中觀論疏 6.29

6.29

「若可燃無燃」下，第六五求門破。問：離一異為五求，合五求為一異。一異破竟，何故復說五求？答：體雖無異，為外道計二十五我，故須離而破之。二十五我者，即色是我、離色是我，我中有色、色中有我、我有於色，五陰則二十五也。問：何故無色有於我耶？答：我有色，此明我為主諦，我御於色故屬我。不得云色為主諦，色御於我，我屬於色，故無此句也。「若可燃無燃」，此明即陰無我。「離可燃無燃」，明離陰無我。「燃無有可燃」，明我無有陰陰不屬我也。「燃中無可燃」者，我中無有陰。「可燃中無燃」，明陰中無有我。長行云「三皆不成」者，異釋云云。今明初句為即、餘四句並是離。既破初句離，後三句同是異，同第二句破也。「問何故說燃可燃」下，第二破法說也。前問、次答。所以作此問者，外人初立燃可燃為成受受者，但破既不成，故失宗迷恍便不知所云，故復問也。又不煩作此釋之，但為欲發起後偈生此問耳。答中上半喻內人法、次句喻外瓶衣。不言瓶衣一異，但瓶自有因果，不可一異；衣義亦爾。「一切等諸法」者，生死涅槃、真妄空有同六門破。問：偈破受，受者等萬法，應備用六門，青目何故偏就五求門耶？答：二義，一者略舉最後、二者五求正為破人法，是以偏舉求之。「若人說有我」下，第三呵責外人。以法喻既窮，故須呵責。二者上五求破但是一異破二十五我，猶未破二十種我。言二十我者，即色是我、離色有我、亦即亦離、非即非離，一陰四句，五陰二十。二十我數少體廣，二十五我數多而義狹。上雖破即離，未破亦即亦離、非即非離，是故此偈總呵責之。即離之，本既無，餘二是末，不須破也。又說此偈者，犢子部云：上來破於即離，不破我宗。今所辨我乃是第五不可說藏，故不墮上破。是以論主今呵責之。第五藏內實無有我，而橫謂有，非佛弟子也。就偈為二：上半牒外所計、下半呵責。「若人說有我」者，即作者本住假實等一切諸我也。「諸法各異相」者，作業及諸根并五陰等。下半呵責無人法而計人法，則不得佛法、生法二空味也。又不識佛性真我而顛倒橫計假實等我，故不得佛性真我之味，故《涅槃經》以一味藥譬於佛性。又不得一相法味而計種種法，如《法華》云「悉是一相一味之法，究竟涅槃常寂滅相，終歸於空。」不得斯味故計一異法。此是對外人計生法，故以二無生為佛性味耳。然佛法既非有人法，亦非無人法，如是四句皆非佛法味，故云「不得寂滅味」。寂滅，即絕四句法也。長行云「諸法從本來無生畢竟寂滅相」者，此句前示外人佛法真味，即序其所失也，又敘論主破人法意。論主所以破人法者，良由諸法本無生寂滅，而外人橫計有人法，所以失佛法味，宜須破之。又釋一切大乘經論破人法意，明諸法本來無生寂滅，但為止橫謂之心故云破耳，實非是破也。又約情立有、約情悟無，故言破實不破也。「是故品末說是偈」，此第二正明失味之人。此中舉薩婆多及犢子者，舉犢子攝取一切計有我之部，明薩婆多攝取一切計有法之部。又薩婆多明計法之始，法有四句：一有一切法、二無一切法、三亦有亦無、四非有非無。此之四句悉是戲論。薩婆多計一切法有，故名一切有部。一切有者，明三世是有及三無為亦有，故名一切有部也。今舉計有既非，當知餘之三句亦失，故云舉始攝終也。破犢子者執我有四句：一即、二離、三亦即亦離、四非即非離。而犢子計非即非離，此既不成，當知前之三句亦壞，故舉終以攝始。又上來破我可說，今破不可說我，則一切我空。所言五法藏者，三世為三、無為為四、第五名不可說。不可說者，不可說有為無為也。問：此品何故破犢子耶？答：《俱舍論．破我品》明犢子立我，正引燃可燃為喻，別有我體故不即陰，由陰合而生故不離陰，如別有火體故不即薪，託薪而生故不離薪。問：犢子既計有我，云何作十六諦無我觀耶？答：《俱舍論》云「後即出觀見有我，入觀則無有我，故得作十六諦觀」也。問：薩婆多、犢子何時出耶？答：佛滅後三百年中，從上座部生薩婆多，從薩婆多出犢子部。《玄義》論以明之。論文舉二人釋上半；「如是等人」下，釋下半也。

From "If what is to be burned has no fire" onwards is the sixth refutation, through the gateway of the fivefold search. Question: Analyzed, oneness and difference become the fivefold search; combined, the fivefold search is just oneness and difference. Once oneness and difference have been refuted, why explain the fivefold search again? Answer: Although the substance is not different, because non-Buddhists posit twenty-five [forms of] self, it is necessary to analyze and refute them. As for the twenty-five [forms of] self: form is the self; separate from form is the self; within the self there is form; within form there is the self; and the self possesses form. For the five aggregates, this makes twenty-five. Question: Why is there no [phrase] "form possesses the self"? Answer: "The self possesses form" clarifies that the self is the master; the self governs form, so [form] belongs to the self. One cannot say that form is the master, that form governs the self, or that the self belongs to form; therefore this phrase is absent. "If what is to be burned has no fire" clarifies that identical to the aggregates there is no self. "Apart from what is to be burned there is no fire" clarifies that apart from the aggregates there is no self. "Fire does not possess what is to be burned" clarifies that the self has no aggregates and the aggregates do not belong to the self. "Within fire there is no what is to be burned" means that within the self there are no aggregates. "Within what is to be burned there is no fire" clarifies that within the aggregates there is no self. Where the prose says "the three are all unestablished," various explanations differ. We now clarify that the first phrase is identity, and the remaining four phrases are all separation. Since the separation of the first phrase is refuted, the latter three phrases are likewise difference, refuted in the same manner as the second phrase. From "[If it is] asked: Why speak of fire and what is to be burned?" onwards is the second part, refuting the stated dharma. First a question, then an answer. The reason this question is posed is that the opponent initially established fire and what is to be burned to establish experience and the experiencer; but since the refutation has shown they are not established, he loses his thesis, becomes bewildered, and no longer knows what to say; hence he asks again. Furthermore, one need not make this explanation; this question is raised merely to introduce the following verse. In the answer, the