Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

中觀論疏 1.35

English (machine translation) 1.35

Language
English

1.35

From “they immediately gave rise to doubts and views” downward is third, directly discerning the arising of delusion. If one practices ultimate emptiness properly, the two wisdoms are produced; if one practices ultimate emptiness without skillful means, views and doubts arise. As the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “Some ingest amṛta and their lifespans are long-lasting; some ingest amṛta, injure their lives, and die prematurely.” This is just the case. In the text there are two parts: first, listing the two headings of views and doubts; next, explaining the two headings. Clinging biasedly to a single principle is called a view; vacillating between two paths is called doubt. From “If all is completely and ultimately empty” downward is second, explaining the two headings. First it explains doubt, and then it explains views. A mind deluded about the teaching necessarily doubts first and forms views later; hence it first explains doubt and then explains views. However, emptiness and existence admit of two doubts: first, doubting existence on account of emptiness—if it is truly and ultimately empty, there should be no guilt or merit; second, doubting emptiness on account of existence—if there truly are guilt and merit, it should not be completely and ultimately empty. Now this text concerns Mahāyāna students who took ultimate emptiness as real, and thus, having faith in ultimate emptiness, doubted guilt and merit; this is precisely doubting existence on account of emptiness. From “In this case there would be neither conventional truth nor ultimate truth” downward is second, explaining the meaning of view above. Being students of the Mahāyāna, they believed that the Mahāyāna's ultimate emptiness was the exhaustive exposition of reality, and therefore that there is neither guilt nor merit. Since there is neither guilt nor merit, there is no conventional truth. Because of conventional truth there is ultimate truth; since there is no conventional truth, there is also no ultimate truth. Formulating this line of textual citation comes from the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa. Question: What happens when Hīnayāna practitioners hear of ultimate emptiness? Answer: Mahāyāna adherents cling to ultimate emptiness and cast out existing phenomena; Hīnayāna adherents cling to determinate existence and reject ultimate emptiness. Thus the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: “When the five hundred schools heard of ultimate emptiness, it was like a knife wounding their hearts.” This is its proof. Question: Above, under clinging to existence, it says they merely attached to the letter; why did they not give rise to doubts? Answer: Existence accords with worldly feelings, and so they directly gave rise to views. Emptiness, running contrary to worldly feelings, causes doubts to arise. Question: Does the previous clinging to existence also lose both truths? Answer: It also loses them. Clinging to intrinsic existence contradicts provisional existence and loses conventional truth; if it loses even conventional truth, how much more so the ultimate truth?

Linked texts (1)