中觀論疏 9.17

9.17

「若謂以現見」下，第六生滅門破成壞。三偈為二：初偈取意破、第二兩偈釋破。上半取意。論初至此有四種立：一者申義，立成壞之前也。二受屈，立品初是也。三屈申俱，屈立現見盡滅相是也。今不復口根等救，但內心立，故論主懸取：外謂眼實見有生滅，汝云何以言說破耶？此之一問通貫一切經論，明凡夫所見之失、聖人破迷之意。外人云：眼見有世出世一切法，云何言說破耶？汝口噵無我眼見有，寧信我眼見為實，豈用口虛言耶？下半呵責，明理無生滅，生滅出自妄情。上來以窮其理，今復破窮理之言。汝以癡妄故，上來破汝癡；今云何復以妄見為證耶？《攝論》無塵並皆是識，更復立於識以破塵，故云似根識、似塵識、似我識、似識識。此論明實無一切物，但是想謂有耳。此語勝彼立有識破塵，直破便足，何須更立別有識耶？又今論與《楞伽》同，實無外四句境，並是妄心所見耳。故有心見有實無有，謂情見無亦無無，乃至謂情見非有非無實無非有非無。然既無所見之境，亦無能見之四心。無有無四境，無數於外；無有無四心，無心於內。如斯悟者，即是涅槃也。攝論師云：世諦無塵而有於識。今明世諦俱無性實塵識，而有因緣假名塵識；真諦即假實俱無也。問：何以知世諦俱有、真諦俱無耶？答：今問識有自體、為無自體？若有自體則是常，無自體則無識。並現〈業品〉。識既爾，塵亦然，故有則俱有、無則俱無。問：若爾，《攝論》何故言塵無而識有耶？答：此是一往以識破塵耳。實無前境，皆是想心謂有耳。然所謂既無，能謂亦爾。又就外義者，生滅是法塵，十八界中意識得，非五識得，云何眼見？數人云：眼見高下色。論云：此是相待假，想心所得。數云：眼見烟雲色。論云：此是因成假，亦是想得。今所明者，眼見既是見倒，想心得亦是想倒。長行云「眼見有生滅云何以言說破」，此是牒外義耳。外云：我眼實見生滅，云何論主用言說破耶？故眼見是實，口說非可信。「是事不然」者，釋下半。初總非；「何以故」下，解釋。又開五別：一先序失，明外人是癡所見，故不足可信；若眼見可信者，與牛羊同。「諸法性空」下，第二明得。「但凡夫」下，第三重辨失。「第一義中」下，第四重辨得。「是事已於〈破相品〉中說」下，第五指上品。以聖人於觀心中如理而說，故說可信。若無言說破，汝何由悟耶？汝癡妄故不可信也，正指〈三相品〉末一偈敘凡聖得失事也。「從法不生法」下，第二兩偈釋無生義。顯外人無生見生，故見是癡妄；顯論主悟生無生，故說是真實。兩偈為二：初明四句無生、第二偈三門無生。偈如文。長行釋四句，即四別：釋從法不生法為三，謂標、釋、結。初文標也。「若至若失」下，第二解釋。即開二別：一總標至失二門有斷常。「若以至」下，第二釋二章門。釋至章門凡有三破：若前法不滅而至於後則為常。又生已更生者，為因時已生，至果時復生，故一物有其重生。又亦無因生者，此法不滅，遂經重生，則為是常，常故無因；又滅為生因，遂不經滅而有重生，故是無因。次釋失中凡有二過：一者前法滅失而後自生，故後法無因。又前法滅失則名為斷，後無因生則為是常。故標章中若至若失俱墮斷常。至是聞熏習不滅，失是滅義耳。又至是僧佉，失是衛世。又至是大眾部，失是上座。又至是成實，失是毘曇。「是故從法不生於法」，第三總結。然此中云：有法不生無。云何他義云：修無常因而得常果？無不生有，云何言真諦境能生心耶？又切論只一法論四句，泥不生瓶、法不生法；泥不生非瓶、法不生非法；非泥不生瓶、非法不生法；非泥不生非瓶、非法不生非法。此窮一法生之原底也。

From "If it is said that through direct perception" onward is the sixth, refuting arising and disintegrating via the gate of arising and ceasing. The three verses fall into two [parts]: first, one verse captures the [opponent's] intent to refute it; second, two verses explain the refutation. The first half captures the intent. From the beginning of the treatise up to this point, there are four kinds of assertions: first, presenting the doctrine, which is the assertion prior to arising and disintegrating; second, conceding defeat, which is the assertion at the beginning of the chapter; third, both conceding and asserting, which is the assertion that direct perception of the characteristics of exhaustion and cessation is conceded. Here, there is no further defense through the mouth, sense faculties, and so forth; it is asserted solely from the inner mind. Therefore, the treatise master anticipates it beforehand: the opponent says that the eye actually sees there is arising and ceasing; how can you refute this through verbal discourse? This single question runs through all sūtras and treatises, clarifying the error of what ordinary persons see and the sage's intent in refuting delusion. The outsider says: "The eye sees all worldly and world-transcending phenomena; how can you refute this through verbal discourse? Your mouth claims there is non-self, but my eye sees existence; rather than believing your empty words from the mouth, shouldn't I trust my direct seeing as real?" The lower half reproaches [him], clarifying that in principle there is no arising and ceasing, and that arising and ceasing emerge solely from deluded feelings. Previously, the principle was thoroughly examined, and now he further refutes words that exhaust the principle. Since you are foolish and deluded, earlier we refuted your foolishness; how can you now cite deluded seeing as proof? The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* holds that there are no external dusts (sense objects) and that everything is consciousness, further establishing consciousness to refute the objects, hence speaking of consciousness resembling sense faculties, consciousness resembling sense objects, consciousness resembling a self, and consciousness resembling consciousness. This treatise clarifies that in reality there are no things at all; there is only the conceptual thought that considers them to exist. These words surpass the