乘，並皆正也。此所論事大，可不留心？問：何故云非有無是愚癡論？《攝大乘論》為戲論謗，何故復云是中道耶，答：得非有無意如肇公意者是中道。復捨有無而著非有無者是愚癡論也。「餘五同虛空」者，如經云「無色無形無對，一相無相」，不知何以目之，強稱實相。由實相故生波若，故眾行立、萬德成。長行料簡前破虛空意：一就本末、二約難易。又一義：五種是有為法，上情陰中已破。虛空是無為法，上來未破，故今前破。「問曰世間人盡見諸法是有是無」下，此生第二呵責門。就文為二：初外呵內、次內呵外。問意云：世人又盡見五種為有、虛空是無，汝云何言非有無？若非有無便是一種，何名五耶？又世諦有、真諦無，今若言非有無，即破二諦。又世人計虛空具有有無，如外道數人執空是有，成論明空是無，云何言非有無耶？今總問：虛空為遍不遍？答有二釋。一云遍，故柱處有空；二云不遍，故柱處無空。問：若言空遍，柱應客柱。彼答云：質質相礙，故不客柱。次問虛空既遍，柱應與空一，空既無礙，柱亦應然；柱既是礙，空亦應礙。若空無礙柱礙，即空與柱異，空不遍柱也。若空不遍，空即不常。若不遍是常，遍應無常。「答曰淺智見諸法」者，此正呵責。以淺智故，見五種為有、空種為無，又見虛空有及見虛空無，又見世諦有及見真諦無。既見有見無即起斷常，故諸見即生，有見故有愛，愛見因緣即流轉生死不得安隱涅槃。數人言：見有得道。此乃是有見，豈得道耶？亦是得有見道，實不得正道。成實人云：見無得道。亦是無見，豈得道耶？又是見於無道，竟不得正道也。深智之人與此相違，見有知表不有、見無知表不無，故《華嚴》云「一切有無法，了達非有無」也。問：智淺何故但見有無耶？答：六種之實即是實相，實相絕四句。今但見有無，未能見亦有亦無，又不能見非有非無，況見絕四句耶？以不能徹見絕四之道，故是智淺。然本見絕四，此得波若實觀；今不能見理，但是無明，故名淺智也。又四句皆是見，今見有無乃作見猶未極，況得滅見之道耶。長行為三：前明無方便失、第二明有方便得、第三結得失。「智者見諸法生」，此第二明有方便得。問：愚者見生起有見、見滅起無見，智者應見生不起有見、見滅應不起無見。若智者見生滅無見、見滅滅有見，亦應愚人見生起無、見滅起有。答：解此不同。有人言：智者體悟生滅不二，知生是滅、知滅是生，是以見生能滅無見、見滅能滅有見。有人言：此是智者跨節悟，非但知生而非有，亦即知生而非無。所以然者，生既非有，非有何所無？是故知生而非有，為初節悟；即知生非無，是第二節悟。故言見生即滅無見。如師常云：「假有不名有，假有不名無也。」今謂此二意義亦有之。文少不便，今明此是直語。智者既見諸法從因緣生，何得斷無？豈得有生？是故見生即滅無見。緣離故滅，豈定有耶？問：何故不言智者見生即知不有、見滅即知不無？答：理實應爾。但意欲破愚人，若直云生而非有、滅而非無，取信即難。現見有生，云何非無？是故今明，以有生故知非定無、以有滅故知非實有，取信即易。如《百論》云「種滅壞故，信知非常。牙相續生，故知非斷。」《大智論》云「見苦集時滅於無見，見滅道時滅於有見。」即此意也。「是故於一切法雖有所見」下，第三雙結得失。前結得、後結失。「雖有所見」者，恐外人云智者見生乃不起無見，而遂見於生即是生見，是故今明雖生如幻而見，幻生不生而生，雖生不生也。「乃至無漏見尚滅」者，無漏是不生不滅中道正觀，本對邪觀故說正觀，既無邪觀豈在正觀耶？「是故」下，此結失也。

"Question: If there is no existence, there should be non-existence": The preceding five verses refuting space as existent are now concluded. Now, in the second place, space as non-existent is refuted. This question has four meanings: First, the preceding refuted the Abhidharma and non-Buddhists [who hold] that space is existent; now it refutes the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra [view] that space is non-existent. The Tattvasiddhi explains that space is an unconditioned phenomenon (an existent of non-entity), yet ultimately maintains there is this phenomenon; if this unconditioned non-entity did not exist, denying the three unconditioned dharmas would incur no offense. Furthermore, the preceding refuted the Hīnayāna clinging to space as existent; now it refutes the Mahāyāna clinging to space as non-existent. Second, it arises on the basis of the Treatise Master's fifth verse, which says: "Where there is no defining characteristic and nothing to be characterized, apart from the defining characteristic and that which is characterized, there is also no other entity whatsoever." The opponent says: This is precisely what space is. If there were entities such as defining characteristics and what is characterized, they would not be called space; it is precisely because of the absence of these various entities that this space is obtained. Third, all of the preceding set forth propositions according to basic tenets; now the opponent takes the Treatise Master's refutation and uses it as his own proposition. Thus, before being refuted he clings to existence, and upon hearing the Treatise Master's refutation he attaches to non-existence, for since beginningless time his afflictions and defilements have been so heavy that he cannot abide without support. Therefore, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Sentient beings are like inchworms; relying on existence they give rise to the view of non-existence, and relying on non-existence they produce the view of existence. Yet sentient beings give rise to views of existence and non-existence regarding all dharmas." Now they give rise to views of existence and non-existence regarding the single dharma of space. Giving rise to existence and non-existence is the root of obstructing the middle way, and is also the root of all views. Why? Originally, space was borrowed to illustrate the Buddha-nature, the Dharma-body, the One Vehicle, and prajñā. Now, if space is turned into annihilation and permanence, then the Buddha-nature and the Dharma-body both become annihilation and permanence, both become the roots of views, and all become the root of obstructing the path. Thus both the path and non-path become non-path. The damage done by this is grave, and it must be refuted and cleansed. Fourth, as in the interpretation of master Kaishan, it explains that space is subsumed under the two truths; space belongs to conventional truth and is therefore called existent. Hearing the Treatise Master previously refute the non-existence of space, he assumes it is negated by ultimate truth and is therefore non-existent; hence he posits existence and non-existence. Below, "Reply": Now, in refuting non-existence, there are broadly two ways: First, if existence and non-existence have different essences, then having no existence to depend on, there is no non-existence. Second, if existence and non-existence share