中觀論疏 7.34

7.34

「問曰」下，生第二段次破他性。有自性即是二世有義，他性即是二世無義，以無有自性假於眾緣然後得生故。自性望眾緣，眾緣於自即是他也。答中上半以自況他、下半釋破。釋破意自性於他性亦名他性，既無自即無他性。望長行，他於他即是自性，既無自性亦無他性。長行初以二義破自性：一就因成門破、次就相待門破。後亦引二義破於他性，如一柱具二假、因四微成，故無自性，無自性故空，即因成空。縱有柱，必是長短，短若有自體，不因於長；因長有短，短無自體，是故短空。然自有他有，須精論之。若守初章作解者，云他有有可有，不由無故有。此有既是自有，今無有可有、由無故有，應是他有。若今由無故有非他有者，他不由無故有，應不自有。又他不由無故有既是性義，今由無故有稱為假義。既是性假相對，亦應自他相對也。「問曰」下，生自他外有。前問意云：諸法乃不可自他，終應有世諦萬法。又汝乃不許自他定性有，應有不自不他因緣之有。答中上半明離自他外無更有法、下半舉自他攝一切法。有自有他是則有法，無自無他是則無法。所言自他者，約二義論：一者如五陰中人體性為自，五陰為他；二者以陰中人為自，自陰已外一切諸法並皆是他。是故自他攝法義盡。又自他門各攝法亦盡。如人當人是人自、法當法是法自，天下無非自，既言無自則無一切法。又他門相望無非是他，破他則一切亦盡。自他合亦盡，瓶為自，瓶外一切皆是他也。

From "Question" onward, the second section is introduced, next refuting other-nature. Having an intrinsic nature is the doctrine of the two times existing; other-nature is the doctrine of the two times not existing, because it lacks an intrinsic nature and arises only after relying on various conditions. Relative to intrinsic nature, the various conditions are "other" to the self. In the response, the first half uses the self to illustrate the other; the second half explains the refutation. The meaning of the refutation is that relative to other-nature, intrinsic nature is also called other-nature; since there is no self, there is no other-nature. Looking at the prose, the other relative to the other is simply intrinsic nature; since there is no intrinsic nature, there is also no other-nature. In the prose, intrinsic nature is first refuted through two meanings: first, refuting it through the gate of formation through causes; second, refuting it through the gate of mutual dependence. Later, it also adduces two meanings to refute other-nature: for example, a single pillar possesses two provisional designations; being formed through the four subtle elements, it lacks an intrinsic nature, and because it lacks an intrinsic nature it is empty—this is emptiness through causal formation. Even if there is a pillar, it must be either long or short; if short had an intrinsic substance, it would not depend on long; because short exists depending on long, short lacks an intrinsic substance, and therefore short is empty. However, own-being and other-being must be investigated thoroughly. If one interprets by adhering to the opening section, it says: other-being has that which can be, which does not exist because of non-being. Since this being is own-being, now having nothing that can be and existing because of non-being should be other-being. If existing now because of non-being is not other-being, then what does not exist because of non-being should not be own-being. Furthermore, that other does not exist because of non-being is the meaning of intrinsic nature, whereas now existing because of non-being is called the meaning of provisional designation. Since nature and provisionality are mutually contrasted, self and other should also be mutually contrasted. From "Question" onward, being apart from self and other is introduced. The intent of the preceding question was: even if phenomena cannot be self or other, ultimately the myriad phenomena of conventional truth should exist. Furthermore, even if you do not allow being with a fixed nature of self and other, there should be being through causes and conditions that is neither self nor other. In the response, the first half explains that apart from self and other there is no further phenomenon; the second half shows that self and other subsume all phenomena. If there are self and other, then there are phenomena; if there is neither self nor other, then there are no phenomena. What are called self and other are discussed in terms of two meanings: first, as within the five aggregates, the substance of the person is the self, and the five aggregates are the other; second, taking the person within the aggregates as the self, all phenomena outside one's own aggregates are entirely the other. Therefore, self and other exhaustively subsume all phenomena. Furthermore, the gates of self and other each subsume all phenomena exhaustively: for instance, a person as a person is the self of the person, and a phenomenon as a phenomenon is the self of the phenomenon; under heaven there is nothing that is not a self, and since it is said that there is no self, there are no phenomena whatsoever. Moreover, viewed relatively from the gate of the other, there is nothing that is not other; refuting the other likewise exhausts everything. The combination of self and other is also exhaustive: a jar is the self, and everything outside the jar is the other.