中觀論疏 5
English (machine translation) 5
- Language
- English
5.1
Composed by the monk Jizang
5.2
Chapter 5: Examination of the Six Elements
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The reasons why this chapter comes next are as follows. First, in accordance with the various different teachings for deluded sentient beings, the Buddha sometimes used the designation of the five aggregates, or sometimes set forth the designation of the six elements; his intention, however, lay in refuting the self, causing the view of self to cease, with no dharma retained either. People who cling to the teachings do not grasp selflessness and merely attach to dharmas. Above, their delusion regarding the five [aggregates] was already refuted; now, their delusion regarding the six [elements] is further eliminated. Therefore, this chapter is spoken. Second, the various Vaipulya sūtras open the path by going through dharmas: sometimes contemplating the five aggregates as being identical to true reality, sometimes examining the six elements to bring about awakening to the dharmakāya. Now, wishing to fully explain the various sūtras and exhaustively examine all dharmas, this chapter is spoken. Third, the body of birth and death generally consists of two parts: first, the part of existence, and second, the part of emptiness. From [the chapter on] "Causes and Conditions" through [that on the] "Five Aggregates," the part of existence was refuted; this single chapter refutes the part of emptiness, causing one to awaken to the fact that this body originally is non-existent, and at present is also not non-empty. Neither existent nor non-existent is precisely the middle way; generating contemplation based on the middle severs all afflictions. Therefore, this chapter is spoken. Fourth, the sūtras state that "all dharmas are extremely profound," referring to the three gates of liberation. The Śata-śāstra states: "If one is separated from emptiness and signlessness, then any supposed knowledge or vision is empty speech without reality." Above, the gate of emptiness has already been elucidated; next, the gate of signlessness is now explained. If one awakens and enters via the gate of emptiness, signlessness is not needed; but because grasping at the sign of emptiness immediately ceases to be a gate, the sign of emptiness is now refuted in turn, causing one to awaken and enter via the gate of signlessness and generate correct contemplation. Hence this chapter exists. The reason why the sign of space is refuted at the very beginning of this chapter is precisely due to this intention. Furthermore, all dharmas have two aspects: first, internal essence; second, external characteristics. Thus the sūtras elucidate the emptiness of intrinsic nature and the emptiness of specific characteristics. Above, the absence of an internal essence was elucidated; now, the absence of external characteristics is distinguished; that is, the nature and characteristics of all dharmas are empty and quiescent. The reason for elucidating the emptiness and quiescence of nature and characteristics is precisely to distinguish the similarities and differences between the two emptinesses of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. The Hīnayāna analyzes nature and characteristics to elucidate emptiness; this is a teaching of arising and ceasing, serving as a contemplation of arising and ceasing. The Mahāyāna elucidates the emptiness of intrinsic nature and the emptiness of specific characteristics, elucidating a teaching of non-arising and non-ceasing and a contemplation of non-arising and non-ceasing. Therefore, the treatise distinguishes the emptiness of nature and characteristics, speaking for persons of the Mahāyāna. Moreover, it is to cause persons of the Hīnayāna to turn from the small and enter the great; hence it elucidates that nature and characteristics are originally empty and quiescent, as in the exposition of the Lotus Sūtra. Furthermore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "Those with craving, views, and the like enter via the gate of signlessness." Craving is a venomous insect, and views are evil demons; how can one be free from them? One should contemplate signlessness. When all objects are without signs, the mind that grasps at signs does not arise; craving and views are then severed, and one is able to transcend the three realms. By destroying signs and contemplating signlessness, one transcends the [samsāra of] fragmented lifespans; by comprehending that signs are originally without signs, one is able to transcend the burning house both inside and outside the three realms, where there is no affliction that is not stilled and no virtue that is not perfected. Fifth, the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra states: "The four great elements surround space, and consciousness is in their midst; this is provisionally designated a person. Space is the basis of the four great elements; the four great elements are the basis of consciousness; and consciousness is the basis of sentient beings." From above up to this point, the branches have been completely refuted; now, this single chapter next refutes their root. Because the branches are obvious, they were refuted first; because the root is obscure, it is eliminated later. Sixth, from above up to this point, one full cycle refuting existence has been completed. The four conditions are called the cause of all phenomena, and the aggregates of sentient beings are the fruit of all dharmas. Since cause and effect have been refuted, the deluded then claim that having neither cause nor effect is merely a discourse of empty space; hence they call Nāgārjuna the "monk of the nihilistic treatise." Also, as when the Nirvāṇa Sūtra encourages the generation of the bodhicitta, various brāhmaṇas say: "Why cause people to be identical to empty space?" They then consider empty space to be nothingness. The Mahāyāna is also like