中觀論疏 7.12

7.12

「嬰兒色為即是」下，第二就一異門破。又開五別：一破、二救、三破救、四重救、五重破。就初為四：初定開；「二俱有過」下，第二總標有過；「何以故」下，第三作難。「是故二俱有過」下，第四總結。作難之中，前破一、次破異。大意為言：若老少是一則墮常過，老少若異則墮斷過。常則應恒，是少遂無有老，無老亦無少；斷則失於父子，乖世俗法。問：何故次無常後有一異破耶？答有二義：一者外人云雖具麁細二種無常，終有色陰。是故今明一異求色不得，則無色陰。二者無常門破通大小乘，小乘亦言色是無常，而有無常之色不空。是故今明一異求色不得。前舉無常門破色，明色非是常；今就一異門破色，明色非無常。破色是常，破外道義；破色無常，破小乘義。故《般若》云「色非常非無常，如是習者與波若相應。」問：色一異破誰義耶？答：一破僧佉義，異破衛世義。又一門破色，破轉變部，即大眾部義；異門破色，破上座部義也。「問曰色雖不定」下，第二外人救義。救意云：色具二義，一念念生滅、二者相續。以念念滅，無有一色及以常過。老少始終相續名為一色，故無有異及以斷過，豈失父子乖世俗法耶？成實師釋相續有二家：一接續、二補續。接續有三釋。一開善云：前念應滅不滅，後念起，續於前念作假一義，故名為續。莊嚴云：轉前念為後念，詺作後念起續前耳，如想轉作受，故言受與想續，實無別受以續想也。次琰師云：想起懸與受作一義，故云續耳。次補續假，是光宅用。舊云：莊嚴是卷荷假、開善燈擔假、光宅是水渧補續假。此中通是三家義，別正同開善前滅後生故不一、相續轉作故不異。「答曰」下，第三破救。大意但問前念，前念若滅則有能續、無所續，若無所亦無能。前念不滅後念不生，有所續、無能續，無能亦無所。又前念不滅，何須後續？又若前念滅，還墮異斷；如其不滅，終是一常。此破意於理已足，但成實者不受斯破，云：當前念時有其兩力，有應滅力、有應轉力，應滅力自滅、應轉力自轉，故舉體滅、舉體轉。今作三節破之。初問：汝識乃有兩力，今想為續汝滅、為續汝不滅？若滅，何得論續耶？若續不滅者，識既不滅，想何由得起來續識耶？次問：前一念識為是一體、為是兩體？彼答只是一體。今問：若只是一體者，有想既其轉者，則將汝轉去，何得有滅？不爾，滅力將滅去，那得有轉耶？其云：轉者自轉、滅者自滅。若爾者，則有兩體，便不相開，何得是一法耶？三者汝識想是兩法共續為一假，故假是有。今言識想是兩不滅法，相續成一不滅法不耶？若爾，既假常在不滅也。「問曰」下，第四重救。救意云：不說滅不滅則離上滅不滅二過，但前色不住故非常非一，復相似相續而生故非斷非異，無上過也。又不暫住故非不滅，能生相似故非滅。「答曰」下，第五重破救。「則有定色而更生」者，觀此破意，非是破補續義。若立補續義，前色去、後色補，則有二過：一者墮上無父子失。前子色去、後子色來，則非復前子，豈非失父子耶？二者復有墮千萬種色。一色去、一色來，豈不千萬？而今乃云則有定色而更生，向但云前色不住、後相似生不住之色。此言猶濫，或可轉來現在、或可謝於過去。若轉來現在，豈非定色而更生耶？復言後相似生則有千萬種色，以前色不住則是定色更生，後相似生則有千萬種色。破前二句，有此二文也。又既有千萬種色，即千萬身千萬種人，不名相續，始終為一色一身一人也。「如是一切處」下，第二總結。又開五別：一法說門結；「如芭蕉」下，第二譬說門結；「如是智者」下，第三重就法說門結；「如燈炎」下，第四重就譬喻門結；「是故色無定性故空」下，第五總結也。「世俗言說」者，此為釋疑故來。疑云：若無色者，經何故說耶？是故釋云：隨俗說耳，非實有也。問：云何為世俗言說有耶？答：佛說虛誑妄取，實無此物，但隨世俗人強作色名耳。問：若爾，世諦唯有名耶？答：於俗人有名物，聖人亦無有名，隨俗作名耳。

From "Is the form of an infant identical to..." onwards, the second part refutes in terms of the approach of identity and difference. This also opens into five divisions: first, refutation; second, rescue; third, refutation of the rescue; fourth, repeated rescue; fifth, repeated refutation. The first part has four sections: first, establishing the alternatives; from "Both have faults" onwards, the second part generally indicates that there are faults; from "Why is this so?" onwards, the third raises difficulties; from "Therefore, both have faults" onwards, the fourth provides a general conclusion. Within raising difficulties, he first refutes identity, and next refutes difference. The main idea is: if old age and youth are identical, then one falls into the fault of permanence; if old age and youth are different, then one falls into the fault of annihilation. Permanence would mean remaining constant, so that being young, there would never be old age, and without old age there would also be no youth; annihilation would entail the loss of father and son, contradicting conventional worldly phenomena. Question: Why is there a refutation by identity and difference following impermanence? Answer: There are two reasons. First, an opponent says that although form possesses both gross and subtle impermanence, the aggregate of form ultimately exists; therefore, it is now shown that when seeking form in terms of identity and difference, it cannot be found, and thus there is no aggregate of form. Second, the refutation by the gateway of impermanence is common to both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna, for the Hīnayāna also says that form is impermanent, yet they hold that impermanent form exists and is not empty; therefore, it is now shown that seeking form through identity and difference, it cannot be found. Previously, adducing the gateway of impermanence to refute form clarified that form is not permanent; now, refuting form in terms of identity and difference clarifies that form is not impermanent. Refuting form as permanent refutes the non-Buddhist doctrines; refuting form as impermanent refutes the Hīnayāna doctrine. Hence the Prajñāpāramitā states: "Form is neither permanent nor impermanent; one who trains in this way accords with prajñā." Question: Whose doctrine does the refutation of form as identical or different refute? Answer: Identity refutes the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya; difference refutes the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika. Moreover, refuting form through the gateway of identity refutes the