position of establishing consciousness to refute objects: a direct refutation is quite sufficient, so why must one further establish a separate consciousness? Moreover, the present treatise agrees with the *Laṅkāvatāra*: there are in reality no external four-proposition objects; all are seen by the deluded mind. Hence, when the mind of existence sees existence, in reality there is no existence; when deluded feelings see nonexistence, there is also no nonexistence; up to, when deluded feelings see neither existence nor nonexistence, in reality there is neither existence nor nonexistence. However, since the objects seen do not exist, the four minds capable of seeing also do not exist. Without the four objects of existence and nonexistence, there are no objects externally; without the four minds of existence and nonexistence, there is no mind internally. One who awakens like this is in nirvāṇa. The masters of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* say that in conventional truth there are no objects yet there is consciousness. Now we clarify that in conventional truth, there are intrinsically real objects and consciousness neither; rather, there are provisionally designated objects and consciousness of dependent origination; in ultimate truth, both provisional and real are absent. Question: How is it known that both exist in conventional truth and both are absent in ultimate truth? Answer: We now ask: does consciousness have intrinsic nature, or does it lack intrinsic nature? If it has intrinsic nature, it is permanent; if it lacks intrinsic nature, there is no consciousness. Both appear in Chapter [17, on] Karma. Consciousness being so, dusts (sense objects) are also like this; therefore, if they exist, both exist; if they are absent, both are absent. Question: If so, why does the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* say that dusts do not exist while consciousness exists? Answer: This is temporarily refuting dusts by means of consciousness. In reality there is no objective realm before [it]; all are only considered to exist by the conceptualizing mind. However, since what is so designated does not exist, the mind that designates it is also like this. Furthermore, in terms of the outsider's doctrine, arising and ceasing are mental objects (dharmāyatana); among the eighteen realms, they are apprehended by the mental consciousness, not apprehended by the five sense consciousnesses—how could the eye see them? The Abhidharma theorists say that the eye sees high and low color-forms. The treatise says: this is relativity designation (saṃketa), apprehended by the conceptual mind. The Abhidharma theorists say that the eye sees the color of smoke and clouds. The treatise says: this is composite designation, also apprehended by conceptual thought. What is clarified here is that seeing with the eye is an inversion of view, and apprehension by the conceptual mind is also an inversion of conception. The prose says, "The eye sees that there is arising and ceasing; how can you refute this through verbal discourse?"—this merely cites the outsider's doctrine. The outsider says: "My eye actually sees arising and ceasing; how can the treatise master refute it with verbal discourse? Hence, eye-seeing is real, and spoken words cannot be trusted." "This is not so" explains the lower half. First, it generally negates [it]; from "Why?" onward, it explains. It also unfolds into five distinct sections: first, presenting the error, clarifying that the outsider's seeing is seeing out of foolishness, and thus unworthy of trust; if eye-seeing were trustworthy, it would be the same as cattle and sheep. From "All dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature" onward is the second, clarifying what is correct. From "Only ordinary persons" onward is the third, distinguishing the error