this; therefore, the present chapter refutes empty space. Seventh, from [the chapter on] "Going and Coming" through [that on the] "Five Aggregates," the three conditioned dharmas were refuted; this chapter next refutes the three unconditioned dharmas, causing both conditioned and unconditioned to be ultimately empty. Hence, among the eighteen emptinesses, after the emptiness of the conditioned and the emptiness of the unconditioned, ultimate emptiness is distinguished. Eighth, at the end of the previous chapter on the "Five Aggregates," the non-Buddhist opponent was encouraged to conduct questioning and answering based on emptiness; the opponent then grasped at the sign of emptiness, and therefore this chapter next refutes emptiness. Ninth, various Mahāyāna sūtras frequently cite empty space as a metaphor: the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā states that "prajñā is like empty space"; the Nirvāṇa Sūtra states that "the Buddha-nature is like empty space"; the Suvarṇaprabhāsa states that "the dharmakāya is like empty space." The deluded mostly do not understand empty space, and thus are deluded about the dharmas illustrated by the metaphor. Now, refuting erroneous empty space and setting forth correct empty space, this present chapter therefore comes. Now let us briefly elucidate it with respect to one matter. The Buddha's body, the dharmakāya, is like empty space. If one explains empty space in terms of permanence and omnipresence, this is the empty space of the non-Buddhists. If empty space serves as a metaphor for the Buddha's dharmakāya, it would be the dharmakāya of the non-Buddhists. If one accepts the Abhidharma's view that empty space is an existent dharma, the Buddha's dharmakāya would be the Abhidharma's dharmakāya. If one takes the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra's view that empty space is a non-existent dharma, it would be the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra's dharmakāya. When the metaphor is ruined, the exposition of the dharma is ruined; therefore, all Mahāyāna sūtras would be ruined. When this chapter refutes erroneous empty space and sets forth correct empty space, the dharmas and metaphors of all Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises are established. This is a matter of great import and should be deeply contemplated. Question: How are the six elements and five aggregates the same and different? Answer: The five aggregates combine form and separate the mind; the six elements combine the mind and separate form. Furthermore, according to the Abhidharma meaning, the five aggregates apply to both the defiled and undefiled, whereas the six elements are only defiled. If explained according to the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, the meaning of the five aggregates constituting a person is direct, while the meaning of the six elements constituting a person is indirect. Just as the four subtle atoms constitute the four great elements, the four great elements constitute the five sense faculties, the five sense faculties constitute the form aggregate, and the form aggregate constitutes a sentient being; therefore, the four great elements are indirect, and the five aggregates are direct. Question: How are the six elements explained in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra the same and different? Answer: In the Abhidharma, the four great elements are of two kinds: first, the four great elements as real dharmas, namely the four tangibles; second, the four great elements as provisional designations, namely shapes and appearances such as earth. In the Abhidharma, the consciousness element is only defiled, whereas in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra it applies to both defiled and undefiled. The Abhidharma explains that empty space is of two kinds: first, conditioned empty space, such as the space inside the bodies of sentient beings, or in wells, caves, doors, and windows; second, unconditioned empty space, which is the place beyond where birds can fly. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra explains that empty space is a non-existent dharma and is only unconditioned. Question: How does one contemplate these six elements? Answer: Below it says: "Therefore know that space is neither existent nor non-existent; the other five are also like this." Awakening to these six elements as neither existent nor non-existent is precisely true reality; generating correct contemplation severs all afflictions, and one no longer receives a body of the six elements; hence it is called the chapter on "Contemplating the Six Elements." Furthermore, if one sees the six elements as existent or non-existent, the body of birth and death appears, and the dharmakāya does not appear. When the dharmakāya appears and accords with the dharmakāya, it is called the sambhogakāya. Once one has attained awakening in accordance with reality and in turn expounds it in accordance with reality for sentient beings, this is precisely the nirmāṇakāya. Thus the Sūtra of the Ten Homages of Mañjuśrī states: "The Buddhas have the characteristic of empty space, and empty space is also without characteristics; because they are free from all causes and effects, I pay homage to that which is unobservable." Therefore, know that contemplating the six elements as neither existent nor non-existent is precisely the dharmakāya; according with the dharmakāya and generating correct contemplation is called the sambhogakāya; and expounding it for beings is precisely the nirmāṇakāya. Furthermore, the three characters "Zhong Guan Lun" (Mādhyamika-śāstra) are themselves the three bodies: "middle" (zhong) is the dharmakāya; according with the middle and generating correct contemplation is the "contemplation" (guan), which is the sambhogakāya; and contemplating internally while manifesting words externally is called the "treatise" (lun), which is the nirmāṇakāya.
