中觀論疏 6.25

6.25

「何以」下，發起第二偈釋破也。所以須釋破者，論主上明更互相待則互失兩因、俱無二果，今小乘大乘內道外道不受此破。如外道立拒舉瓶互為因果，數人大小二生義亦同之，成實師正引此文證相待義，乃至中假之流亦明無有可有、由無故有，無無可無、由有故無，此乃無定性因果，而更互為因則因義成，更互為果則果義立，云何言無因果耶？是故有此偈，更開二關責之：上半就無門、下半據有門。「若法有待成」者，重牒立也。「未成云何待」者，既待故方成，則知未待時未成。既未待時未成，未成則無兩物，以何更互待耶？下半云「若成已有待」，初句取意，汝謂未待時先已有長短兩物成，然後論相待，勉上無待過者，成已何用待？此正破也。未待之時兩物已成，何用更互待耶？待本為成耳，今未待已成，則不須復待也。問：成實師云前有長短兩體然後相待立名，以先有體勉未成兩無，難相待立名。故離下半不須待之失。故莊嚴義云：因成為世諦體，相續為世諦用，相待為世諦名。開善云：因成當體、續待為用也。今次責之。未待有長短體，此體為待為不待？若相待，云何言體未待耶？若不待，何得有此體名耶？又若體不待，則相待假狹；而相待通一切法，云何名待體不待耶？又名待體不待，應名燒體不燒。又名法各有體，名在口以聲為體，法在[紙/巾]以色為體。名法既各有體，則名法應各待。若一待一不待，一有體一不有體。又名待他體不因他，何謂因成？若名體並待，今未待未有名，亦應未待未有體。又名體是因緣義，何容有體未有名？若於不知者故無名，亦於不知者故無體；道理有名而不知，道理有體而不知耶。若上古時有物未有名，故本無名者，亦上古本無物，如劫初穀不生，亦如諸法不生。

From "Why is this?" downward, [the text] introduces the second verse to explain the refutation. The reason this explanatory refutation is needed is that the author of the treatise previously showed that mutually depending on each other results in mutually losing both causes and lacking both effects; yet now the Hīnayāna, the Mahāyāna, Buddhists, and non-Buddhists do not accept this refutation. For instance, non-Buddhists maintain that raising and setting down a jar mutually serve as cause and effect; the Sarvāstivādins' doctrine of major and minor arising is also like this; masters of the Tattvasiddhi directly cite this text to prove the doctrine of mutual dependence; and even the proponents of the middle and provisional explain that non-existence can be made existent, existing by virtue of non-existence, while non-existence is not an absolute non-existence, being non-existent by virtue of existence. This is causality lacking fixed nature: mutually serving as cause, the meaning of 'cause' is established; mutually serving as effect, the meaning of 'effect' is constituted. How can one say there is no cause and effect? Therefore this verse appears, presenting two further checkpoints to cross-examine them: the first half is based on the approach of non-existence, and the second half relies on the approach of existence. "If a thing is established through dependence" restates the opponent's thesis. "How can it depend before it is established?": since it is established only through dependence, one knows that before it depends, it is not yet established. Since before depending it is not yet established, and being unestablished there are not two things, on what do they mutually depend? The second half says, "If, already established, it depends": the first line captures the opponent's sense—if you claim that before depending, the two entities of long and short were already established beforehand, and only then is their mutual dependence discussed, so as to escape the earlier flaw of having nothing to depend on, [then] "once established, what need is there to depend?" This directly refutes it. When they were not yet depending, the two things were already established; what need is there for them to depend mutually? Dependence is originally for the sake of establishment; now that they are already established prior to depending, there is no need to depend again. Question: Masters of the Tattvasiddhi say that first there are the two entities of long and short, and afterwards, through mutual dependence, names are established; using the prior existence of the entities, they escape the challenge of neither existing prior to establishment, and through mutual dependence names are established. Thus they avoid the flaw in the second half of needing no dependence. Hence the doctrine of Zhuangyan says: causal constitution is the substance of conventional truth, continuity is the function of conventional truth, and mutual dependence is the name of conventional truth. Kaishan says: causal constitution corresponds to substance, while continuity and dependence are functions. Now we cross-examine them in turn. Before depending, there are the entities of long and short: do these entities depend, or do they not depend? If they depend, how can you say the entities do not yet depend? If they do not depend, how can there be the names for these entities? Furthermore, if the entities do not depend, then provisional designation through mutual dependence would be narrow; yet mutual dependence applies universally to all phenomena: how could the names depend while the entities do not? Furthermore, if names depend while entities do not, the name should burn while the entity does not burn. Furthermore, name and phenomenon each have their own entity: the name is in the mouth, having sound as its entity; the phenomenon is on paper/cloth, having form as its entity. Since name and phenomenon each have their own entity, name and phenomenon should each depend. If one depends and the other does not, one would have an entity and the other would not have an entity. Furthermore, if the name depends on another while the entity is not caused by another, how could it be causally constituted? If name and entity both depend, now, when they do not yet depend, there is not yet a name, and so before depending there should also not yet be an entity. Furthermore, name and entity belong to the meaning of causes and conditions; how could there be an entity without yet a name? If for one who does not know, there is no name, then for one who does not know, there would also be no entity. If in principle there is a name though one does not know it, is it that in principle there is an entity though one does not know it? If in ancient times there were things but not yet names, so that originally there were no names, then in ancient times there were also originally no things, just as at the beginning of the kalpa grain does not grow, and just as all phenomena do not arise.