中觀論疏 9.36

9.36

問：四品破出世法，何故乃破顛倒耶？答前破世間非無出世，但前多破世間、後多破出世耳。二者欲顯世出世不二，故就出世中破世也。三者又顯計有出世即是顛倒，故破出世法名破顛倒。四者二乘之人於如來身計苦無常名為顛倒，既於出世法中起倒，故於出世中破倒也。五者如來之身實非有無而計有無，即是顛倒，故今破此倒也。大小乘人唯有二法：一者世間、二出世間。前破世間竟，舉出世救，今破出世間竟，還舉世間來救。以外是有所得人心，不能無所依着，故前後互舉立義。問：〈染者品〉已破煩惱，即是破顛倒，今何故復破？答：煩惱難破，故須多破。又前破染是破愛，今破顛倒是破見，以一切眾生不出愛與見也。問：何故破如來後次破顛倒？答：就惑者為言，凡有二義：一約自行，如來是能離之人，顛倒是所離之惑。就化他而言，前者有如來出世，後為斷眾生煩惱，是故前破如來，次破顛倒。二若接前文生者，上品末云「如來所有性即是世間性。」外云：世間以煩惱為性，如來以離染為體，云何言如來是世間性耶？是故今明顛倒不生即是如來。問：云何為顛倒？答：顛倒有通有別。通者，一切有所得皆是顛倒。故《大品》云「眾生以顛倒因緣故往來六道」。別而為言，有三倒、四倒、十二倒、八倒。三倒者，謂想心見。毘曇云「想心非倒體，但為倒所亂，故名為倒。」毘婆闍婆提人言：「三種皆是倒體」。成實師有二釋：一云識迷實曰心倒，想迷假曰想倒，行陰心迷前二倒成即見倒也。二云約一體判即心為三倒體，體僻為心倒，便生異想為想倒，僻決為見倒。此三倒重品屬見惑，輕屬修惑，下品屬習氣。今龍樹意，凡厥有心則是心倒，有所想念皆是想倒，凡有所見皆是見倒。問：三倒生斷二時云何同異？答：《智度論》釋〈隨喜品〉明三倒生時異、斷時異。生時前起想心，後起見倒，此從輕至重。斷時前斷見，後斷想心。故見倒屬見諦斷，想心屬思惟斷。四倒者，謂於生死中起常樂我淨。問：四倒以何為體？答婆沙云。以慧數為體。問五見幾倒幾非倒。答：《婆沙》云「二見半是倒，我見中有我我所，我見是我倒，我所見非我倒。」復有說言：我與我所合名為我倒。邊見之中有斷有常，以常見為常倒。見取之中有獨頭、足上，無樂淨計樂淨，是獨頭見取，名樂淨倒。餘二見半謂邪見邊見中斷見惑取，此非是倒。問：何故爾邪？答：凡具五義方乃名倒。一是見性，簡鈍使也。二緣真生，謂是迷理惑，簡迷事惑也。三果上起，於苦諦上生也。四正相翻，苦諦下有苦無常理，今正翻苦諦，故計常樂我。五者是獨頭非足上。《婆沙》又云「具三義故名倒，一猛利性、二妄取、三同性倒。邪見斷見是猛利性非是顛倒，壞境界故。戒取是猛利性及妄取非同性倒。餘二見半事具三義也。」《俱舍》三義立倒：一增有，如無我計我故也；二決定；三背境。易解也。二見半具三義，餘二見半無增有也。次明十二倒，上座部及毘婆闍婆提明四倒，一一倒中具想心見，故名十二。八是見諦斷，四修道斷。八見道斷者，謂無常常。想倒無常見常倒，餘三亦爾。故此八屬見斷也。四屬修斷者，四種心倒也。至苦忍時斷八倒盡，至金剛心斷四盡也。《俱舍論》更出一師云：十二種中，四種見倒屬見諦斷，八屬修道斷。數人云：但見是倒，唯有四，無十二倒。又但見斷非修斷，但苦諦下惑非三諦下惑也。問：初二果人既無四倒，云何起染愛猶行夫婦之禮耶？答：《婆沙》二釋。一云：起樂淨有二，一於諦理起，初二果人則無也；二於事中起，則有也。次釋云：初二果人起染愛時，實起不淨苦想，但不獲已而起。如婆羅門鍛指譬，孰知指不淨，但以苦痛故，肉指安口中。彼亦爾也。十二倒者，毘婆闍婆提云：想心見倒三為本，各起常樂我淨四，成十二倒。若依《雜心》唯見心所起名之為倒，如前說也。所言八倒者，雜心師想心見但起生死中常樂我淨四倒，不起後佛地苦無常四。成論師云：前後八倒皆是見惑，非思惟惑。見等中屬三使，我倒屬我見、常倒屬邊見、樂淨屬見取。常謂無常皆是有而言無，屬邪見攝。復有說云：後四倒屬無明攝。所以然者，二乘之人斷見思惑竟，猶起後四倒，故知屬無明所攝。此解應詣也。問：昔外道凡夫於生死中計常等四倒，二乘之人於法身復起無常等四，凡聖合論故有八倒者，可得言二乘之人就今具八倒不？答：亦具有也。以計佛地是無常，故有無常等四；復執己涅槃是於常樂，此即是無常計常。所以然者，二乘涅槃實無常樂計為常樂，故有常等四倒。問：二乘之人不計涅槃為我，云何有我倒耶？答：我有二種，一人我、二法我。雖無人我，執有涅槃即是法我，故有我倒。凡夫之人具足八倒，此易知也。此品具破通別兩倒，故云破顛倒品。問：云何是破通別顛倒？答：此品中非但破八倒，亦破外人八行，故知計生死常無常皆是倒，乃至四句悉是倒，即是破通倒；正破四倒等，此是破別倒。問：云何破顛倒耶？答：內外大小皆言有是顛倒，不知顛倒本性空寂；今求其顛倒不可得，即是實相，故云破顛倒品。又內外大小皆言有顛倒生，而欲滅之，則顛倒不滅；今求顛倒本自不生、今亦不滅，故顛倒便滅，故名破顛倒。又外人見顛倒不顛倒二相，則是明與無明愚者謂二。若計倒不倒二，則倒與不倒皆成顛倒；今了倒不倒本無二相，則倒與不倒皆名不倒，故破顛倒。