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The chapter opens into two parts: first the thesis is established, and next it is refuted. The establishment has two parts: first explaining its characteristics (lakṣaṇa), and next explaining the substantial entity of the dharma (dharma-svabhāva). 'Determinate characteristics' means, for example, that the characteristic of earth is solidity, which cannot be made non-solid, and the characteristic of fire is heat, which cannot be made cold. 'There are the six kinds' means that since there are their characteristics, there are their substantial entities; these are the essential characteristics of the entity, not indicative characteristics, and therefore having the characteristic implies having the entity. Question: How does the establishment in the preceding chapters differ from this establishment? Answer: From Chapter [One], 'Conditions', to [Chapter Four], 'The Five Aggregates', existence (bhāva) was established; here, characteristics (lakṣaṇa) are established. Above, because existence was established, the author of the treatise refuted existence to elucidate the door of liberation of emptiness (śūnyatā). Now, because characteristics are established, he refutes characteristics to elucidate the door of liberation of signlessness (animitta); thus there is a sequence. In the reply, the eight verses are divided into two parts: the first seven verses refute characteristics to elucidate the door of signlessness; the second, a single verse, refutes by way of rebuke, explaining non-existence based on ultimate reality, rebuking their claiming existence where there is none. The first part also has two sections: the first six verses refute space (ākāśa), and the following one verse analogously applies this to the remaining five kinds. The refutation of space has two parts: the first five and a half verses refute the dharma of space, and the next half verse refutes the person who cognizes space. The first has two parts: the first five verses refute space as being existent, and the next half verse refutes space as being non-existent. Within the refutation of existence, the five verses form four sections: the first verse and a half adduces the characterizing mark to refute the characterized; the next verse and a half adduces the characterized to refute the characterizing mark; the third, a single verse, refutes through mutual dependence of mark and characterized; the fourth, a single verse, concludes and refutes. The first verse and a half has two parts: the preceding verse directly refutes, and the next half verse progressively refutes. The first half of the first verse explains that if space depends on a mark, it falls into being without space; the second half explains that if space does not depend on a mark, it falls into being markless: both advancing and retreating result in error. The first half refutes as follows: as for your previous statement that 'the six kinds each have determinate characteristics,' if so, because the mark exists, space exists; but since the mark does not exist, space does not exist. Question: What is the mark of space? Answer: Space has two kinds of marks: first, an indicative mark; second, an essential mark of the entity. For instance, seeing that a pillar exists, one knows that outside the pillar there is non-existence. Dependent on existence one knows non-existence; existence is the indicative mark belonging to non-existence. Second, because the pillar is removed, the non-existence of the pillar is obtained; the locus of the pillar's non-existence is the essential mark of the entity of space. Yet both marks depend on the pillar; if so, because the pillar exists, space can be had; if there were not yet a pillar, there should not yet be space. Furthermore, space and the pillar are concurrent; since the pillar is impermanent, space should also be so. Question: The first half explains that when the mark is non-existent, space is non-existent; is this a relative non-existence through mutual dependence, or an absolute non-existence independent of relation? Answer: It possesses both meanings. If it is an indicative mark, it is non-existent because of mutual dependence; if it is the essential mark of the entity that is non-existent, then being without the mark entails being without the entity. The second half refutes the dharma not concurring with the mark. If you say that before the pillar existed, space already existed, then space would be without a mark; and your prior statement that the six kinds each have determinate characteristics would be invalidated. Question: Of what mark is space devoid? Answer: Space exists before having an indicative mark, so it is just a markless existence of space. If one says it lacks an essential mark of the entity, then being without a mark entails being without space. Therefore, lacking an indicative mark incurs the fault of losing the mark; while lacking an essential mark of the entity incurs two faults: first, falling into being markless; second, falling into being entityless. The prose commentary only explains the second half to show that space falls into being markless, and does not explain the first half regarding the absence of the dharma, which is only explained when reaching the second verse. Or in another sense: being markless is just being without the dharma, and so it also explains the first half. From 'Question' downward, the second half-verse is introduced to progressively refute a markless existent space. Question: The opponent initially said that the six kinds each have determinate characteristics; why now change their tenet to assert a markless existent space? Answer: The opponent's doctrine has a root and branches. Speaking from the root, space is an eternal dharma and the mark is impermanent; thus, before there is a mark, space already pre-exists, so space is markless. Speaking from the branches, form subsequently arises, and dependent on the destruction of form one knows space; hence they say space has a mark. The initial statement that it has a mark was based on its branches; now stating that there is a markless space concerns its root. Therefore, the two statements do not contradict each other. From 'Answer' downward, it refutes a markless existent space. 'Nowhere is there' means: the non-existence explained here is the non-existence of the essential mark of the entity, not the non-existence of the indicative mark; if it lacks the essential mark of the entity, then this thing does not exist. There are two dharmas that subsume all dharmas: first, conditioned dharmas; second, unconditioned dharmas. Conditioned dharmas have arising, abiding, and ceasing as their characteristics; second, unconditioned dharmas have the absence of arising, abiding, and ceasing as their characteristic. Since both have their respective characteristics, these dharmas exist. If space were markless, it would be neither conditioned nor unconditioned, and thus would not be an existent dharma; hence it says 'nowhere is there.' Why? Space is one among the three unconditioned dharmas; how could it be neither conditioned nor unconditioned? Moreover, according to the Abhidharma, there are conditioned space and unconditioned space; now, being neither conditioned nor unconditioned, there is no existent dharma, hence it says 'nowhere is there.' The second half belongs to the next verse and a half, which adduces the characterized to refute the characterizing mark. This further opens into two distinctions: the first half-verse explains that because there is no characterized, what does the characterizing mark characterize? The next single verse opens two approaches to re-examine and challenge the characterizing mark. The first half-verse has two intents: first, to take the idea [of the opponent] and rescue the first half. If space were ultimately markless, one could obtain the absence of the dharma; but though it was previously markless, a mark subsequently comes to characterize it, and therefore it has a mark; because it has a mark, it again has a dharma. Now, conceding this in order to refute it: if previously it were markless and subsequently a mark came to characterize it, the mark would never adhere. As is commonly said, 'the ultimate truth has no name'; if one uses names to designate the truth, one strays ever further from the truth. The second intent says: if it were previously markless, then there would be no dharma; what would the subsequent mark characterize? Just as a pillar has roundness as its mark, if there is no round mark, there is no pillar; what would be characterized? Space has the absence of form as its mark; if there is no absence of form, there is no space; what would be characterized? The prose commentary, from 'If you say that previously it was markless' downward, explains the second half, and further gives rise to the third verse.
