中觀論疏 8.16

8.16

「若業有性」下，第二破外人義。此從一業至七業乃至不失法，總破外人上三番義也。問：此論常先破外邪、後申正因緣義，今何故先申正、後破邪？答：論有多體，不應一途而取之也。又前申正，明業不墮斷常，欲顯外人計業墮於常見，故此申即是破也。五偈為二：初四偈就業門破業、後一偈舉煩惱破業。初又二：前三偈破其未受果業，次一偈破其過去已受果業義，即是破其二世有義也。初三偈次第相生，前偈明無性故不生不滅，則顯有性者是於生滅，生則為常、滅則為斷。故今第一偈云「若業有性者是則名為常」。以未來本有業性，豈非常耶，又現在執業有性，亦墮於常。此為正意。若執業有一毫自體，則一毫不假緣，則名之為常。若一毫之法假緣則無自體，無自體則無物，無物則本無生，云何有業？此言切要，一切法皆作此問之。「不作亦名業」者，未來本有善惡兩業，現在雖不造作，亦名為業。又現在有一毫業自體則不假緣，便是本有故為常。「常則不可作」者，未來本自有業則名為常，常則不可作。此第一偈顯性有義有於常過，第二偈傳顯前下半不作業有過。上半總明不作有罪，下半別明罪過。第三偈上半破世俗法過，下半罪福無差別過。餘二偈易知。「問曰」下，第五番次破業果報，前問、次答。問意有二：一領因無，仍上最後以煩惱破業生也；二立果有也。「答曰」下，第二破。汝以果有故證因有者，今以因空驗果是空。長行先釋上半；今「諸煩惱」下，釋下半也。問：煩惱與業望果云何異耶？答：《俱舍論》云「煩惱直令果有，業能令六道果差別。」與此文長行相應也。「問曰」下，第六番破起業人義。前來五段並是破法，今次破人。法為人本，又內學多計有法，故前破法、後破於人。前立、次破。立為三：一者長行發起、二偈本正立、三解釋。長行有二：初領前因果無。「而經說」下，立有人法。偈本正立人之因。《毘婆沙》云「無明覆其眼，愛結縛其身，則是從癡有愛。癡愛因緣是故起業，業因緣受六道身。」下半立作受二者不一不異。實法義人滅於前、牛生於後，是故不一；假名相續轉人作牛，所以不異。亦得約人牛兩形是故不一，神明無別所以不異。答中二偈，為兩：初偈明因人法無、次偈果人法無。前偈上半明所起法無、下半辨能起人無。第二偈上半明因人法無故果法無、下半明果法無故果人無。《涅槃經》云「聞無作無受，五逆罪滅。」今此兩偈明無人作法作、無所受果能受人，五逆即滅。亦是生法二忍、人法兩無我。此是本性無，非折故無。長行為三：初釋偈本，即是破義。「業有三種」下，別釋立義。身口意為三，亦是罪福無動等三，此別釋業義也。「五陰中假名人」，此釋起業人也。「是業」下，釋果報也。受果人即是起業人，故不別釋之。「若起業者」下，第三還結成破意。「問曰」下，第七番破眼現見事，前問、次答。外人譬理雖屈，而惑心不除，故舉現所見事以問論主。問有二：一領上所破之事。「而今現見」下，正舉現事以問論主。若人法都空，眼不應見；如其眼見，則人法不無。又聞前無，今以現所見有，請論主會通，故有「云何」之言。又上一舌已窮，今舉兩眼來救。「答」下三偈為二：初兩偈別明法喻、次一偈總明法喻。前又二：初偈舉喻、次偈合喻。所以舉重化曉之者，汝言現見必有、若不有應不見者，此事不然，眼亦見化，可言有耶？眼雖見化，既其不有，眼見六道事亦同然。又上來六番明業畢竟空無所有義，今舉十喻明不有有義。前明有無所有，破著有之心；今明無所有有，除斷無之見，即是就業義明中道。又上來破定性有，此一番始得申經，明世諦因緣如幻化有，此有無所有方是真諦。又上來就法說門破業，今此一番就喻說破業，具如〈三相品〉末委曲釋之。上來破外人斷常業竟，乃明如此等畢竟空，破病始竟也，今始申經二諦。肇公用此文作《不真空論》「譬如幻化人，非無幻化人，幻化人非真人也。」非無幻化人，即俗諦；幻化人非真人，謂真諦也。又非無幻化人顯非無義，非真人顯非有義，都是明俗諦幻六道宛然而常四絕，四絕宛然而六道不失也。問：何故舉世尊重化？答：佛化與餘人化，凡有三異，一佛能重化，餘不能；二佛滅後能留化，餘人不能；三餘人化主語、化人便默，化人若語、化主便默；佛則能俱語俱默。第三偈上半廣法、下半廣喻。長行初釋前偈；「如是生死身」下釋第二偈合譬。「諸煩惱」者，釋第三偈，前釋上半。釋上半中四法：一釋煩惱、二釋業、三釋作者、四釋果報。「分別有九十八使」者，《毘婆沙》云「佛但說於七使，迦旃延聰明利根分別七使為九十八。」與此文相應。又《成論》破九十八云「煩惱隨地不隨界，何止九十八。」則知九十八非佛說，三毒九十八但是根本正使。「九結」者，七使并慳、嫉，根支合說也。「十纏六垢」，但說支條也。「無量諸煩惱」者，略說百八，廣有八萬四千。「業名為身口意業」下，釋偈中業也。初明三業。「今世後世」下，就三性明業也。「苦報」下，就三受門明業。「現報」下，就三報門明業。「如是等無量」，上來但是四種三門明業，復有四業十業無量諸門也。「作者」，釋偈中作者。「異報」下，釋偈中果報字。「如是等」下，釋第三偈下半也。

From "If karma has intrinsic nature" onward is the second [section], refuting the opponent's position. This spans from one karma up to seven karmas, and even to the imperishable dharma, refuting in a comprehensive way the opponent's preceding three rounds of positions. Question: This treatise regularly first refutes the external heterodoxies and subsequently elucidates the correct doctrine of causes and conditions; why does it now first elucidate the correct and subsequently refute the heterodox? Answer: Treatises have many formats; one should not take them in only one single way. Furthermore, previously elucidating the correct clarified that karma does not fall into annihilation and permanence, wishing to reveal that the opponent's reification of karma falls into the view of permanence; hence, this elucidation is itself the refutation. The five verses comprise two [parts]: the first four verses refute karma in terms of the karma aspect itself; the final verse adduces afflictions to refute karma. The first part also has two [subsections]: the first three verses refute karma that has not yet experienced its fruit, and the next single verse refutes the position on karma that has already experienced its fruit in the past, which is to refute their thesis of existence in the two time periods. The first three verses arise in succession: the preceding verse explained that because of lack of intrinsic nature there is no arising and no cessation, thereby revealing that possessing intrinsic nature implies arising and cessation, where arising constitutes permanence and cessation constitutes annihilation. Thus, the first verse now states: "If karma has intrinsic nature, then it is termed permanent." Since intrinsic nature of karma would fundamentally exist in the future, how could it not be permanent? Moreover, grasping karma as having intrinsic nature in the present also falls into permanence. This is the primary intended meaning. If one grasps karma as possessing even the slightest self-entity, then that