Pariṇāmavāda, which is the doctrine of the Mahāsāṃghika; refuting form through the gateway of difference refutes the doctrine of the Sthaviravāda. From "Question: Although form is not fixed..." onwards, the second part is the opponent's rescue. The intention of the rescue is: form possesses two aspects—first, moment-by-moment arising and ceasing; second, continuity. Because it ceases from moment to moment, there is no single [abiding] form, and thus no fault of permanence; because old age and youth form a continuity from beginning to end, it is called a single form, so there is no difference and no fault of annihilation—how could there be any loss of father and son, or contradiction of conventional worldly phenomena? The masters of the Tattvasiddhi explain continuity in two schools: first, continuation by conjunction; second, continuation by replenishment. Continuation by conjunction has three explanations. First, Kaishan says: when the preceding moment should cease but has not yet ceased, the subsequent moment arises, continuing the preceding moment to constitute the meaning of a single provisional entity; hence it is called continuation. Zhuangyan says: transforming the preceding moment into the subsequent moment is merely designated as the subsequent moment arising to continue the preceding one; just as conception transforms into sensation, one therefore says that sensation continues conception, but there is actually no separate sensation that continues conception. Next, Master Yan says: when conception arises, it remotely forms a single meaning with sensation, and hence one merely says it continues. Next, the provisional designation of continuation by replenishment is used by Guangzhai. Traditionally it is said: Zhuangyan is the provisional entity of the rolling lotus leaf; Kaishan is the provisional entity of carrying lamps on a shoulder-pole; Guangzhai is the provisional entity of replenishing water droplets. Here it generally covers the doctrines of all three masters, but specifically accords with Kaishan: because the prior ceases and the subsequent arises, they are not identical; because of continuous transformation, they are not different. From "Answer:" onwards, the third part refutes the rescue. The main idea is simply to question the preceding moment: if the preceding moment ceases, then there is that which can continue, but nothing to be continued; and if there is no object, there is also no subject. If the preceding moment does not cease, the subsequent moment does not arise: there is that to be continued, but nothing that can continue; and having no subject, there is also no object. Furthermore, if the preceding moment does not cease, why would a subsequent continuation be needed? Moreover, if the preceding moment ceases, one reverts to falling into difference and annihilation; if it does not cease, it ultimately remains a single permanent thing. This refutation is already logically sufficient, but the followers of the Tattvasiddhi do not accept this refutation, saying: at the time of the preceding moment there are two capacities—the capacity to cease and the capacity to transform; the capacity to cease ceases on its own, and the capacity to transform transforms on its own; therefore, in its entire substance it ceases, and in its entire substance it transforms. Now we refute it in three steps. First, we ask: your consciousness supposedly possesses two capacities; now does conception continue your cessation, or does it continue your non-cessation? If it continues cessation, how can one speak of continuation? If it continues non-cessation, since consciousness has not ceased, how could conception arise to continue consciousness? Second, we ask: is the consciousness of that preceding single moment a single substance, or two substances? They answer that it is only a single substance. Now we ask: if it is only a single substance, since there is a conception that transforms, it would carry you away in transformation—how could there be cessation? Otherwise, the capacity of cessation would carry it away in cessation—how could there be transformation? They say: that which transforms