again. From "In ultimate truth" onward is the fourth, distinguishing what is correct again. From "This matter has already been explained in Chapter [7,] 'Examination of Characteristics'" onward is the fifth, pointing to the earlier chapter. Because the sage speaks in accordance with principle within the mind of contemplation, his speech is trustworthy. If there were no refutation by verbal discourse, how could you awaken? Because you are foolish and deluded, you cannot be trusted; this directly points to the matter of the gains and losses of ordinary persons and sages recounted in the final verse of Chapter [7,] 'Examination of the Three Characteristics'. From "From a dharma, a dharma does not arise" onward, the second two verses explain the meaning of non-arising. They show that the outsider sees arising where there is no arising, so his view is foolish and deluded; they show that the treatise master awakens to arising as non-arising, so his words are true and real. The two verses are divided into two: first, clarifying non-arising across the four propositions; second, one verse on non-arising through three gates. The verse is as in the text. The prose explains the four propositions, which has four distinctions: explaining that from a dharma a dharma does not arise has three parts, namely the thesis, the explanation, and the conclusion. The initial text is the thesis. From "Whether arriving or failing" onward is the second, the explanation. This opens into two distinctions: first, generally indicating that the two gates of arriving and failing involve annihilation and permanence. From "If by arriving" onward is the second, explaining the two chapter gates. Explaining the gate of arriving has three refutations in all: if the prior dharma does not cease and arrives at the subsequent, it would be permanent. Again, arising after having already arisen means it has already arisen at the time of the cause, and arises again upon reaching the fruit; thus a single entity would have repeated arising. Again, arising without a cause means that since this dharma does not cease and directly undergoes repeated arising, it is permanent, and being permanent, it lacks a cause; further, cessation is the cause of arising, yet it does not undergo cessation and has repeated arising, hence it lacks a cause. Next, explaining failing has two faults in all: first, the prior dharma ceases and is lost, and the subsequent arises spontaneously, so the subsequent dharma lacks a cause. Again, the prior dharma ceasing and being lost is called annihilation, and the subsequent arising without a cause is permanence. Therefore, in the thesis, whether arriving or failing, both fall into annihilation and permanence. Arriving is the non-cessation of the perfuming of hearing; failing is the meaning of cessation. Again, arriving is Sāṃkhya; failing is Vaiśeṣika. Again, arriving is Mahāsāṃghika; failing is Sthavira. Again, arriving is the *Tattvasiddhi*; failing is the Abhidharma. "Therefore, from a dharma a dharma does not arise" is the third, the general conclusion. However, here it says: an existent dharma does not produce a nonexistent one. How then does another doctrine say that by cultivating an impermanent cause one attains a permanent fruit? Nonexistence does not produce existence; how can it be said that the objective realm of ultimate truth can produce the mind? Furthermore, strictly speaking, the four propositions are discussed regarding just a single dharma: clay does not produce a pot, a dharma does not produce a dharma; clay does not produce a non-pot, a dharma does not produce a non-dharma; non-clay does not produce a pot, a non-dharma does not produce a dharma; non-clay does not produce a non-pot, a non-dharma does not produce a non-dharma. This exhausts the origin and foundation of the arising of a single dharma.