one essence, because there is existence there is non-existence; if there is no existence, there is no non-existence. Since existence and non-existence are already non-existent, from the beginning up to this point the refutation of the dharma of space is complete; now, second, it refutes the person formed by space. As the Tattvasiddhi says: "The four great elements surround space, consciousness is within it, and it is provisionally designated a person." Now, examining the meaning of space, it cannot be obtained; thus the four great elements have nothing to surround. Since the four great elements do not exist, consciousness has nothing to rely upon; by what provisional designation could it be called a person? Therefore, the preceding refuted the constitutive dharmas, and now it refutes the constituted person. Because dharmas do not exist, it is called the non-arising of dharmas; because persons do not exist, it is called the non-arising of sentient beings. Possessing both non-arisings, one attains the patience of the non-arising of dharmas. Second is the refutation of object and cognition. The first half of the verse refutes the object to be known; the second half refutes the cognition capable of knowing. Therefore, existence and non-existence are both leveled, and condition and contemplation are both silenced. Master Sengzhao used this to illuminate the meaning of nirvāṇa, stating: "Dharmas have no characteristics of existence or non-existence; the sage has no cognition of existence or non-existence." Dharmas having no characteristics of existence or non-existence means there is no differentiation externally; the sage having no cognition of existence or non-existence means there is no mind internally. Without differentiation externally and without mind internally, both are tranquil and dissolved into vast, great equality—this is called nirvāṇa. Furthermore, the reason for refuting the knower is that space is fundamentally neither existent nor non-existent; it is merely that conceptual cognition deems it existent or non-existent. Hence, refuting the conceptual knower brings the meaning of space to tranquility. Below, "Therefore, know that space": In the second place, this analogously refutes the other five elements. The first three lines bring up space; the final line analogously extends it to the five elements. "Neither existent": concludes the refutation of existence above, which constitutes five verses. "Nor non-existent": concludes the refutation of non-existence above, which is half a verse. "Neither a defining characteristic": concludes the refutation of defining characteristics, which is the third verse. "Nor that which is characterized": concludes the refutation of that which is characterized from the first two verses of the chapter. Someone said: This explains the correct meaning of space. Erroneously, one calculates space as existent or non-existent; correct space is neither existent nor non-existent. Now, clarifying the refutation of errors, this interpretation can be accepted. Since the Abhidharmikas' explanation of space falls into the two extremes, it is now clarified that space is the middle way. Hence, the various sūtras take space as an analogy for the Dharma-body, which is the middle-way Dharma-body, middle-way prajñā, and so on. Question: Do the masters of the provisional middle way negate, or do they negate the negation of existence? If they negate existence, since fundamentally there is no existence, what is negated? If they negate the negation, having already said "neither existent," how could they negate the negation? Another question: Is existence relative to non-existence or not? You believe that existence is relative to non-existence. Since existence is not established, non-existence is not established. Now, "neither existent nor non-existent" is relative to existence and non-existence. Since existence and non-existence are negated, "neither existent nor non-existent" is also not established. Therefore Master Sengzhao said: "To say it is not existent clarifies that it is not existent, not that it is 'non-existent'. To say it is not non-existent clarifies that it is not non-existent, not that it is 'non-non-existent'." Having concluded with "neither existent nor non-existent," one also concludes with neither pervasive nor non-pervasive, neither permanent nor impermanent, and neither determined nor undetermined. This is departing far from the two extremes without clinging to the middle way. Thus one knows that space transcending the four propositions is truly correct space. Taking this space as an analogy for the Dharma-body, Buddha-nature, prajñā, and the One Vehicle, all are correct. The matter discussed here is vast; how could one not pay close attention? Question: Why is it said that "neither existent nor