中觀論疏 8.22

8.22

品為三：一長行發起、二偈本正明觀法、三長行解釋。初有二問答。前問意云：從〈因緣品〉至〈觀業品〉明一切法皆畢竟空是名諸法實相者，此牒論主上來所說也。詳此牒意則詺諸法實相以之為法，今觀此法故云觀法品。「云何入」者，入是悟也證也，是故問入。然虛妄不可得入實相、實相復不得入實相，又求虛妄不可得，將何物入實相耶？若以實相入實相者，則應建立實際於實際，而實不爾，二門之中云何得入？「答曰滅我我所名為入」者，外意云：有實相是所入、行人為能入，如今學大小乘人皆言：有人能證得菩提、菩提是所證。論主云：若能除能入之人、所入之法，畢竟無能入所入，乃名為入。《華嚴》云「如來深境界，其量齊虛空。一切眾生入，真實無所入。」《大集》云「無入之入乃名法入」。亦如開波若宗，身子問：「云何菩薩行於波若？」佛以五眼不見，而却責之：「若能不見，能行菩薩體。不見菩薩字、不見波若、不見行不見不行，乃名菩薩行於波若。」今爾。《智度論》第一卷摩犍提偈云「非見聞覺知，非持戒所得，亦非不見聞，非不持戒得。」彼難云：「若爾者，行啞法得道。」佛答云：「若不見諸法，汝爾時自啞。」並是今文意也。問：上來以破我，何故更破？答：我病難除，又是眾惑之本，是故重破。又上來多破實有我義，今此中正明入實相觀除微細假名之我。若言有大乘之人名為菩薩，欲行實相觀，即是我我所見，故異上也。次問答，如文。偈本關內舊分之為三：初五偈明聲聞稟教得益、次六偈明菩薩稟教得益、後一偈明緣覺得益。所以偏明聲聞、次菩薩者，此二同稟佛教，故一類明之。緣覺既出無佛世，不稟佛教，故在後別說也。猶如聲聞藏、菩薩藏，不名緣覺藏，以緣覺不稟教故也。前之二章即是明二藏，亦是大小乘，亦是半滿，故申一切教盡。稟此二教得益，明一切益周。不明人天教者，若明出世則具得世間。問：既是大乘論，但應明菩薩得益，云何明二乘教及益耶？答：示此論無迷不破、無教不申、無益不備，始是大乘，以大包小故也。所以先小後大者，示教益次第。復欲以示小是方便、大為真實，前開方便門、後示真實相也。近代人云：此是北土瑤師分之。蓋不遠尋古疏，故有此謬耳。又依長行末，青目自作此文，講者宜用也。一師相承開之為五：初一行半明所離、次一行半明得無我慧、第三二行明兩種涅槃、第四五行廣序佛教、第五二行明三乘得益；今明作此分之於文則亂，宜用前意也。就五偈明聲聞觀，以為二別：初一偈半序聲聞教、第二三偈半明稟教得益。就初又二：前一偈明人無我教、次半偈明法無我教，亦是生法二空也。初偈又二：上半破即陰我、下半破離陰我。上半云：我既即陰，陰有生滅，我亦應然。若爾，但見五陰，不見有我。又我是五陰，陰五我亦五，則失一我；一無則多亦無，亦應例之。我既即陰，我一陰亦一，則失五陰；多無故，一亦無。但今正破我，不破於陰，故但以我從陰，不將陰等我也。下半云：既離陰有我體，亦應離陰有我相；若還以陰相為我相，亦應還以陰體為我體。計我是示相煩惱。又云我有赤白等四色，又云我如淨珠燈炎，皆以陰相為相，是故今責。別不見我相令異陰相，不應還以陰相為我相也。問：計我者何故陰相為我相？答：陰攝有為，計我者聞，以有為相證我；無為無有相貌，不得舉以證我也。「若無有我者」，第二明法無我，亦是法空。前借陰以除我，此借我以除陰。問：《智度論》明大小乘具二無我智，十八卷云論主引小乘經云：何等是老病？謂法空。誰為老病死？謂人空。而《楞伽》、《攝論》等明小乘但得人空，云何通會？答：小乘有二，一鈍、二利，利者具得二空，鈍者但得人空，即毘曇、成實是也。二小乘多明人空、少說法空，大乘多說法空、少明人空，以少從多為論，故《楞伽》但明人空。三者小乘得人空盡，以皆知畢竟無我，故說得人空；得法空不盡，不知法本性空，不知三界內外法空，故是以不說聲聞法空也。

The chapter has three parts: first, the prose introduction; second, the verse text directly explaining the contemplation of dharmas; third, the prose commentary. The first contains two sets of questions and answers. The sense of the previous question is: from the "Chapter on Conditions" to the "Chapter on Contemplating Karma," it was explained that all dharmas are completely empty, which is termed the true mark of all dharmas; this recapitulates what the author of the treatise stated above. Considering the meaning of this recapitulation, the true mark of all dharmas is termed "dharma," and now contemplating this dharma is why it is called the "Chapter on Contemplating Dharmas." Regarding "how does one enter": "entering" means awakening and realizing; therefore, one asks about entering. However, delusion cannot enter the true mark, nor can the true mark enter the true mark; furthermore, seeking delusion yields nothing, so with what thing could one enter the true mark? If the true mark were to enter the true mark, one would have to establish the limit of reality upon the limit of reality, yet in truth it is not so; between these two gates, how could one attain entry? Regarding "The answer says: the extinguishing of 'I' and 'mine' is called entering": the outsider's idea is that the true mark is the entered, and the practitioner is the enterer—just as today those who study the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna all say that there is a person who can realize and attain bodhi, and bodhi is what is realized. The treatise master says: if one can eliminate the person who enters and the dharma that is entered, such that in the ultimate sense there is neither enterer nor entered, only then is it called entering. The *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* states: "The Tathāgata's profound sphere is equal in measure to space. All sentient beings enter it, yet in truth there is nothing entered." The *Mahāsaṃnipāta-sūtra* states: "Entry without entering is called entering the Dharma." It is also like opening the lineage of the *Prajñāpāramitā*: Śāriputra asked, "How does a bodhisattva practice prajñā?" The Buddha, [seeing] with the five eyes that it is not perceived, instead rebuked him: "If one can perceive nothing, one can practice the substance of a bodhisattva. Not seeing the word 'bodhisattva', not seeing prajñā, not seeing practice and not seeing non-practice—this is called a bodhisattva practicing prajñā." The present case is likewise. In the first fascicle of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, the