Question: The preceding four chapters refuted supramundane dharmas; why then refute error here?

Answer: The earlier refutation of the mundane did not exclude the supramundane; it was merely that the earlier chapters mostly refuted the mundane, while the later ones mostly refute the supramundane. Second, in order to show that the mundane and the supramundane are non-dual, he refutes the mundane within the supramundane. Third, it also shows that conceiving the existence of the supramundane is itself an error; therefore, refuting supramundane dharmas is called refuting error. Fourth, people of the two vehicles conceive the Tathāgata's body to be suffering and impermanent, which is called an error; since they give rise to error concerning supramundane dharmas, he refutes error within the supramundane. Fifth, the Tathāgata's body is in truth neither existent nor nonexistent, yet they conceive existence and nonexistence, which is an error; therefore, he now refutes this error.

For practitioners of the Great and Lesser Vehicles there are only two dharmas: first, the mundane; second, the supramundane. Having finished refuting the mundane previously, they cited the supramundane as a rescue; now, having finished refuting the supramundane, they turn back and cite the mundane to rescue their position. Because outsiders possess minds of attainability and cannot be free of reliance and attachment, they cite back and forth to establish their doctrines.

Question: The chapter "Examination of the Impassioned" has already refuted defilements, which is indeed refuting error; why refute it again now?

Answer: Defilements are difficult to refute, so they must be refuted repeatedly. Furthermore, the earlier refutation of passion was a refutation of craving, while the present refutation of error is a refutation of views, because all sentient beings do not go beyond craving and views.

Question: Why refute error immediately after refuting the Tathāgata?

Answer: Speaking in terms of the deluded, there are two points: First, regarding one's own practice, the Tathāgata is the person capable of abandoning, while error is the delusion to be abandoned. Speaking in terms of transforming others, first there is the Tathāgata appearing in the world, and afterward he severs sentient beings' defilements; therefore, he first refutes the Tathāgata and next refutes error. Second, if arising in connection with the preceding text: the end of the previous chapter says, "The nature belonging to the Tathāgata is the nature of the world." The opponent says: "The world takes defilements as its nature, while the Tathāgata takes departure from passion as his essence; how can you say that the Tathāgata is the nature of the world?" Therefore, he now clarifies that the non-arising of error is itself the Tathāgata.

Question: What is error?