non-existent" is a foolish doctrine, and why does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha call it a slander of prapañca, yet here it is said to be the middle way? Answer: If one grasps the meaning of "neither existent nor non-existent" as Master Sengzhao intended, it is the middle way. If one again abandons existence and non-existence only to cling to "neither existent nor non-existent," that is a foolish doctrine. "The other five are identical to space": As the sūtra says: "Without form, without shape, without opposition, of one characteristic which is characterless." Not knowing how to name it, one forcefully designates it the true mark. From the true mark, prajñā arises; hence the various practices are established, and myriad virtues are accomplished. The prose comments on the previous intent of refuting space: first, in terms of root and branch; second, in terms of difficulty and ease. Another meaning is: The other five elements are conditioned dharmas, which were already refuted above in the aggregate of feeling. Space is an unconditioned dharma, which had not been refuted up to this point; therefore it is refuted first here. Below, "Question: All worldly people see phenomena as existent or non-existent": This gives rise to the second section, the approach of reprimand. The text has two parts: first, the opponent reprimands the proponent; second, the proponent reprimands the opponent. The gist of the question is: Worldly people all see the five elements as existent and the element of space as non-existent; why do you say it is neither existent nor non-existent? If it is neither existent nor non-existent, it would be of one single kind; how could they be called five? Furthermore, conventional truth is existent and ultimate truth is non-existent; if one now says they are neither existent nor non-existent, that refutes the two truths. In addition, worldly people calculate space as possessing both existence and non-existence: non-Buddhists and Abhidharmikas cling to space as existent, while the Tattvasiddhi explains space as non-existent; why do you say it is neither existent nor non-existent? Now we generally ask: Is space pervasive or non-pervasive? There are two explanations in reply. One says it is pervasive, and therefore where a pillar is, there is space. The second says it is not pervasive, and therefore where a pillar is, there is no space. Question: If you say space is pervasive, the pillar should admit another pillar. They reply: Physical forms mutually obstruct, and therefore it does not admit a pillar. Next, we ask: Since space is pervasive, the pillar should be identical with space; since space is unobstructed, the pillar should also be unobstructed. If the pillar is obstructive, space should also be obstructive. If space is unobstructed while the pillar is obstructive, then space and the pillar are different, and space does not pervade the pillar. If space does not pervade, space is impermanent. If being non-pervasive were permanent, being pervasive should be impermanent. "Reply: Those of shallow intellect see phenomena": This is the direct reprimand. Because of shallow intellect, they see the five elements as existent and the space element as non-existent; they also see space as existent and see space as non-existent; they also see conventional truth as existent and see ultimate truth as non-existent. Having seen existence and non-existence, they give rise to annihilation and permanence. Thus various views arise; because there are views, there is craving; through the conditions of craving and views, they transmigrate through birth and death, unable to attain peaceful nirvāṇa. The Abhidharmikas say: "By seeing existence one attains the path." This is merely the view of existence; how could one attain the path? It is only attaining the path of the view of existence; in truth, one does not attain the correct path. Followers of the Tattvasiddhi say: "By seeing non-existence one attains the path." This too is the view of non-existence; how could one attain the path? This is also seeing the path of non-existence; ultimately one does not attain the correct path. People of profound intellect are the opposite of this: seeing existence, they know it signifies non-existence; seeing non-existence, they know it signifies not non-existent. Hence the Avataṃsaka-sūtra says: "All phenomena of existence and non-existence / Are completely understood as neither existent nor non-existent." Question: Why is it that those of shallow intellect see only existence and non-existence? Answer: The reality of the six elements is precisely the true mark, and the true mark transcends the four propositions. Now they see only existence and non-existence, and are not yet able to see both existence and non-existence, nor can they see