first half [of the verse] uses the metaphor of the inner person and dharmas; the next line uses the metaphor of outer pots and clothes. It does not speak of the oneness or difference of pot and clothes, but a pot has its own cause and effect, which cannot be one or different; the meaning of clothes is also like this. "All such dharmas" means that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, the real and the false, emptiness and existence, are all alike refuted through the six gateways. Question: The verse refutes the ten thousand dharmas such as experience and experiencer, which should fully employ the six gateways; why does Piṅgala exclusively focus on the gateway of the fivefold search? Answer: There are two senses: first, briefly citing the last one; second, the fivefold search specifically serves to refute person and dharmas, which is why it is selectively cited to seek them out. From "If someone says there is a self" onwards is the third part, rebuking the opponent. Since both dharma and metaphor have been exhausted, a rebuke is required. Second, the above refutation by the fivefold search only refutes the twenty-five selves through oneness and difference, but has not yet refuted the twenty kinds of self. As for the twenty selves: form is the self; apart from form there is the self; both identical and separate; neither identical nor separate. With four propositions for one aggregate, the five aggregates make twenty. The twenty selves are fewer in number but broader in scope, while the twenty-five selves are greater in number but narrower in meaning. Although identity and separation were refuted above, both-identical-and-separate and neither-identical-nor-separate have not been refuted; therefore this verse rebukes them in general. Since the root of identity and separation is already absent, the remaining two are branches and need not be refuted. Furthermore, regarding the statement of this verse, the Vātsīputrīyas say: "The preceding refutations refuted identity and separation, but did not refute our school. The self we now distinguish is the fifth, inexpressible storehouse, and so does not fall under the above refutation." Therefore the author of the treatise now rebukes them. Within the fifth storehouse there is actually no self, yet they arbitrarily claim there is; they are not disciples of the Buddha. The verse consists of two parts: the first half reiterates what the opponent posits; the second half rebukes it. "If someone says there is a self" refers to all selves such as the agent, the prior entity, the provisional, and the real. "And that dharmas have distinct characteristics" refers to action, the faculties, the five aggregates, and so forth. The second half rebukes positing a person and dharmas where there are none, whereby one does not attain the taste of the Buddha-Dharma, the twofold emptiness of sentient beings and dharmas. Furthermore, not recognizing the true self of Buddha-nature, they perversely and arbitrarily posit provisional and real selves, and thus do not attain the taste of the true self of Buddha-nature; hence the Nirvāṇa Sūtra compares Buddha-nature to a medicine of a single taste. Furthermore, not attaining the single-characteristic taste of the Dharma, they posit various dharmas, just as the Lotus Sūtra says: "All are dharmas of a single characteristic and a single taste—the characteristic of ultimate nirvāṇa, constantly tranquil and extinguished, finally returning to emptiness." Failing to attain this taste, they posit dharmas of oneness and difference. This is in response to the opponent positing birth and dharmas, hence using the two kinds of non-arising as the taste of Buddha-nature. However, the Buddha-Dharma neither has a person and dharmas, nor lacks a person and dharmas; all such four propositions are not the taste of the Buddha-Dharma; hence it says "they do not attain the taste of quiescence." Quiescence is precisely the dharma that transcends the four propositions. Where the prose says "dharmas are from the beginning without arising and of the characteristic of ultimate quiescence," this line first reveals