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From 'Within that which has a mark or is markless' downward is the second part, which specifically refutes the characterizing mark, explaining the second half of the preceding verse. The first half explains that in the two gates of existence and non-existence, a mark cannot be found; the second half subsumes all dharmas. That a mark does not reside in that which has a mark has two meanings: first, originally it already possesses the mark, so it does not need another mark. Just as a pillar originally possesses the round mark, it does not further require a round mark to characterize the pillar. Second, if originally possessing a round mark it further required another mark, one pillar would have two roundnesses, and one space would have two marks. If one pillar had two roundnesses, one roundness could also have two pillars. Furthermore, since there would be two marks, there would be a third, and so on ad infinitum. That a mark does not reside in that which is markless also has two meanings: first, since it originally lacks a mark, if one then brought a mark to characterize it, it would ultimately not adhere of itself. Second, it is solely the absence of form that constitutes the entity of space; since there is no mark of the absence of form, there is no entity of space, and the subsequent mark would have nothing to characterize. The meaning of this verse is deep and its words far-reaching; it explains that conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are both interrogated in this manner. All sentient beings assume that conditioned and unconditioned dharmas each have marks and therefore generate a mind that grasps at marks; generating a mind that grasps at marks is the root of afflictions, and so they give rise to afflictions; because of afflictions, there are karma and suffering. Now, interrogating that conditioned and unconditioned marks cannot be found, there are no marks whatsoever, and thus one does not generate a mind that grasps at marks, immediately obtaining liberation. The prose commentary explains the first half in four sections: first, explaining that a mark does not reside in that which is markless; next, explaining that a mark does not reside in that which has a mark; then, re-explaining that a mark does not reside in that which is markless; fourth, the conclusion. In the verse, it first explains that it does not reside in that which has a mark. Now, first explaining that which is markless has two meanings: first, it is the opponent's original tenet, which originally established that it is first markless and subsequently a mark comes to characterize it. Second, it is to complete the preceding verse: taking horns and a hump as the entity of an ox, if there are no such marks, there is no ox to be characterized. Next, it explains that a mark does not reside in that which has a mark. Adducing water and fire: the previous refutation concerned sentient beings, whereas this refutation concerns non-sentient beings, merely adducing them interchangeably. From 'Furthermore' downward, it re-refutes that a mark does not reside in that which is markless. First, it states the absence of a cause; next, it explains the absence of a cause. Stating that 'without a dharma there is a mark': since it is said to be markless, there is no characterized, and the characterized is the cause of the characterizing mark. The mark and the characterized are constantly interdependent: previously it explained the absence of the characterized; here it explains the absence of the characterizing mark. Because there is no dharma of the characterized upon which to depend, there is no characterizing mark. From 'Therefore' downward is the fourth section, adducing the verse to conclude. As for 'Because the dharma of the mark does not exist', this is the fourth verse, refuting through the mutual dependence of mark and characterized. The first half explains that the characterized depends on the mark; since the mark is non-existent, the characterized is non-existent. The second half explains that the mark depends on the characterized; since the characterized is non-existent, the mark is non-existent. This also explains that the essential mark of the entity and the characterized are mutually dependent; because the essential mark of the entity is non-existent, the characterized is non-existent. Second, if one applies the refutation of mutual dependence to indicative marks, the preceding three verses are called separate refutations, and this single verse is called an intertwined refutation. That the preceding three are separate refutations means: the first two verses directly refute the characterized, and the next verse directly refutes the characterizing mark; now, this single verse refutes both the characterizing and characterized together, hence it is called intertwined. Question: Previously it refuted the characterized and subsequently refuted the characterizing mark; why does it now first explain that because the mark is non-existent the characterized is non-existent, and subsequently explain that because the characterized is non-existent the mark is non-existent? Answer: This is refutation following immediate momentum. The third verse directly refuted the mark, so riding the momentum of refuting the mark, it immediately refutes the characterized; the second half rides the first half's refutation of the characterized to still refute the mark, and therefore now there is no mark. The fifth verse concludes and subsumes all dharmas in refutation. The first half concludes the preceding; the second half subsumes all dharmas. 