中觀論疏 7.36

7.36

「若人見有無」下，第二合破有無。離破有四，合破亦四。就初偈序其四失而呵責之、第二偈引佛說勸捨有無、第三兩偈重破無有釋成捨義、第四兩偈出有無過釋破有無所以。長行云「必求有見」者，此非是有無中有見，此乃是深著諸法必求有所見也。「佛能滅有無」下，第二引經勸捨有無。恐外人云：論主自破有無，何必可信？是故今明佛親勸捨，宜應受之。問：此是小乘經耶？大乘經耶？答：此是小乘經。所以引小乘經者，明小乘經中尚破有無，何況大乘。又若就著有無，非但大乘不攝，亦非學小乘人，故引小乘經也。《大品經》引先尼得信，亦引小乘以況大，明小乘尚辨法空，況大乘耶。「若法實有性」下，第三兩偈重破有無，釋成勸捨。若實有有無，佛不勸捨；以求之無從，妄謂為有，故佛勸捨。兩偈為二：初就有性門破異、第二偈俱就性無性門破異。問：何故破異耶？答：惑人謂內外諸法並皆變異故有有法，有有法故即有無法；今求變異無從即無有法，有法既無無法亦無。又破異者，或人謂本無今有為生，則無變為有；已有還無為滅，有變異為無。今既破於異，則具破有無。第二偈上半重牒前有性門無異，此破外道毘曇等義；下半破成實及中假之流，言有因緣無性之異。「定有則著常」下，第四兩偈顯有無過，釋次破有無意。所以諸佛菩薩經之與論破有無者，良由有無是諸見之根、障正觀本，是故破耳。又顯有無過，勸外人捨於有無。有無無過，諸佛菩薩不勸捨之，以是大過故須捨也。初偈標有無是斷常、次偈釋有無是斷常。上半標有無是斷常、下半勸捨。斷常是十四難本、為六十二見根，有見則有愛，愛見既具足則纏垢又生。既有煩惱則便有業，以有惑業迴流六趣，有此大過故下半勸捨。長行云「如說三世者」，此是薩婆多義。又說因中先有果，此是僧佉執。前內今外，皆墮於常。「斷滅名無相續因」者，前念為因、後念為果，前念既滅則無後因，後念果起何所詶耶？前破常，破衛世與僧佉；今破斷，破二世無及優樓迦義。又前別破二家，今總破先因後果義也。第二偈釋有無是斷常所以。麁論斷常，凡有二種：一法斷常、二人斷常，陰滅神滅此是人斷，陰滅神存名為人常。法斷常者，如三世有部名為法常，二世無義即是法斷，蓋並是麁論斷常。問：云何有無是斷常？答：且約人作。人因陰有則無自體，若有人自體不假陰成。陰雖斷滅則人存，故是常。瓶柱亦爾，故有是常。然因果相續名為不斷，今因遂滅無則果無所續，故無即是斷。若望大乘無所得觀，裁起有心即墮於常，徵起無念便入於斷。問：起何等有無斷常耶？答：觸事皆得論之，舉其宗要正是道也。若言有道可求則墮有中名為常見，若無道可求則墮無中名為斷見。〈成壞品〉云「若有所受法，則墮於斷常。」

