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中觀論疏 1.37

English (machine translation) 1.37

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English

1.37

From “Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, for the sake of these people” downward is fourth, clarifying that the author of the treatise appeared in the world to compose it. This contains three purposes: First, addressing comprehensively both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna practitioners above: refuting the previous positing of existence causes existence not to be existence, so that the view of existence ceases; refuting the previous clinging to emptiness causes emptiness not to be emptiness, so that the view of emptiness ceases—this is the middle way. Question: The assertion that it is neither existent nor non-existent is foolish sophistry; how can it be the middle way? Answer: It does not take “neither existent nor non-existent” as the middle; it clarifies that being free from the views of existence and non-existence is called the middle. If one leaves existence and non-existence yet attaches to neither existent nor non-existent, that is not the middle. Second, addressing specifically the Hīnayāna practitioners above. Provisionally speaking, Hīnayāna practitioners posited that phenomena exist, thus obtaining conventional truth; not knowing that phenomena are empty, they lost the ultimate truth. But since they did not recognize the ultimate truth, neither did they recognize conventional truth, and thus lost both truths. Now he elucidates the middle way of the two truths, enabling Hīnayāna practitioners to recognize the middle way of the two truths, generate right contemplation, and extinguish prapañca; therefore Nāgārjuna composed this Madhyamaka-śāstra. Third, addressing the Mahāyāna students above. Provisionally speaking, Mahāyāna practitioners attained the ultimate emptiness of phenomena, thus obtaining the ultimate truth; but they lost the conventional truth. Yet since they did not recognize conventional truth, neither did they recognize the ultimate truth. Although phenomena are ultimately empty, they distinctly exist, and thus one does not linger in emptiness; although they exist through causes and conditions, they are ever ultimately empty, and thus one does not attach to existence. This is the middle way of the two truths. Now, to destroy the two extremes of annihilation and permanence and elucidate the two truths, causing Mahāyāna students to recognize the middle way and generate right contemplation, it says: “for the sake of these people, he composed this Madhyamaka-śāstra.”

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