'Therefore now there is no mark' concludes the second half of the fourth verse; 'nor is there that which is characterized' concludes the first half of the fourth verse. This is a chain-link mutually generating sequence, hence rising from below to above. Subsuming all dharmas in the second half means: the preceding refutation of mark and characterized having been exhaustive, it now uses mark and characterized to subsume all dharmas. All dharmas do not go beyond the essential mark of the entity and its characterized, or the indicative mark and its characterized. Since mark and characterized are both non-existent, all dharmas are completely non-existent. The prose commentary states 'causes and conditions, root and branches': some say that dependent on the mark there is the characterized, and dependent on the characterized there is the mark, hence they are called causes and conditions. The characterized is the root and the mark is the branches, hence they are called root and branches. Furthermore, because they are mutually dependent, they are mutually root and branches. We now say that 'causes and conditions' is a designation for the reasons; 'root and branches' is an appellation for the beginning and end. Throughout the chapter, from beginning to end, seeking this mark and characterized, they are ultimately unobtainable. Smoke also has a mark: during the day, fire is the characterized and smoke is the mark; at night, smoke is the characterized and fire is the mark. Making this statement has two meanings: first, to show that the mark and the characterized are indeterminate; second, to show that the mark and the characterized subsume all dharmas.
5.6
"Question: If there is no existence, there should be non-existence": The preceding five verses refuting space as existent are now concluded. Now, in the second place, space as non-existent is refuted. This question has four meanings: First, the preceding refuted the Abhidharma and non-Buddhists [who hold] that space is existent; now it refutes the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra [view] that space is non-existent. The Tattvasiddhi explains that space is an unconditioned phenomenon (an existent of non-entity), yet ultimately maintains there is this phenomenon; if this unconditioned non-entity did not exist, denying the three unconditioned dharmas would incur no offense. Furthermore, the preceding refuted the Hīnayāna clinging to space as existent; now it refutes the Mahāyāna clinging to space as non-existent. Second, it arises on the basis of the Treatise Master's fifth verse, which says: "Where there is no defining characteristic and nothing to be characterized, apart from the defining characteristic and that which is characterized, there is also no other entity whatsoever." The opponent says: This is precisely what space is. If there were entities such as defining characteristics and what is characterized, they would not be called space; it is precisely because of the absence of these various entities that this space is obtained. Third, all of the preceding set forth propositions according to basic tenets; now the opponent takes the Treatise Master's refutation and uses it as his own proposition. Thus, before being refuted he clings to existence, and upon hearing the Treatise Master's refutation he attaches to non-existence, for since beginningless time his afflictions and defilements have been so heavy that he cannot abide without support. Therefore, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Sentient beings are like inchworms; relying on existence they give rise to the view of non-existence, and relying on non-existence they produce the view of existence. Yet sentient beings give rise to views of existence and non-existence regarding all dharmas." Now they give rise to views of existence and non-existence regarding the single dharma of space. Giving rise to existence and non-existence is the root of obstructing the middle way, and is also the root of all views. Why? Originally, space was borrowed to illustrate the Buddha-nature, the Dharma-body, the One Vehicle, and prajñā. Now, if space is turned into annihilation and permanence, then the Buddha-nature and the Dharma-body both become annihilation and permanence, both become the roots of views, and all become the root of obstructing the path. Thus both the path and non-path become non-path. The damage done by this is grave, and it must be refuted and cleansed. Fourth, as in the interpretation of master Kaishan, it explains that space is subsumed under the two truths; space belongs to conventional truth and is therefore called existent. Hearing the Treatise Master previously refute the non-existence of space, he assumes it is negated by ultimate truth and is therefore non-existent; hence he posits existence and non-existence. Below, "Reply": Now, in refuting non-existence, there are broadly two ways: First, if existence and non-existence have different essences, then having no existence to depend on, there is no non-existence. Second, if existence and non-existence share one essence, because there is existence there is non-existence; if there is no existence, there is no non-existence. Since existence and non-existence are already non-existent, from the beginning up to this point the refutation of the dharma of space is complete; now, second, it refutes the person formed by space. As the Tattvasiddhi says: "The four great elements surround space, consciousness is within it, and it is provisionally designated a person." Now, examining the meaning of space, it cannot be obtained; thus the four great elements have nothing to surround. Since the four great elements do not exist, consciousness has nothing to rely upon; by what provisional designation could it be called a person? Therefore, the preceding refuted the constitutive dharmas, and now it refutes the constituted person. Because dharmas do not exist, it is called the non-arising of dharmas; because persons do not exist, it is called the non-arising of sentient beings. Possessing both non-arisings, one attains the patience of the non-arising of dharmas. Second is the refutation of object and cognition. The first half of the verse refutes the object to be known; the second half refutes the cognition capable of knowing. Therefore, existence and non-existence are both leveled, and condition and contemplation are both silenced. Master Sengzhao used this to illuminate the meaning of nirvāṇa, stating: "Dharmas have no characteristics of existence or non-existence; the sage has no cognition of existence or non-existence." Dharmas having no characteristics of existence or non-existence means there is no differentiation externally; the sage having no cognition of existence or non-existence means there is no mind internally. Without differentiation externally and without mind internally, both are tranquil and dissolved into vast, great equality—this