中觀論疏 1.18

1.18

The fourth [gate], the gate of refuting and elucidating. Question: Above, it was said that refuting causes and conditions gives the chapter its name, 'Causes and Conditions.' What kinds of people are refuted? Answer: Though divergent attachments are numerous, four kinds are briefly indicated: first, smashing the non-Buddhists; second, subduing the Abhidharmists; third, expelling the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra [masters]; fourth, rebuking the great attachments [of Mahāyāna followers]. Speaking generally of the non-Buddhists, there are two doctrines: first, positing false causes; second, clinging to absence of cause. As for positing false causes, three kinds are briefly explained: first, non-Buddhists of a single cause, who assert that a single cause and condition such as Maheśvara is capable of producing the fruit of myriad varieties [of things]; second, non-Buddhists of past deeds, who assert that the fruits of all phenomena are due solely to past karma, without present conditions; third, non-Buddhists of present conditions, who assert that the combination of the four great elements is capable of producing external phenomena, and the intercourse of male and female is capable of producing sentient beings. Second, non-Buddhists of absence of cause, who assert that all phenomena arise naturally, not arising from causes. As for what is called the causes and conditions of the Abhidharma, intrinsic nature of the fruit fundamentally exists, which is brought to arise by relying on the six causes and four conditions; this is the doctrine that the two [times of past and future] exist. As for what is called the causes and conditions of the Tattvasiddhi, although it does not explain that the intrinsic nature of the fruit fundamentally exists within the cause, the fruit has the principle of being capable of arising, and therefore by relying on the three causes and four conditions it is enabled to arise; this is the doctrine that the two [times of past and future] do not exist. As for what is called the causes and conditions of the Mahāyāna, like the Mahāyāna of the Tattvasiddhi, it explains that conventional truth has three kinds of provisional designations; the provisional is not self-existent, and the three provisional designations of conventional truth are termed causes and conditions. For example, the former Dilun masters and others distinguished the doctrines of the four tenets, asserting that the Abhidharma is the tenet of causes and conditions, the Tattvasiddhi is the tenet of provisional designations, the Prajñā teachings and the like are the tenet of the unreal, and the Nirvāṇa teachings and the like are named the tenet of the real. Such varieties as these all study causes and conditions yet miss causes and conditions. Thus correct causes and conditions become false causes and conditions, just as taking ambrosia turns into poison instead, or like entering the water seeking a pearl and mistakenly grasping tiles and gravel. This treatise refutes and washes away such causes and conditions; therefore it is called the chapter on refuting causes and conditions. Because it refutes such falsely clung-to causes and conditions and elucidates the causes and conditions of non-attainment in the Mahāyāna, it names the chapter by this. Question: How did Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna address the conditions? Answer: There are four kinds of people who study causes and conditions yet miss causes and conditions: first, the Vātsīputrīyas say causes and conditions refer to intrinsic nature, and through the causes and conditions of the five aggregates a separate person-dharma arises, while through the causes and conditions of the four great elements a separate eye-dharma arises; second, according to the causes and conditions of the Abhidharma, there is no person-dharma, but there is an eye-dharma; third, according to the causes and conditions of the Tattvasiddhi, it explains that in conventional truth, both provisional person and dharma exist through causes and conditions, whereas in ultimate truth both do not exist; fourth, the Fangguang (Vaitulya) say that even in conventional truth there are entirely no causes and conditions of person or dharma. These four kinds of people all study causes and conditions yet miss causes and conditions. Therefore, refuting these four kinds of people and elucidating correct causes and conditions is why the chapter is so named.