中觀論疏 8.25

8.25

就文為二：第一三偈明菩薩所觀之法、第二三偈明菩薩得益人相。上聲聞法中亦作此二章也，一人無我教、次法無我教，即是雙教；後明智斷兩益。今大乘中亦前明兩教、後辨雙益也。三偈為二：初偈標方便實相二種章門、第二兩偈釋二章門。初上半標方便章門、下半標實相章門。問：何故前明我無我方便耶？答：正對聲聞以我為方便、無我為真實，如毘曇十六諦空無我理，又如成實者云：世諦有我、第一義諦無我，是故今明聲聞若我無我，望菩薩皆是方便，所以命初辨我無我方便也。然我無我既是方便，常無常等例然，故昔說無常既是方便，今說常樂亦是方便。如是三乘一乘萬義皆類。下半明真實章門，即是非我無我，亦非常無常，非三非一等萬義皆類。上半是世諦、下半是第一義諦。上半為三悉檀、下半是第一義悉檀。亦得上半是真俗二諦，《智度論》云「人等世界故有，第一義故無。」故知以我為世諦，無我為真諦；下半非我無我，則是中道一實諦也。又上半名為半字法門、下半究竟乃為滿字。若論具足滿者，上下二半皆是半字，非我無我我無我具足方圓滿稱為滿字。又上半即是教門、下半稱之為理。偈意多含，不可一途取盡也。「諸法實相者」下，第二兩偈釋章門。初偈逐近，釋實相章門；第二偈釋方便章門。又前明從方便入實相，故前明方便、後辨實相；今從實相起方便，故前實相、後方便。「諸法實相者」，牒前偈下半實相章門也。「心行言語斷」下，釋實相義也。初就法說門釋實相，竪超四句故四句心亡，橫絕百非故百非心斷。在心既爾，言語亦然，四句之言不能言、百非之說不能說也。又非但實相不可言，即言亦是實相，故雖言無言。故天女詰身子云：「汝但知實相無言，未悟言即實相。」故言滿十方常是四絕。問：云何爾耶？答：若有言體，即是本有，名之為常，常不可言。今因緣言，言無自體，故無言。以雖言，即本來不言故。〈業品〉云「諸業本不生，以無定性故。」亦應言：諸言本無言，以無定性故也。在言既爾，心行亦然。一者實相絕四句，四句心不能緣。二者即緣是實相，雖遍緣萬法亦常是四絕也。「無生亦無滅」者，下半就譬喻門說。四生不能生，故稱無生；力負不能滅，故稱無滅。又上言斷心滅者，明四句言本不生、今亦無滅，非是有四句言生然後滅之。言既爾，心亦然。「寂滅如涅槃」者，惑者皆謂生死有生滅、涅槃無生滅，故借涅槃喻其生死，汝所謂生死如汝涅槃，故云寂滅如涅槃。今明實相不同南方真諦之理、北土實相波若，亦異舊《地論》梨耶、晚《攝論》大乘阿摩羅識，如此等並同犢子計我有理存焉。今只論色是實相，如假名色不可有不可無，四句求色不可得，故色即是實相也。《智度論》四十二卷解云何為色相？云何為識相？無所有為色相，無所有是受想行識相。又天主歎須菩提所說，不壞假名而說實相，故知假名宛然而即是實相也。「一切實非實」下，第二釋前方便章門。問：前以我無我為方便，今云何以實不實釋之？又前以我無我二重為方便，非我非無我為實，今何以實不實四句解前方便？答：余聽之累載、講之積年，未見符文釋此意者。今少分識之，用簡來哲。前明我無我為方便者，此是對二乘以無我無實我為方便，故明二乘若權若實望菩薩皆成方便，非我非無我乃為真實。今此中論真實者，上明諸法實相者心行言語斷，此明菩薩所悟實相則絕於四句。實相雖絕四句之言，要因四句之言方得悟入實相，故以絕四句為實、以四句為方便。此釋實是契文旨也。問：何故以四句為方便、絕四句為真理耶？答：欲攝一切理教盡。夫論教者不出四句，則四句攝一切言教盡。夫論至理極乎絕四，故以絕四明極理。雖是一章之論，總攝一切佛法理教事圓也。問：何故上以我無我為方便，今以實不實為方便？答：欲示實相是體，體更無二，故前明實相還牒實相以釋實相，示方便是用，用有多門，故前示我無我方便，今示實不實方便。問：上何故以我無我為方便，今明實不實方便耶？答：上聲聞人我為方便、無我為實，以法為方便、無法為真實。上對聲聞，明我無我皆方便，非我無我為真實；今亦對聲聞，有法無法皆方便，非法無非法為真實，是故今明實不實也。

The text comprises two parts: first, three verses explaining the dharmas contemplated by the bodhisattva; second, three verses explaining the aspects of the persons who attain benefit, the bodhisattvas. In the dharma of the śrāvakas above, these two sections were also established: first the teaching of the non-self of persons, next the teaching of the non-self of dharmas—which is the dual teaching; and afterwards the two benefits of wisdom and cessation were explained. Here in the Mahāyāna, it likewise first explains the two teachings and afterwards treats the dual benefits. The three verses divide into two: the first verse sets out the two topical headings of expedient and real mark; the second two verses explain these two topical headings. The first half of the first [verse] sets out the heading of the expedient, and the second half sets out the heading of the real mark. Question: Why is the expedient of self and non-self explained first? Answer: It directly counters the śrāvakas' taking self as expedient and non-self as real, such as the emptiness and non-self principle of the sixteen aspects in the Abhidharma, or as the Tattvasiddhi scholars say: conventional truth has a self, while ultimate truth has no self. Therefore, it is now explained that whether self or non-self, in the eyes of the bodhisattva, they are both expedients for the śrāvaka; this is why the expedient of self and non-self is initially addressed. However, since self and non-self are expedients, permanence and impermanence follow the same pattern. Thus, the past teaching of impermanence was an expedient, and the present teaching of permanence and bliss is also an expedient. In this manner, the myriad doctrines of the three vehicles and the one vehicle are all analogous. The second half explains the heading of the real: namely, neither-self-nor-non-self, nor-permanent-nor-impermanent; neither-three-nor-one, and the myriad other doctrines are all analogous. The first half is conventional truth; the second half is ultimate truth. The first half comprises the three siddhāntas; the second half is the ultimate siddhānta. It is also admissible that the first half represents the two truths of ultimate and conventional: the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says, "Persons and the like exist from the perspective of the worldly, but are non-existent from the perspective of the ultimate." Thus we know that self is conventional truth and non-self is ultimate