is called nirvāṇa. Furthermore, the reason for refuting the knower is that space is fundamentally neither existent nor non-existent; it is merely that conceptual cognition deems it existent or non-existent. Hence, refuting the conceptual knower brings the meaning of space to tranquility. Below, "Therefore, know that space": In the second place, this analogously refutes the other five elements. The first three lines bring up space; the final line analogously extends it to the five elements. "Neither existent": concludes the refutation of existence above, which constitutes five verses. "Nor non-existent": concludes the refutation of non-existence above, which is half a verse. "Neither a defining characteristic": concludes the refutation of defining characteristics, which is the third verse. "Nor that which is characterized": concludes the refutation of that which is characterized from the first two verses of the chapter. Someone said: This explains the correct meaning of space. Erroneously, one calculates space as existent or non-existent; correct space is neither existent nor non-existent. Now, clarifying the refutation of errors, this interpretation can be accepted. Since the Abhidharmikas' explanation of space falls into the two extremes, it is now clarified that space is the middle way. Hence, the various sūtras take space as an analogy for the Dharma-body, which is the middle-way Dharma-body, middle-way prajñā, and so on. Question: Do the masters of the provisional middle way negate, or do they negate the negation of existence? If they negate existence, since fundamentally there is no existence, what is negated? If they negate the negation, having already said "neither existent," how could they negate the negation? Another question: Is existence relative to non-existence or not? You believe that existence is relative to non-existence. Since existence is not established, non-existence is not established. Now, "neither existent nor non-existent" is relative to existence and non-existence. Since existence and non-existence are negated, "neither existent nor non-existent" is also not established. Therefore Master Sengzhao said: "To say it is not existent clarifies that it is not existent, not that it is 'non-existent'. To say it is not non-existent clarifies that it is not non-existent, not that it is 'non-non-existent'." Having concluded with "neither existent nor non-existent," one also concludes with neither pervasive nor non-pervasive, neither permanent nor impermanent, and neither determined nor undetermined. This is departing far from the two extremes without clinging to the middle way. Thus one knows that space transcending the four propositions is truly correct space. Taking this space as an analogy for the Dharma-body, Buddha-nature, prajñā, and the One Vehicle, all are correct. The matter discussed here is vast; how could one not pay close attention? Question: Why is it said that "neither existent nor non-existent" is a foolish doctrine, and why does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha call it a slander of prapañca, yet here it is said to be the middle way? Answer: If one grasps the meaning of "neither existent nor non-existent" as Master Sengzhao intended, it is the middle way. If one again abandons existence and non-existence only to cling to "neither existent nor non-existent," that is a foolish doctrine. "The other five are identical to space": As the sūtra says: "Without form, without shape, without opposition, of one characteristic which is characterless." Not knowing how to name it, one forcefully designates it the true mark. From the true mark, prajñā arises; hence the various practices are established, and myriad virtues are accomplished. The prose comments on the previous intent of refuting space: first, in terms of root and branch; second, in terms of difficulty and ease. Another meaning is: The other five elements are conditioned dharmas, which were already refuted above in the aggregate of feeling. Space is an unconditioned dharma, which had not been refuted up to this point; therefore it is refuted first here. Below, "Question: All worldly people see phenomena as existent or non-existent": This gives rise to the second section, the approach of reprimand. The text has two parts: first, the opponent reprimands the proponent; second, the proponent reprimands the opponent. The gist of the question is: Worldly people all see the five elements as existent and the element of space as non-existent; why do you say it is neither existent nor non-existent? If it is neither existent nor non-existent, it would be of one single kind; how could they be called five? Furthermore, conventional truth is existent and ultimate truth is non-existent; if one now says they are neither existent nor non-existent, that refutes the two truths. In addition, worldly people calculate space as possessing both existence and non-existence: non-Buddhists and Abhidharmikas cling to space as existent, while the Tattvasiddhi explains space as non-existent; why do you say it is neither existent nor non-existent? Now we generally ask: Is space pervasive or non-pervasive? There are two explanations in reply. One says it is pervasive, and therefore where a pillar is, there is space. The second says it is not pervasive, and therefore where a pillar is, there is no space. Question: If you say space is pervasive, the pillar should admit another pillar. They reply: Physical forms mutually obstruct, and therefore it does not admit a pillar. Next, we ask: Since space is pervasive, the pillar should be identical with space; since space is unobstructed, the pillar should also be unobstructed. If the pillar is obstructive, space should also be obstructive. If space is unobstructed while the pillar is obstructive, then space and the pillar are different, and space does not pervade the pillar. If space does not pervade, space is impermanent. If being non-pervasive were permanent, being pervasive should be impermanent. "Reply: Those of shallow intellect see phenomena": This is the direct reprimand. Because of shallow intellect, they see the five elements as existent and the space element as non-existent; they also see space as existent and see space as non-existent; they also see conventional