verse to Māgandiya states: "It is not attained through seeing, hearing, perceiving, or cognizing, nor through keeping precepts; nor is it attained through not seeing or hearing, nor through not keeping precepts." He objected: "If so, one attains the Way by practicing a mute dharma." The Buddha replied: "If you do not see dharmas, you are at that time mute yourself." These all share the intent of the present text. Question: Since the self has already been refuted above, why refute it again? Answer: The sickness of the self is difficult to eliminate and is the root of all afflictions; therefore, it is refuted again. Furthermore, above it mostly refuted the concept of a substantially existent self; here, it directly clarifies that entering the contemplation of the true mark eliminates the subtle, provisionally designated self. If one says that there is a Mahāyāna person named "bodhisattva" who wishes to practice the contemplation of the true mark, this is itself the view of "I" and "mine"; hence it differs from the above. The next question and answer are as in the text. In the region of Guannei, the verse text was traditionally divided into three parts: first, five verses explain the śrāvaka's benefit from receiving the teaching; next, six verses explain the bodhisattva's benefit from receiving the teaching; finally, one verse explains the pratyekabuddha's attainment of benefit. The reason for first explaining the śrāvaka and next the bodhisattva is that both receive the Buddha's teaching, so they are explained as one category. Since pratyekabuddhas appear in an age without a Buddha and do not receive the Buddha's teaching, they are explained separately at the end. It is just as with the Śrāvaka Piṭaka and Bodhisattva Piṭaka: there is no Pratyekabuddha Piṭaka because pratyekabuddhas do not receive the teaching. The preceding two sections explain the two piṭakas, which are also the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, as well as the incomplete and complete [teachings]; thus they exhaustively elucidate all teachings. Receiving these two teachings and gaining benefit demonstrates that all benefits are complete. If the teachings for humans and devas are not explained, it is because explaining the supramundane fully includes the mundane. Question: Since this is a Mahāyāna treatise, it should only explain the bodhisattva's attainment of benefit; why explain the teachings and benefits of the two vehicles? Answer: To show that this treatise leaves no delusion unrefuted, no teaching unelucidated, and no benefit incomplete—only then is it the Mahāyāna, because the Great embraces the small. The reason for putting the small first and the Great later is to show the sequence of teaching and benefit. Furthermore, it intends to show that the small is an expedient and the Great is the real: first opening the door of expedients, and later revealing the true mark. Recent scholars say that this division was made by Master Yao of the North. This is merely because they have not investigated the ancient commentaries far enough, hence this error. Moreover, relying on the end of the prose section, Piṅgala himself composed this text; lecturers should adopt it. One master's transmission divides it into five: first, one and a half stanzas explain what is abandoned; next, one and a half stanzas explain the attainment of the wisdom of selflessness; third, two stanzas explain the two kinds of nirvāṇa; fourth, five stanzas extensively introduce the Buddha's teaching; fifth, two stanzas explain the three vehicles' attainment of benefit. We now explain that making this division causes disorder in the text; the former interpretation should be adopted. Regarding the five verses explaining the śrāvaka's contemplation, there are two divisions: first, one and a half verses introduce the śrāvaka teaching; second, three and a half verses explain the attainment of benefit from receiving the teaching. Within the first, there are again two: the first verse explains the teaching of the selflessness of persons; the next half-verse explains the teaching of the