truth; the second half, neither-self-nor-non-self, is the single real truth of the middle way. Furthermore, the first half is called the half-letter teaching, and the second half, being consummate, is the full letter. But if speaking of complete fullness, both the upper and lower halves are half-letters; only when neither-self-nor-non-self and self-and-non-self are fully integrated and complete is it called the full letter. Furthermore, the first half is the teaching, and the second half is called the principle. The verse holds many implications and cannot be exhausted by a single approach. From "The real mark of all dharmas" onwards, the second two verses explain the headings. The first verse, following what is adjacent, explains the heading of the real mark; the second verse explains the heading of the expedient. Furthermore, previously it explained entering the real mark from expedients, so it first explained expedients and then the real mark; now, proceeding from the real mark to generate expedients, it first treats the real mark and then expedients. "The real mark of all dharmas" takes up the heading of the real mark from the second half of the preceding verse. "Mental activity and speech cease" onwards explains the meaning of the real mark. First, it explains the real mark in terms of the approach of dharmic explanation: vertically transcending the four propositions, the mind of the four propositions perishes; horizontally cutting off the hundred negations, the mind of the hundred negations ceases. Being so in the mind, speech is also like this: the words of the four propositions cannot speak of it, and the explanations of the hundred negations cannot explain it. Furthermore, not only is the real mark unspeakable, but speech itself is also the real mark; thus, although there is speech, there is no speech. Hence the goddess questioned Śāriputra: "You only know that the real mark has no speech, but have not realized that speech is itself the real mark." Therefore, though speech fills the ten directions, it is constantly cut off from the four propositions. Question: Why is it so? Answer: If speech had an intrinsic substance, it would be inherently existent and called permanent, and the permanent cannot be spoken of. Now, speech arises through causes and conditions; speech lacks self-substance, and therefore there is no speech. Because although spoken, it is fundamentally unspoken. The "Chapter on Karma" says: "All actions do not originally arise, because they lack fixed intrinsic nature." One should likewise say: all speech is fundamentally unspoken, because it lacks fixed intrinsic nature. Being so with speech, mental activity is also like this. First, the real mark cuts off the four propositions; the mind of the four propositions cannot take it as an object. Second, the objectifying itself is the real mark; although it broadly objectifies the myriad dharmas, it is constantly cut off from the four propositions. "Neither arising nor ceasing": the second half explains this in terms of metaphor. The four modes of arising cannot produce it, hence it is called non-arising; brute force cannot extinguish it, hence it is called non-ceasing. Furthermore, the above statement that the mind ceases clarifies that the speech of the four propositions does not originally arise and now does not cease either; it is not that the speech of the four propositions arises and is subsequently extinguished. As it is with speech, so it is with the mind. "Quenched and pacified like nirvāṇa": the confused all say that saṃsāra has arising and ceasing, while nirvāṇa has no arising and ceasing; hence nirvāṇa is borrowed as an analogy for saṃsāra: your so-called saṃsāra is like your nirvāṇa; therefore it is said, "quenched and pacified like nirvāṇa." Now, it is clarified that the real mark is not like the principle of ultimate truth in the South, nor the prajñā of the real mark in the North; it also differs from the ālayavijñāna of the old Daśabhūmika-śāstra [masters] and the amalavijñāna of the Mahāyāna in the later Mahāyānasaṃgraha. All such views agree with the