truth as existent and see ultimate truth as non-existent. Having seen existence and non-existence, they give rise to annihilation and permanence. Thus various views arise; because there are views, there is craving; through the conditions of craving and views, they transmigrate through birth and death, unable to attain peaceful nirvāṇa. The Abhidharmikas say: "By seeing existence one attains the path." This is merely the view of existence; how could one attain the path? It is only attaining the path of the view of existence; in truth, one does not attain the correct path. Followers of the Tattvasiddhi say: "By seeing non-existence one attains the path." This too is the view of non-existence; how could one attain the path? This is also seeing the path of non-existence; ultimately one does not attain the correct path. People of profound intellect are the opposite of this: seeing existence, they know it signifies non-existence; seeing non-existence, they know it signifies not non-existent. Hence the Avataṃsaka-sūtra says: "All phenomena of existence and non-existence / Are completely understood as neither existent nor non-existent." Question: Why is it that those of shallow intellect see only existence and non-existence? Answer: The reality of the six elements is precisely the true mark, and the true mark transcends the four propositions. Now they see only existence and non-existence, and are not yet able to see both existence and non-existence, nor can they see neither existence nor non-existence; how much less can they see the transcendence of the four propositions? Because they cannot thoroughly see the path that transcends the four [propositions], their intellect is shallow. Now, originally seeing the transcendence of the four [propositions] constitutes the true contemplation of prajñā; failing to see the principle is merely ignorance, hence it is called shallow intellect. Moreover, all four propositions are views; now seeing existence and non-existence means their forming of views is not even thorough, so how could they attain the path of eliminating views? The prose has three parts: first, clarifying the loss from lacking skillful means; second, clarifying the gain from possessing skillful means; third, concluding the gains and losses. "The wise see the arising of phenomena": this is the second part, clarifying the gain from possessing skillful means. Question: The foolish see arising and produce the view of existence, and see cessation and produce the view of non-existence; the wise should see arising without producing the view of existence, and see cessation without producing the view of non-existence. If the wise seeing arising and cessation extinguishes the view of non-existence, and seeing cessation extinguishes the view of existence, the foolish should likewise see arising and produce non-existence, and see cessation and produce existence. Answer: Explanations of this differ. Someone said: The wise embody the non-duality of arising and cessation; they know that arising is cessation, and cessation is arising. For this reason, seeing arising can extinguish the view of non-existence, and seeing cessation can extinguish the view of existence. Someone said: This is the wise person's stepped awakening: not only knowing that arising is not existent, but also knowing that arising is not non-existent. Why is this? Since arising is not existent, what non-existence could there be to what is not existent? Therefore, knowing that arising is not existent is the initial stage of awakening; knowing that arising is not non-existent is the second stage of awakening. Hence it says that seeing arising immediately extinguishes the view of non-existence. As the master always said: "Provisional existence is not called existence; provisional existence is not called non-existence." We now maintain that these two interpretations also have their point. However, the phrasing is slightly awkward; now we clarify that this is straightforward speech. Since the wise see that phenomena arise from causes and conditions, how could there be nihilistic non-existence? How could there be [inherent] arising? Therefore, seeing arising immediately extinguishes the view of non-existence. Because they cease through the separation of conditions, how could they be definitely existent? Question: Why does it not say that the wise, seeing arising, know it is not existent, and seeing cessation, know it is not non-existent? Answer: In terms of actual principle, it should be so. But the intention is to refute the foolish; if one directly said that arising is not existent and cessation is not non-existent, it would be difficult to win their confidence. Since they currently see arising, how could it be not non-existent? Therefore, it is now clarified that because there is arising, one knows it is not definitely non-existent; because there is cessation, one knows it is not truly existent. Thus it is easy to win their confidence. As the Śata-śāstra says: "Because the seed perishes, one faithfully knows it is not permanent; because the sprout arises in succession, one knows it is not annihilated." The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "When seeing suffering and its origin, one eliminates the view of non-existence; when seeing cessation and the path, one eliminates the view of existence." This is precisely the meaning. Below, "Therefore, although there is something seen regarding all phenomena": This is the third part, concluding both gains and losses. First it concludes the gain, and later the loss. "Although there is something seen": Fearing that the opponent might say that while the wise, seeing arising, do not produce the view of non-existence, they nonetheless see arising and thus hold a view of arising, it is therefore clarified now that although it arises like an illusion, it is seen; illusory arising is non-arising yet arising, arising yet non-arising. "Even uncontaminated views are still extinguished": Uncontaminated is the correct contemplation of the middle way of non-arising and non-ceasing. Originally, correct contemplation was spoken of in opposition to erroneous contemplation; once there is no erroneous contemplation, how could correct contemplation remain? Below, "Therefore": This concludes the loss.