neither existence nor non-existence; how much less can they see the transcendence of the four propositions? Because they cannot thoroughly see the path that transcends the four [propositions], their intellect is shallow. Now, originally seeing the transcendence of the four [propositions] constitutes the true contemplation of prajñā; failing to see the principle is merely ignorance, hence it is called shallow intellect. Moreover, all four propositions are views; now seeing existence and non-existence means their forming of views is not even thorough, so how could they attain the path of eliminating views? The prose has three parts: first, clarifying the loss from lacking skillful means; second, clarifying the gain from possessing skillful means; third, concluding the gains and losses. "The wise see the arising of phenomena": this is the second part, clarifying the gain from possessing skillful means. Question: The foolish see arising and produce the view of existence, and see cessation and produce the view of non-existence; the wise should see arising without producing the view of existence, and see cessation without producing the view of non-existence. If the wise seeing arising and cessation extinguishes the view of non-existence, and seeing cessation extinguishes the view of existence, the foolish should likewise see arising and produce non-existence, and see cessation and produce existence. Answer: Explanations of this differ. Someone said: The wise embody the non-duality of arising and cessation; they know that arising is cessation, and cessation is arising. For this reason, seeing arising can extinguish the view of non-existence, and seeing cessation can extinguish the view of existence. Someone said: This is the wise person's stepped awakening: not only knowing that arising is not existent, but also knowing that arising is not non-existent. Why is this? Since arising is not existent, what non-existence could there be to what is not existent? Therefore, knowing that arising is not existent is the initial stage of awakening; knowing that arising is not non-existent is the second stage of awakening. Hence it says that seeing arising immediately extinguishes the view of non-existence. As the master always said: "Provisional existence is not called existence; provisional existence is not called non-existence." We now maintain that these two interpretations also have their point. However, the phrasing is slightly awkward; now we clarify that this is straightforward speech. Since the wise see that phenomena arise from causes and conditions, how could there be nihilistic non-existence? How could there be [inherent] arising? Therefore, seeing arising immediately extinguishes the view of non-existence. Because they cease through the separation of conditions, how could they be definitely existent? Question: Why does it not say that the wise, seeing arising, know it is not existent, and seeing cessation, know it is not non-existent? Answer: In terms of actual principle, it should be so. But the intention is to refute the foolish; if one directly said that arising is not existent and cessation is not non-existent, it would be difficult to win their confidence. Since they currently see arising, how could it be not non-existent? Therefore, it is now clarified that because there is arising, one knows it is not definitely non-existent; because there is cessation, one knows it is not truly existent. Thus it is easy to win their confidence. As the Śata-śāstra says: "Because the seed perishes, one faithfully knows it is not permanent; because the sprout arises in succession, one knows it is not annihilated." The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "When seeing suffering and its origin, one eliminates the view of non-existence; when seeing cessation and the path, one eliminates the view of existence." This is precisely the meaning. Below, "Therefore, although there is something seen regarding all phenomena": This is the third part, concluding both gains and losses. First it concludes the gain, and later the loss. "Although there is something seen": Fearing that the opponent might say that while the wise, seeing arising, do not produce the view of non-existence, they nonetheless see arising and thus hold a view of arising, it is therefore clarified now that although it arises like an illusion, it is seen; illusory arising is non-arising yet arising, arising yet non-arising. "Even uncontaminated views are still extinguished": Uncontaminated is the correct contemplation of the middle way of non-arising and non-ceasing. Originally, correct contemplation was spoken of in opposition to erroneous contemplation; once there is no erroneous contemplation, how could correct contemplation remain? Below, "Therefore": This concludes the loss.