Vātsīputrīyas in positing that a self possesses an existent principle. Here we simply maintain that form is the real mark: like provisionally designated form, which can neither exist nor not exist, form cannot be found when sought through the four propositions; therefore form is itself the real mark. Fascicle forty-two of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa explains: what is the mark of form? What is the mark of consciousness? Having nothing existent is the mark of form; having nothing existent is the mark of sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness. Furthermore, the Lord of Devas praised what Subhūti spoke: without destroying provisional designations, he spoke of the real mark. Thus we know that provisional designations are vividly present and yet are themselves the real mark. From "All is real and not real" onwards is the second part, explaining the previous heading of expedients. Question: Previously, self and non-self were taken as expedients; why are they now explained through real and not real? Furthermore, previously the two levels of self and non-self were taken as expedients and neither-self-nor-non-self as real; why now use the four propositions of real and not real to explain the previous expedient? Answer: I have listened to this for many years and lectured on it over accumulating years, yet have never seen an explanation conforming to the text that explains this intention. Now I recognize a small portion of it to select it for future scholars. When it was previously explained that self and non-self are expedients, this was in response to the two vehicles taking non-self or the absence of a real self as the expedient; thus it clarified that whether provisional or real for the two vehicles, both become expedients from the perspective of the bodhisattva, and neither-self-nor-non-self is the real. Now, when treating the real here, it was explained above that for the real mark of all dharmas, mental activity and speech cease; this clarifies that the real mark realized by the bodhisattva cuts off the four propositions. Although the real mark cuts off the words of the four propositions, it must depend on the words of the four propositions to gain awakening and entrance into the real mark; therefore cutting off the four propositions is taken as real, and the four propositions are taken as expedient. This explanation truly accords with the purport of the text. Question: Why take the four propositions as expedient and cutting off the four propositions as the true principle? Answer: It aims to subsume all principles and teachings completely. Discourse on teaching does not go beyond the four propositions; thus the four propositions subsume all verbal teachings completely. Discourse on the ultimate principle culminates in cutting off the four; thus cutting off the four clarifies the ultimate principle. Although it is the discussion of a single section, it synthetically subsumes all Buddhist principles and teachings, making the matter complete. Question: Why was self and non-self previously taken as expedient, while real and not real is now taken as expedient? Answer: It aims to show that the real mark is the substance, and the substance has no duality; hence the previous explanation of the real mark took up the real mark again to explain the real mark. It shows that the expedient is the function, and function has many gates; hence previously it showed the expedient of self and non-self, and now shows the expedient of real and not real. Question: Why was self and non-self previously taken as expedient, while real and not real is now explained as expedient? Answer: Above, for the śrāvaka, self was expedient and non-self was real, dharmas were expedient and the absence of dharmas was real. Above, in response to the śrāvaka, it was explained that both self and non-self are expedients, and neither-self-nor-non-self is real; now, also in response to the śrāvaka, having dharmas and lacking dharmas are both expedients, and neither-dharmas-nor-non-dharmas is real; therefore it now explains real and not real.