Answer: Error has both general and particular senses. In general, all attainability is error. Thus the *Large Sūtra* says: "Sentient beings, through the causes and conditions of error, transmigrate in the six destinies." In particular, there are the three errors, four errors, twelve errors, and eight errors.

The three errors are conception, mind, and view. The Abhidharma says: "Conception and mind are not the essence of error; they are merely confused by error, and are therefore called error." The Vibhajyavādins say: "All three are the essence of error." The masters of the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* offer two explanations: The first says that consciousness deluded about the real is called the error of mind; conception deluded about the provisional is called the error of conception; and when the mental factor of the saṃskāra-skandha is deluded about the preceding two errors, it is established as the error of view. The second says that, judging them as one essence, mind is the essence of all three errors: when the essence is deviant, it is the error of mind; when it gives rise to disparate conceptions, it is the error of conception; and when the deviance becomes definitive, it is the error of view. Among these three errors, the heavy tier belongs to the defilements of view, the light tier belongs to the defilements of cultivation, and the lowest tier belongs to habitual propensities. Now, in Nāgārjuna's intention, whenever there is mind, it is the error of mind; whenever there is conceiving and thinking, it is the error of conception; and whenever there is viewing, it is the error of view.

Question: How do the arising and severing of the three errors differ or coincide in time?

Answer: The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, in explaining the "Chapter on Rejoicing," clarifies that their times of arising and their times of severing are different. At the time of arising, conception and mind arise first, and the error of view arises later; this proceeds from light to heavy. At the time of severing, view is severed first, and conception and mind are severed later. Hence, the error of view belongs to what is severed by seeing the truth, while conception and mind belong to what is severed by cultivation.

The four errors are giving rise to permanence, bliss, self, and purity within saṃsāra.

Question: What do the four errors take as their essence?

Answer: The *Vibhāṣā* says that they take the mental factor of wisdom as their essence.

Question: Among the five views, how many are errors and how many are not?

Answer: The *Vibhāṣā* says: "Two views and a half are errors. In the view of self, there are self and what belongs to self; the view of self is the error of self, while the view of what belongs to self is not the error of self." There is also an explanation that says: "Self and what belongs to self combined are called the error of self." In the extreme view, there are annihilation and permanence; the view of permanence is the error of permanence. In the attachment to views, there are the standalone and the dependent: conceiving bliss and purity where there is no bliss or purity is the standalone attachment to views, which is called the error of bliss and purity. The remaining two views and a half—namely, false view, the view of annihilation within the extreme view, and the attachment to precepts—are not errors.

Question: Why is this so?

Answer: Only when possessing five characteristics is it called an error: First, it is of the nature of view, distinguishing it from dull fetters. Second, it arises in relation to the true, meaning it is a delusion confused about principle, distinguishing it from delusion confused about facts. Third, it arises upon the fruit, being generated upon the truth of suffering. Fourth, it directly contradicts: under the truth of suffering there is the principle of suffering and impermanence, and now it directly contradicts the truth of suffering, thus conceiving permanence, bliss, and self. Fifth, it is standalone, not dependent. The *Vibhāṣā* also says: "Possessing three characteristics, it is called an error: first, sharp nature; second, false grasping; third, error of identical nature. False view and the view of annihilation are of sharp nature but are not errors, because they destroy the object. Attachment to precepts is of sharp nature and false grasping, but not an error of identical nature. The other two views and a half fully possess the three characteristics." The *Kośa* establishes error by three characteristics: first, superimposing existence, as conceiving self where there is no self; second, definitiveness; third, turning away from the object. This is easy to understand. The two views and a half possess the three characteristics, while the other two views and a half lack the superimposition of existence.

Next, to explain the twelve errors: the Sthaviras and the Vibhajyavādins explain the four errors as each containing conception, mind, and view, hence making twelve. Eight are severed by seeing the truth, and four are severed by the path of cultivation. The eight severed on the path of seeing are: regarding impermanence as permanent—the error of conception regarding impermanence as permanent, the error of view regarding impermanence as permanent, and likewise for the other three; thus these eight belong to what is severed by seeing. The four belonging to what is severed by cultivation are the four errors of mind. When reaching the patience regarding suffering, the eight errors are completely severed; when reaching the vajra-like mind, the four are completely severed. The *Abhidharmakośa-śāstra* introduces another master who says: among the twelve, the four errors of view belong to what is severed by seeing the truth, and eight belong to the path of cultivation. The Sarvāstivādin masters say: only views are errors, so there are only four, not twelve errors. Furthermore, they are only severed by seeing, not severed by cultivation, and are only delusions under the truth of suffering, not delusions under the other three truths.