to the opponent the true taste of the Buddha-Dharma, recounting what they have missed; it also recounts the treatise author's intent in refuting person and dharmas. The reason the author of the treatise refutes person and dharmas is truly because all dharmas are originally unarisen and quiescent, yet the opponent arbitrarily posits a person and dharmas, thereby losing the taste of the Buddha-Dharma; hence they must be refuted. It also explains the intent of all Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises in refuting person and dharmas, clarifying that all dharmas are originally unarisen and quiescent; it is only to halt the mind of arbitrary assertion that one speaks of "refutation," but in reality there is no refutation. Furthermore, existence is established relative to ordinary sentiment, and non-existence is realized relative to ordinary sentiment; therefore one speaks of refutation, but in reality there is no refutation. "Therefore at the end of the chapter this verse is spoken": this is the second part, directly clarifying the persons who have lost the taste. Citing the Sarvāstivādins and the Vātsīputrīyas here: citing the Vātsīputrīyas subsumes all sects that posit a self; mentioning the Sarvāstivādins subsumes all sects that posit dharmas. Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādins represent the beginning of positing dharmas. There are four propositions regarding dharmas: 1. all dharmas exist; 2. all dharmas do not exist; 3. both exist and do not exist; 4. neither exist nor do not exist. All four of these propositions are prapañca. The Sarvāstivādins posit that all dharmas exist, hence their name "the school that asserts that everything exists." "Everything exists" clarifies that the three times exist and the three unconditioned dharmas also exist; hence they are named the Sarvāstivāda school. Now, since citing the assertion of existence is already incorrect, one should know that the remaining three propositions are also mistaken; thus it is said that citing the beginning subsumes the end. Refuting the Vātsīputrīyas: their grasping of the self has four propositions: 1. identical, 2. separate, 3. both identical and separate, 4. neither identical nor separate. And the Vātsīputrīyas posit neither identical nor separate; since this is not established, one should know that the previous three propositions are also ruined; thus citing the end subsumes the beginning. Furthermore, previously the expressible self was refuted; now the inexpressible self is refuted, so all selves are empty. What are called the five dharma storehouses: the three times make three, the unconditioned makes four, and the fifth is called the inexpressible. "Inexpressible" means inexpressible as conditioned or unconditioned. Question: Why does this chapter refute the Vātsīputrīyas? Answer: The chapter "Refutation of the Self" in the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya explains that when the Vātsīputrīyas establish a self, they specifically cite fire and what is to be burned as a metaphor: having a distinct substance of self, it is not identical to the aggregates; arising from the conjunction of the aggregates, it is not separate from the aggregates—just as fire has a distinct substance and so is not identical to the fuel, yet reliant on fuel to arise, it is not separate from the fuel. Question: Since the Vātsīputrīyas posit a self, how do they practice the contemplation of non-self of the sixteen aspects of the truths? Answer: The Abhidharmakośa says: "Afterwards, emerging from contemplation, they see there is a self; entering contemplation, there is no self; therefore they can practice the contemplation of the sixteen aspects." Question: When did the Sarvāstivādins and Vātsīputrīyas appear? Answer: Within the three hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, from the Sthaviranikāya arose the Sarvāstivādins, and from the Sarvāstivādins emerged the Vātsīputrīya sect. The treatise Xuanyi has clarified this. The text of the treatise cites the two persons to explain the first half; from "Such persons" onwards, it explains the second half.