中觀論疏 6.17

6.17

「問曰」下，第三救也。此一問答乃明經論之大宗，釋破立所以也。問：何故就此品明破立大意耶？答：隨寄一品可得言之。又此品通喻一切法，故就通品通明立破。又至此品來法譬已周，故明破立所以。就問為二：一請停一異、二論辨有無。所以停一異者，欲與論主論辨破立有無故。又外人知受一異之難，必辭理俱屈，今欲藏其所屈，故請停之。又外人知答與不答二並無通，是故請停。又欲投論主之難以難論主，令同眾人，故請停也。又論初已來順宗立義，此之一問是反難立也。「若言無燃可燃」下，第二論辨有無。問有二意：一問所破燃可燃、二問能破之一異。問所破燃可燃，有有無二關。若有而破，有四種失：一者道理實有，強破令無，則是邪見。故《大品》云「若法前有後無，諸佛菩薩則有過罪。」二者若實有則不可令無，喻如真無不可令有也。三者我見可燃有、汝亦見其有，既同是有，云何破令無？四者汝將有以破汝有，如〈五陰品〉末問不成問也。若言無燃可燃而欲破者，亦有四過：一者若無則不應破，破故則不應無；今現見汝破，故知不無。二者若無而破，何不破兔角龜毛，而破燃可燃耶？三者我見其有、汝見其無，有不失罪福，無是邪見，故經云「寧起身見，不惡取空。」四者以汝無破我有，亦用我有破汝無，如〈五陰品〉末問不成問也。從「若言無燃可燃」下，是有難文也。「如兔角」下，是無難文。問意但見難無、不見難有，若作二關難者少不便，「如兔角」下只是重釋無難耳。「若汝計有一異」下，第二問能破也。亦有四過：一者有能破必有所破，則論主有能、外人有所。二俱是有則俱應破，不爾俱不被破。三若我破汝不破，亦汝破我不破。四若有破不破，則有有不有四難也。若無能破亦有四難：一無能破，以何破他？二者內若無能，外則有所，此是因內有、外待無說有也。三者若無能破，則是無見。四者無能破是大邪見，以無所破謂無外道，無能破則無內道，謂大邪見。而文中但就有難不云無者，既見論主從初品已來恒以一異破於外人，則謂論主有於一異，故言「若汝許有一異」，則為已有；論主若無一異，則不將一異以責外人。既用一異以責於外，則知論主許有一異也。

From 'Question' onward is the third part, the salvage. This single question and answer clarifies the overarching theme of the sūtras and treatises, and explains the reason for refutation and establishment. Question: Why clarify the general intent of refutation and establishment in this chapter? Answer: It could be stated in connection with any chapter. Furthermore, this chapter is a metaphor that applies generally to all dharmas, so it clarifies establishment and refutation generally in connection with a general chapter. Moreover, by the time one arrives at this chapter, doctrine and metaphor are complete, so it clarifies the reason for refutation and establishment. The question has two parts: 1. requesting to set aside identity and difference; 2. debating existence and non-existence. The reason for setting aside identity and difference is that he wishes to debate the existence or non-existence of refutation and establishment with the treatise master. Furthermore, the outsider knows that if he accepts the difficulty concerning identity and difference, his words and reasoning will both be cornered; now, wishing to conceal his cornered state, he requests to set it aside. Furthermore, the outsider knows that both answering and not answering are without resolution, and for this reason requests to set it aside. Furthermore, he wishes to turn the treatise master's difficulty back onto the treatise master so as to make him like the common crowd, and therefore requests to set it aside. Furthermore, from the beginning of the treatise onward, positions were established in accordance with its doctrine; this single question is an establishment made by raising a counter-difficulty. From 'If you say there is no burning and burnable' onward, second, is the debate on existence and non-existence. The question has two intentions: first, questioning the burning and the burnable that are refuted; second, questioning the identity and difference that do the refuting. Questioning the burning and the burnable that are refuted contains the two dilemmas of existence and non-existence. If one refutes them when they exist, there are four kinds of faults: First, if in principle they truly exist, forcibly refuting them to make them non-existent is heterodox view. Hence the Large Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'If dharmas existed before and are non-existent later, the buddhas and bodhisattvas would have faults and transgressions.' Second, if it truly exists, it cannot be made non-existent, just as true non-existence cannot be made to exist. Third, I see that the burnable exists, and you also see that it exists; since both agree it exists, how can it be refuted to make it non-existent? Fourth, you use what exists to refute what you have as existent, which, like the question at the end of the 'Chapter on the Five Aggregates', does not constitute a valid question. If one says that the burning and the burnable do not exist and wishes to refute them, there are also four faults: First, if they do not exist, they should not be refuted; because they are refuted, they should not be non-existent; now we visibly see that you refute them, so we know they are not non-existent. Second, if you refute them when they do not exist, why do you not refute hare horns and tortoise hair, but instead refute the burning and the burnable? Third, I see them as existing, and you see them as non-existent; existence does not lose [the basis for] wrongdoing and merit, whereas non-existence is heterodox view; hence the sūtra says: 'Better to give rise to the view of self than to grasp emptiness wrongly.' Fourth, using your non-existence to refute my existence is also using my existence to refute your non-existence, which, like the question at the end of the 'Chapter on the Five Aggregates', does not constitute a valid question. The passage from 'If you say there is no burning and burnable' onward is the text presenting the difficulty concerning existence. The passage from 'like hare horns' onward is the text presenting the difficulty concerning non-existence. The intention of the question seems only to challenge non-existence, not existence; if framed as a challenge using two dilemmas, it is slightly awkward, so 'like hare horns' onward is merely a restatement of the challenge concerning non-existence. From 'If you impute that there is identity and difference' onward, second, is questioning what does the refuting. There are also four faults: First, if there is that which can refute, there must be that which is refuted; then the treatise master has that which can [refute], and the outsider has that which is [refuted]. If both are existent, then both should be refuted; otherwise, neither should be refuted. Third, if I am refuted and you are not refuted, then you can also be refuted and I not refuted. Fourth, if there is being refuted and not being refuted, then there are the four difficulties of existing and not existing. If there is nothing that can refute, there are also four difficulties: 1. If there is nothing that can refute, with what do you refute others? 2. If internally there is no capacity [to refute], externally there is an object [refuted]; this is establishing the external as existent dependent on the internal's non-existence. 3. If there is nothing that can refute, this is the view of non-existence. 4. If there is nothing that can refute, it is a great heterodox view: considering that there is nothing to be refuted means there are no non-Buddhists, while having nothing that can refute means there is no internal path—this is called a great heterodox view. Yet in the text he only proceeds with the difficulty concerning existence and does not mention non-existence: having seen that from the first chapter onward the treatise master always refutes outsiders by means of identity and difference, he presumes that the treatise master possesses identity and difference; therefore he says, 'If you allow that there is identity and difference,' taking it as belonging to himself. If the treatise master lacked identity and difference, he would not take identity and difference to task the outsider. Since he uses identity and difference to task the outsider, he knows that the treatise master allows that there is identity and difference.