From "If a person perceives existence and nonexistence" onward is the second [section], refuting existence and nonexistence together. The separate refutation had four [sections], and the combined refutation likewise has four: The first verse sets forth their four errors and rebukes them. The second verse quotes the Buddha's teaching to urge abandoning existence and nonexistence. The third [set of] two verses re-refutes nonexistence and existence, explaining and establishing the meaning of abandonment. The fourth [set of] two verses presents the faults of existence and nonexistence, explaining the reason for refuting existence and nonexistence. When the prose states, "[One] inevitably seeks a view of existence," this is not a view of existence from between existence and nonexistence; rather, it is deep attachment to phenomena, inevitably seeking something to be seen. From "The Buddha is able to eliminate existence and nonexistence" onward is the second [part], quoting a sūtra to urge the abandonment of existence and nonexistence. It is feared that an opponent might say: "The author of the treatise refutes existence and nonexistence on his own; why must this be trustworthy?" Therefore, it is now made clear that the Buddha himself urged their abandonment, so one ought to accept it. Question: Is this a Hīnayāna sūtra or a Mahāyāna sūtra? Answer: This is a Hīnayāna sūtra. The reason for citing a Hīnayāna sūtra is to make clear that even within Hīnayāna sūtras existence and nonexistence are refuted, let alone in the Mahāyāna. Furthermore, if one clings to existence and nonexistence, not only is one not embraced by the Mahāyāna, but one is also not a practitioner of the Hīnayāna; therefore a Hīnayāna sūtra is quoted. The *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* cites the attainment of faith by Śreṇika, likewise citing the Hīnayāna to illustrate the Mahāyāna, making clear that since even the Hīnayāna explains the emptiness of dharmas, how much more so the Mahāyāna! From "If a dharma truly had intrinsic nature" onward is the third [part], where two verses re-refute existence and nonexistence, explaining and establishing the exhortation to abandon them. If existence and nonexistence truly existed, the Buddha would not urge their abandonment; because seeking them yields no basis and they are falsely thought to exist, the Buddha urged their abandonment. The two verses comprise two [points]: First, from the approach of having intrinsic nature, change is refuted; the second verse, addressing both intrinsic nature and lack of intrinsic nature, refutes change. Question: Why refute change? Answer: Deluded people think that internal and external dharmas all undergo change, and therefore there are existent dharmas; because there are existent dharmas, there are nonexistent dharmas. Now, seeking change yields no basis, so there are no existent dharmas; since existent dharmas do not exist, nonexistent dharmas also do not exist. Furthermore, in refuting change: some people think that original nonexistence becoming present existence constitutes arising—thus nonexistence changes into existence; while existing things turning back into nonexistence constitutes cessation—thus existence changes into nonexistence. Now, since change is refuted, existence and nonexistence are both fully refuted. The first half of the second verse reiterates the preceding approach of having intrinsic nature lacking change; this refutes the tenets of the non-Buddhists, the Abhidharma, and so forth. The second half refutes the *Tattvasiddhi* and the proponents of provisionality within the middle, who speak of the change of naturelessness through causes and conditions. From "Determined existence leads to clinging to permanence" onward is the fourth [part], where two verses reveal the faults of existence and nonexistence, explaining the intention behind subsequently refuting existence and nonexistence. The reason why the sūtras and treatises of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas refute existence and nonexistence is precisely because existence and nonexistence are the roots of all views and the basis obstructing right contemplation; therefore they are refuted. Furthermore, revealing the faults of existence and nonexistence urges opponents to abandon existence and nonexistence. If existence and nonexistence had no faults, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas would not urge abandoning them; because they are great faults, they must be abandoned. The first verse marks existence and nonexistence as annihilation and permanence; the next verse explains why existence and nonexistence are annihilation and permanence. The first half marks existence and nonexistence as annihilation and permanence; the second half urges abandonment. Annihilation and permanence are the roots of the fourteen unanswerable questions and the foundation of the sixty-two views. Where there are views, there is craving; once craving and views are fully present, defilements and impurities arise again. Once there are afflictions, there is karma; because of afflictions and karma, one transmigrates through the six destinies. Because there are these great faults, the second half urges abandonment. The prose states: "As for those who speak of the three times," this is the Sarvāstivāda tenet. Also, speaking of the effect pre-existing in the cause is the Sāṃkhya attachment. The former is Buddhist and the latter non-Buddhist, yet both fall into permanence. As for "'annihilation' means having no cause for continuity": the prior thought-moment is the cause and the subsequent thought-moment is the effect; since the prior thought-moment has ceased, there is no subsequent cause, so when the effect of the subsequent thought-moment arises, what does it repay? Earlier, in refuting permanence, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya were refuted; now, in refuting annihilation, the nonexistence of the two times and the tenets of Ulūka are refuted. Furthermore, earlier the two schools were refuted individually, whereas now the doctrine of prior cause and subsequent effect is refuted in general. The second verse explains the reason why existence and nonexistence are annihilation and permanence. In rough terms, annihilation and permanence are of two kinds: first, the annihilation and permanence of dharmas; second, the annihilation and permanence of persons. The skandhas perishing and the spirit perishing is the annihilation of the person; the skandhas perishing while the spirit endures is called the permanence of the person. As for the annihilation and permanence of dharmas: the Sarvāstivāda is termed dharma-permanence, while the doctrine of the nonexistence of the two times is dharma-annihilation; these are both rough discussions of annihilation and permanence. Question: How are existence and nonexistence annihilation and permanence? Answer: Let us explain this provisionally with respect to the person. A person exists in dependence on the skandhas and therefore lacks self-substance. If a person had a self-substance, it would not depend on the skandhas for its formation. Even though the skandhas are annihilated, the person would endure, hence it is permanent. A vase or a pillar is also like this; hence existence is permanence. However, the continuity of cause and effect is called non-annihilation; now, if the cause utterly ceases and is nonexistent, the effect has nothing to continue, hence nonexistence is precisely annihilation. From the perspective of the Mahāyāna contemplation of non-attainment, the moment a mind of existence arises, one falls into permanence; the moment a thought of nonexistence emerges, one enters into annihilation. Question: What kind of existence and nonexistence, annihilation and permanence, arise? Answer: This can be discussed regarding any matter, but to cite the central essence, it is precisely the Path. If one says there is a Path that can be sought, one falls into existence, which is called the view of permanence; if there is no Path that can be sought, one falls into nonexistence, which is called the view of annihilation. The "Chapter on Examination of Becoming and Dissolution" states: "If there is any dharma that is apprehended, one falls into annihilation and permanence."