中觀論疏 6.27

6.27

「燃不餘處來」下，第四內外門破。有此文來者，外人聞上因不因破，無辭可通，但現見攢木火生，外緣合故有，所以論主更說此門。但火生有因有緣，手燧等為緣、薪則為因，假緣而有故為外；藉因而生，秤之為內。今求竝無從，豈有內外？數人有性四大、事四大，因事發性，如燈炷是也。此中有性火，後因外事火來炷之，則發其體性火故照，此即有從外來義。有自性即內出義，若《成實論》云「炷中有火理」，是內出義。今因外火發生此理，若無此理火炷終不燃。此則餘所來義。今總問：木有火理性，為異薪、為不異？若已異，即已應能燒，即無復薪也。若不異，雖截木，火終不生。又問：木中無事火，與大虛不異，云何得生火？又炎炎是火而非薪，段段是薪而非火，雖相著而終異，則燃是燃，故燃非是可燃燃；可燃是可燃，故可燃非是燃可燃也。又木有火理者，不然。今用作餘物，何必出火？如破泥有瓶性也。又燒木方名薪，則薪火一時，一時則非因果義。又木有火理，因果則並，若無火理則無可待。又問：木有當燃理，亦有當不燃理。若有可燃理名可燃者，有不可燃理應名不可燃。又木中無事燃，說木為可燃；水中無事燃，亦可說水為可燃。又木中無事燃，遂得生事燃；水中無事燃，水中亦應生。若一生一不生，則一有事一無事，餘如〈去來〉說。

From "Fire does not come from elsewhere" downward is the fourth approach: refutation by means of internal and external. This text comes because when outsiders hear the above refutation by means of dependent and independent, they have no words to justify themselves; yet they visibly observe fire arising when sticks are rubbed together, existing due to the combination of external conditions, so the author of the treatise states this approach further. Now, the arising of fire has causes and conditions: hands, drill, and so forth are conditions; the wood is the cause. Existing relying on conditions, it is called external; arising supported by a cause, it is called internal. Now, seeking them, both have no basis; how could there be internal and external? The Sarvāstivādins posit nature-four-great-elements and concrete-four-great-elements: through the concrete, the nature is brought forth, as in the case of a lamp wick. Here there is the nature-fire; later, when external concrete fire comes to touch the wick, it brings forth its substantial nature-fire so that it illuminates; this is the meaning of coming from outside. Having intrinsic nature is the meaning of emerging from within. When the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says that "within the wick is the principle of fire," that is the meaning of emerging from within. Now, through external fire, this principle is brought forth; if there were no such principle of fire, the wick would never burn. This is the meaning of coming from elsewhere. Now we cross-examine comprehensively: does wood have the nature of the principle of fire as distinct from the wood, or as not distinct? If it were already distinct, it should already be able to burn, and there would no longer be wood. If it is not distinct, even if one cuts the wood, fire will never arise. Furthermore, we ask: if within wood there is no concrete fire, it would be no different from empty space; how could fire be produced? Furthermore, the flaming is fire and not wood, while the pieces are wood and not fire; though touching each other, they are ultimately distinct. Thus, burning is burning, so burning is not burning through that which is to be burned; that which is to be burned is that which is to be burned, so that which is to be burned is not burned through burning. Furthermore, to say that wood has the principle of fire is incorrect. If it is now used to make other things, why must fire emerge? Just like breaking clay to find the nature of a jar. Furthermore, only when wood burns is it called fuel; then fuel and fire are simultaneous, and being simultaneous, it is not the meaning of cause and effect. Furthermore, if wood has the principle of fire, cause and effect would be concurrent; if it lacks the principle of fire, there is nothing to depend on. Furthermore, we ask: wood has the principle of being about to burn, and also the principle of being about to not burn. If having the principle of combustibility makes it combustible, then having the principle of non-combustibility should make it non-combustible. Furthermore, if having no concrete burning within wood, wood is called combustible, then with water having no concrete burning, water could also be called combustible. Furthermore, if having no concrete burning within wood, concrete burning nonetheless arises; then having no concrete burning within water, it should also arise in water. If one arises and the other does not, then one would have the concrete and the other would lack the concrete. The rest is as explained in Chapter on "Going and Coming".