slightest bit does not depend on conditions, and it is therefore called permanent. If a phenomenon of even the slightest bit depends on conditions, then it lacks a self-entity; lacking a self-entity, it is nothing; being nothing, it fundamentally lacks arising—how could karma exist? These words are crucial; all dharmas should be queried in this manner. "Even non-action would be termed karma": the two karmas, wholesome and unwholesome, would fundamentally exist in the future, so even if one does not produce them in the present, they would still be called karma. Furthermore, if the present had the slightest self-entity of karma, it would not depend on conditions; that is, it would fundamentally exist, and therefore be permanent. "Being permanent, it could not be done": if karma fundamentally existed by itself in the future, it would be called permanent; being permanent, it could not be done. This first verse reveals the flaw of permanence in the thesis of existence with intrinsic nature. The second verse successively reveals the flaws in the preceding latter half's [thesis of] karma without action. The first half comprehensively clarifies that non-action incurs fault; the second half specifically clarifies the nature of the fault. The first half of the third verse refutes the flaw regarding conventional phenomena; the second half points out the flaw of there being no distinction between demerit and merit. The remaining two verses are easy to understand. From "Question" onward is the fifth round, which in turn refutes karma and its fruit/retribution; first comes the question, followed by the reply. The question has two intentions: first, acknowledging the nonexistence of causes, following up on the very end where karma's arising was refuted by means of afflictions; second, establishing the existence of fruit. From "Reply" onward is the second [part], the refutation. You had used the existence of fruit to prove the existence of cause; now, through the emptiness of cause, the emptiness of fruit is verified. The prose first explains the first half; now, from "All afflictions" onward, it explains the second half. Question: How do afflictions and karma differ with respect to the fruit? Answer: The Kośa-śāstra states, "Afflictions directly cause the fruit to exist; karma is able to make the fruits of the six destinies differentiated." This accords with the prose of this text. From "Question" onward is the sixth round, refuting the notion of a person who initiates karma. The previous five sections all refuted dharmas; now, next, the person is refuted. Dharmas are the basis for the person, and moreover internal Buddhists mostly posit the existence of dharmas; hence, dharmas were refuted first, and the person is refuted afterwards. First comes the proposition, followed by the refutation. The proposition has three parts: first, the initiation in prose; second, the verse text properly establishing it; third, the explanation. The prose has two parts: first, acknowledging the preceding nonexistence of cause and fruit. From "Yet sūtras state" onward, it establishes that there are persons and dharmas. The verse text properly establishes the cause of the person. The Vibhāṣā states, "Ignorance covers one's eyes; the bond of craving ties one's body: that is, from delusion arises craving. Due to causes and conditions of delusion and craving, karma is initiated; due to causes and conditions of karma, bodies in the six destinies are received." The second half establishes that the agent and the experiencer are neither identical nor different. In the sense of real dharmas, the human ceases prior and the ox is born afterwards, and so they are not identical; in provisional designation continuity, the human transforms into the ox, and so they are not different. One may also take the two forms of human and ox as being not identical, while the conscious spirit has no distinction and is therefore not different. In the reply, there are two verses, making two parts: the first verse clarifies the nonexistence of causal persons and dharmas; the next verse clarifies the nonexistence of fruitional persons and dharmas. The first half of the first verse clarifies the nonexistence of the dharmas initiated; the second half explains the nonexistence of the person capable of initiating them. The first half of the second verse clarifies that because causal persons and dharmas are nonexistent, fruitional dharmas are nonexistent; the second half clarifies that because fruitional dharmas are nonexistent, the fruitional person is nonexistent. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra states, "Hearing that there is neither agent nor experiencer, the sins of the five heinous deeds are eradicated." Now these two verses clarify that there is no person who acts nor dharma that acts, no experienced fruit nor person capable of experiencing it—the five heinous deeds are thereupon eradicated. This also constitutes the two patiences regarding beings and dharmas, and the two selflessnesses of person and dharma. This is an intrinsic nonexistence, not a nonexistence produced by analytical reduction. The prose has three parts: first, explaining the verse text, which is the refutational meaning. From "Karma is of three kinds" onward, it specifically explains the proposition. Body, speech, and mind are the three; they are also the three of demerit, merit, and the unshakeable: this specifically explains the meaning of karma. "The provisional person within the five aggregates": this explains the person who initiates karma. From "This karma" onward, it explains the fruit/retribution. The person who receives the fruit is none other than the person who initiates karma, and is thus not explained separately. From "If one who initiates karma" onward is the third [part], concluding and completing the refutational intention. From "Question" onward is the seventh round, refuting the matter of what is visibly seen by the eye; first comes the question, followed by the reply. Although the opponent's reasoning is defeated by analogy, the deluded mind is not eliminated; therefore, they bring up matters visibly seen to question the treatise master. The question has two parts: first, acknowledging the matters refuted above. From "Yet now it is visibly seen" onward, it directly brings up visible matters to question the treatise master. If persons and dharmas were utterly empty, the eye should not see them; if the eye sees them, then persons and dharmas are not nonexistent. Moreover, having heard of the prior nonexistence, they now take the existence of what is visibly seen and request the treatise master to reconcile them, hence the words "how is it?". Furthermore, while their single tongue was exhausted above, they now bring forth their two eyes to the rescue. From "Reply" onward, the three verses comprise two parts: the first two verses specifically clarify the doctrine and analogy; the next single verse comprehensively clarifies the doctrine and analogy. The former also has two parts: the first verse adduces the analogy, and the next verse applies the analogy. The reason for adducing double phantom creations to elucidate this is: you say that what is visibly seen must exist, and that if it does not exist it should not be seen; this matter is not so, for the eye also sees phantom creations—can one say they exist? Even though the eye sees a phantom creation, it is nevertheless nonexistent; what the eye sees of affairs in the six destinies is likewise the same. Furthermore, the preceding six rounds clarified the meaning of karma being ultimately empty and nonexistent; now ten analogies are adduced to clarify the meaning of nonexistent existence. Previously, clarifying the nonexistence of existence refuted the mind that clings to existence; now, clarifying the existence of nonexistence removes the view of annihilatory nothingness—this is precisely elucidating the middle way in terms of karma. Moreover, the preceding refuted existence with fixed intrinsic nature, and only in this round can the sūtras be elucidated, clarifying that conventional causes and