selflessness of dharmas, which are also the two emptinesses of living beings and dharmas. The first verse again has two: the first half refutes the self as identical to the aggregates; the second half refutes the self as distinct from the aggregates. The first half says: if the self were identical to the aggregates, since the aggregates have arising and ceasing, the self should also be like that. If so, one would only see the five aggregates and not see any self. Furthermore, if the self were the five aggregates, since the aggregates are five, the self would also be five, and thus the single self would be lost; if one is nonexistent, the many are also nonexistent, and this should apply by analogy. Since the self would be identical to the aggregates, and the self is one, the aggregates would also be one, and thus the five aggregates would be lost; since the many are nonexistent, the one is also nonexistent. But now it directly refutes the self and does not refute the aggregates; therefore, it only reduces the self to the aggregates and does not equate the aggregates with the self. The second half says: if there were a substance of the self distinct from the aggregates, there should also be characteristics of the self distinct from the aggregates; if one still takes the characteristics of the aggregates as the characteristics of the self, one should also take the substance of the aggregates as the substance of the self. Positing a self is an affliction that exhibits characteristics. It is also said that the self has four colors such as red and white, and it is said that the self is like a pure jewel or the flame of a lamp; these all take the characteristics of the aggregates as its characteristics, and therefore this is now questioned. Since no separate characteristics of the self are seen to make it distinct from the characteristics of the aggregates, one should not take the characteristics of the aggregates as the characteristics of the self. Question: Why do those who posit a self take the characteristics of the aggregates as the characteristics of the self? Answer: The aggregates encompass the conditioned; those who posit a self have heard [of the aggregates] and prove the self by conditioned characteristics; the unconditioned has no characteristics, so it cannot be cited to prove the self. "If there is no self" is the second, which clarifies the selflessness of dharmas, which is also the emptiness of dharmas. Previously it borrowed the aggregates to eliminate the self; here it borrows the self to eliminate the aggregates. Question: The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* explains that both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna possess the two wisdoms of selflessness; in fascicle eighteen, the treatise master cites a Hīnayāna sūtra: "What are old age and sickness? They are the emptiness of dharmas. Who undergoes old age, sickness, and death? That is the emptiness of persons." Yet the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, and others explain that the Hīnayāna only attains the emptiness of persons; how is this reconciled? Answer: There are two kinds of Hīnayāna: first, dull; second, sharp. The sharp fully attain both emptinesses; the dull only attain the emptiness of persons, which refers to the Abhidharma and the *Tattvasiddhi*. Second, the Hīnayāna mostly explains the emptiness of persons and rarely teaches the emptiness of dharmas, while the Mahāyāna mostly teaches the emptiness of dharmas and rarely explains the emptiness of persons; speaking in terms of subsuming the lesser under the greater, the *Laṅkāvatāra* only explains the emptiness of persons. Third, the Hīnayāna attains the emptiness of persons exhaustively, because they all know that ultimately there is no self, so they are said to attain the emptiness of persons; but they do not attain the emptiness of dharmas exhaustively, not knowing that dharmas are intrinsically empty by nature, and not knowing that dharmas internal and external to the three realms are empty; for this reason it is not said that śrāvakas [attain] the emptiness of dharmas.