transforms on its own; that which ceases ceases on its own. If that were so, then there would be two substances that do not accommodate each other—how could it be a single phenomenon? Third, your consciousness and conception are two phenomena that together continue to form a single provisional entity, so the provisional entity exists. Now do you say that consciousness and conception are two unceasing phenomena that continuously form a single unceasing phenomenon, or not? If so, then the provisional entity would always remain and never cease. From "Question:" onwards, the fourth part is a repeated rescue. The intention of the rescue is: by not speaking of cessation or non-cessation, one avoids the two faults of cessation and non-cessation above; but because the preceding form does not abide, it is neither permanent nor identical; and because it arises in a similar continuity, it is neither annihilated nor different, so there are none of the above faults. Moreover, because it does not abide for an instant, it is not unceasing; and because it can produce a similar [moment], it is not ceased. From "Answer:" onwards, the fifth part is a repeated refutation of the rescue. As for "then there would be a determinate form that is produced anew," examining the intention of this refutation, it is not refuting the meaning of continuation by replenishment. If one establishes the meaning of continuation by replenishment, where the preceding form departs and the subsequent form replenishes it, then there would be two faults: first, falling into the aforementioned fault of having no father and son: if the prior son's form departs and the subsequent son's form arrives, it is no longer the prior son—how would this not lose father and son? Second, one would also fall into having tens of millions of kinds of form: with one form departing and one form arriving, how could there not be tens of millions? Yet now he says: "then there would be a determinate form that is produced anew." Just earlier he merely said that the preceding form does not abide and that a subsequent similar form arises, [which is] a non-abiding form. This statement is still ambiguous: it might either transform into the present, or pass away into the past. If it transforms into the present, how is that not a determinate form produced anew? Furthermore, saying that a subsequent similar form arises entails tens of millions of kinds of form: because the preceding form does not abide, it is a determinate form produced anew; because the subsequent similar form arises, there are tens of millions of kinds of form. To refute the preceding two lines, there are these two passages. Moreover, since there would be tens of millions of kinds of form, there would be tens of millions of bodies and tens of millions of kinds of persons, which could not be called a continuity remaining a single form, a single body, and a single person from beginning to end. From "In this way everywhere..." onwards, the second part is the general conclusion. This also opens into five divisions: first, concluding via doctrinal statement; from "Like a plantain tree..." onwards, the second concludes via metaphor; from "In this way the wise..." onwards, the third repeatedly concludes via doctrinal statement; from "Like the flame of a lamp..." onwards, the fourth repeatedly concludes via metaphor; from "Therefore, form lacks a determinate nature and is empty" onwards, the fifth is the overall conclusion. As for "conventional discourse," this is introduced to resolve a doubt. The doubt asks: if there is no form, why do the sūtras speak of it? Therefore it explains: it is merely spoken in accordance with convention, not because it really exists. Question: How does it exist as conventional discourse? Answer: The Buddha taught deceptive and false grasping; in reality there is no such entity, but in accordance with worldly conventions one forcibly applies the name of form. Question: If so, is there only a name in conventional truth? Answer: For conventional persons there are names and entities; for the noble ones there are not even names, but they merely make names in accordance with convention.