conditions exist like an illusion or phantom creation; only when this existence is nonexistent is it the ultimate truth. Furthermore, the preceding refuted karma through doctrinal discourse; this round refutes karma through analogies, fully explained in detail at the end of the "Chapter on the Three Characteristics". The refutation of the opponent's permanent and annihilated karma above is now finished, and by explaining such ultimate emptiness, the refutation of errors is finally complete; now the two truths of the sūtras are first elucidated. Master Zhao utilized this text to compose the *Buzhenkong lun*: "It is like a phantom-created person: it is not that there is no phantom person, but the phantom person is not a real person." "Not that there is no phantom person" is conventional truth; "the phantom person is not a real person" refers to ultimate truth. Moreover, "not that there is no phantom person" reveals the meaning of non-nonexistence, while "not a real person" reveals the meaning of non-existence; all of this clarifies that the illusory six destinies of conventional truth are manifest yet constantly severed of the four [extremes], and that while severed of the four [extremes] they are manifest and the six destinies are not lost. Question: Why adduce the double phantom creations of the World-Honoured One? Answer: The Buddha's phantom creations and the phantom creations of other people have three differences in total: first, the Buddha can create a phantom from a phantom, while others cannot; second, after the Buddha passes away, he can leave phantom creations behind, while others cannot; third, when another person creates a phantom, if the creator speaks the phantom becomes silent, and if the phantom speaks the creator becomes silent; the Buddha, however, can speak together and remain silent together. The first half of the third verse expands upon the doctrine; the second half expands upon the analogy. In the prose, it first explains the preceding verse; from "Such bodies in saṃsāra" onward, it explains the second verse's application of the analogy. "All afflictions" explains the third verse, first explaining the first half. In explaining the first half, there are four dharmas: first, explaining afflictions; second, explaining karma; third, explaining the agent; fourth, explaining the fruit/retribution. "Classified, there are ninety-eight underlying tendencies": The Vibhāṣā says, "The Buddha only taught seven underlying tendencies; Kātyāyana, possessing brilliant and sharp faculties, classified the seven tendencies into ninety-eight." This accords with the present text. Furthermore, the *Chengshi lun* refutes the ninety-eight, saying, "Afflictions follow the grounds, not the realms; why stop at ninety-eight?" Thus we know that the ninety-eight were not spoken by the Buddha; the three poisons and the ninety-eight are merely the fundamental, primary tendencies. "Nine fetters": the seven underlying tendencies along with avarice and jealousy, where roots and branches are stated together. "Ten entanglements and six impurities": these only state the branches. "Immeasurable afflictions": briefly stated, there are one hundred and eight; expanded, there are eighty-four thousand. From "Karma is called karma of body, speech, and mind" onward, it explains the karma in the verse. First it clarifies the three karmas. From "Present life and future life" onward, it clarifies karma in terms of the three natures. From "Painful retribution" onward, it clarifies karma through the approach of the three feelings. From "Present retribution" onward, it clarifies karma through the approach of the three retributions. "And immeasurable such as these": the above merely clarified karma through four varieties of threefold approaches; there are further the four karmas, the ten karmas, and immeasurable approaches. "Agent" explains the word agent in the verse. From "Different retribution" onward, it explains the word fruit/retribution in the verse. From "Such as these" onward explains the second half of the third verse.