Question: Since practitioners of the first two fruits are free from the four errors, why do they still give rise to passionate love and engage in the rites of husband and wife?

Answer: The *Vibhāṣā* gives two explanations. The first says: Giving rise to [the conception of] bliss and purity has two types: one arises regarding the truth and principle, which practitioners of the first two fruits do not have; the other arises within factual matters, which they do have. The next explanation says: When practitioners of the first two fruits give rise to passionate love, they actually give rise to conceptions of impurity and suffering, but act merely out of inability to do otherwise. It is like the simile of the Brahmin burning his finger: knowing full well the finger is impure, yet because of the bitter pain, he places his flesh finger in his mouth. They are also like this.

As for the twelve errors, the Vibhajyavādins say: The three errors of conception, mind, and view are the root, each giving rise to the four of permanence, bliss, self, and purity, forming twelve errors. If according to the *Saṃyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya*, only what is arisen from the mental factor of view is called error, as stated before.

As for the eight errors: The masters of the *Saṃyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya* say that conception, mind, and view only give rise to the four errors of permanence, bliss, self, and purity within saṃsāra, and do not give rise to the later four of suffering, impermanence, etc., regarding the Buddha stage. The masters of the *Tattvasiddhi* say: Both the earlier and later eight errors are defilements of view, not defilements of cultivation. Among the views, etc., they belong to three fetters: the error of self belongs to the view of self; the error of permanence belongs to the extreme view; bliss and purity belong to the attachment to views. Believing the permanent to be impermanent is in all cases saying that what exists does not exist, which is subsumed under false view. There is also an explanation that says: The latter four errors are subsumed under ignorance. Why so? Because people of the two vehicles, having already severed the defilements of view and thought, still give rise to the latter four errors; hence we know they are subsumed under ignorance. This explanation should be accepted as accurate.

Question: Formerly, heterodox outsiders and ordinary people conceived the four errors of permanence, etc., within saṃsāra, while people of the two vehicles further gave rise to the four of impermanence, etc., regarding the dharmakāya; discussed together across the ordinary and the noble, there are eight errors. Can it be said that people of the two vehicles fully possess the eight errors in the present context?

Answer: They also possess them fully. Because they conceive the Buddha stage to be impermanent, there are the four of impermanence, etc.; furthermore, they grasp their own nirvāṇa as permanent and blissful, which is conceiving the impermanent to be permanent. Why so? Because the nirvāṇa of the two vehicles is in truth devoid of permanence and bliss, yet they conceive it to be permanent and blissful; thus they have the four errors of permanence, etc.

Question: People of the two vehicles do not conceive nirvāṇa to be a self; how can they have the error of self?

Answer: There are two kinds of self: first, the self of persons; second, the self of dharmas. Although they lack the self of persons, grasping the existence of nirvāṇa is itself the self of dharmas; hence they have the error of self. That ordinary people fully possess the eight errors is easy to understand.

This chapter refutes both the general and particular errors, and is therefore called the chapter refuting error.

Question: How does it refute the general and particular errors?

Answer: In this chapter, not only are the eight errors refuted, but the eight practices of outsiders are also refuted. Thus we know that conceiving saṃsāra to be permanent or impermanent is in all cases an error, up to the four propositions all being errors—this is the refutation of the general error; whereas directly refuting the four errors, etc., is the refutation of the particular errors.

Question: How does it refute error?

Answer: Internal and external, Great and Lesser [Vehicles] all say that existence is an error, failing to understand that error is by its original nature empty and quiescent. Now, seeking this error, it cannot be found, which is itself the true nature of reality; hence it is called the chapter refuting error. Furthermore, internal and external, Great and Lesser [Vehicles] all say that error arises and they wish to extinguish it, yet error is not extinguished thereby; now, seeking error, it is originally unarisen and now likewise unceasing, so error is thereby extinguished; therefore it is called refuting error. Furthermore, outsiders see the two characteristics of error and non-error, which is like light and ignorance that the foolish regard as two. If one conceives error and non-error as two, then both error and non-error become error; now understanding that error and non-error originally lack two characteristics, then both error and non-error are called non-error; therefore it refutes error.