5.7
Chapter Six: Examination of Passion and the Impassioned
5.8
The reason why this chapter follows has eight aspects in all:
First: In the preceding chapters, when seeking for the body, it could not be found. Thus, the skandhas of feeling and perception eliminated the existence of this body, and the six elements refuted the nonexistence of the body; since existence and nonexistence have both been purified, the body is ultimately empty. Furthermore, feeling and perception eliminated the branch-manifestations of the body, and the six elements refuted the root of the body; since root and branches have both been purified, inner and outer are both empty. The deluded might then say: "If you say there is no body, how can there be mind? Since there is mind, there must certainly be a body." Thus the Daśabhūmika-sūtra says: "The three realms are all made by the one mind"; hence mind is the root of the six destinies. Since the root exists, the branches cannot be nonexistent. However, because bodily characteristics are coarse and prominent, they were examined first, while mental characteristics are subtle and fine, and are thus examined later.
Second: The afflictions and bondages of birth-and-death consist of cause and effect: the skandhas of feeling and perception are the effect, and the three poisons are the cause. The preceding [chapters] examined and found no effect; now [this chapter] investigates and finds no cause. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra explains that the twelve links of dependent origination are fundamentally unarisen and unceasing, and ultimately without cause and effect, which explains the meaning of the five natures. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra examines the twelve links of dependent origination to elucidate the meaning of the three prajñās: when one attains the prajñā and Buddha-nature of all the preceding chapters, if one perceives the twelve links of dependent origination, the river of conditions is filled and the river of nature is overturned. Now, examining the twelve [links] as neither cause nor effect, the river of nature is filled and the river of conditions is overturned. Originally, it was in contrast to the river of conditions that there was a river of nature; since the river of conditions has been overturned, the river of nature also ceases, meaning both rivers are overturned together. For the sake of sentient beings, there are the two expedient means of condition and nature, and the meaning in which both the river of conditions and the river of nature are filled; therefore this treatise examines the meaning of cause and effect in the twelve [links].
Question: Why examine the effect first and the cause later?
Answer: The characteristics of the effect are manifest, whereas the characteristics of the cause are hidden; therefore the effect is examined first.
Question: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Those of dull faculties contemplate from the effect; those of sharp faculties contemplate from the cause." This treatise expounds the practice of contemplation in the Mahāyāna; why does it contemplate from the effect?
Answer: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Bodhisattvas, for the sake of sentient beings, also contemplate from the effect." Now this treatise is for the dull-witted of the final age, and therefore contemplates from the effect.
Third: Up to this point, the text has directly elucidated the emptiness of dharmas; now, in this single chapter, both person and dharmas are obliterated together: the dharma of passion is the cause, and the impassioned person is the effect.
Fourth: It arises specifically from the end of the previous chapter. Above it was said: "Those of shallow wisdom see phenomena as having the characteristics of existence or nonexistence." The prose says: "Seeing phenomena arise, they grasp at characteristics and call it existence; seeing phenomena cease, they grasp at characteristics and call it nonexistence." An opponent would say: "If so, there must be grasping at characteristics. Grasping at characteristics is affliction, and affliction is the dharma of passion. The one who gives rise to grasping at characteristics is the impassioned person." Therefore, this present chapter next refutes grasping at characteristics.
Fifth: It aims to refute the notion of severing afflictions held by all insiders, outsiders, Mahāyāna, and Hīnayāna practitioners. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra says: "If Subhūti does not sever afflictions yet does not abide with them, only then may you take the food." Regarding severing and not severing, there are four kinds of persons in all:
1. Lay worldlings: the three poisons are actively present, and they do not understand eradication and severing.
2. Renunciant heterodox practitioners: they sever the defilements of the three intermediate realms of emptiness, but are unable to eradicate those of the stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Hence the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "These heterodox practitioners come near to exhausting the three realms of existence, yet turn back again." As for the explanation of how worldlings sever defilements, there are two masters: the Sarvāstivādins explain that worldlings sever defilements because the Sarvāstivādins attain the path by seeing existence, and worldlings also sever defilements because they see existence. The Tattvasiddhi explains that one severs defilements by seeing emptiness; worldlings do not see the characteristics of emptiness, but merely suppress [defilements] within existence.
3. Persons of the two vehicles: they sever the defilements of the three realms, but have not eliminated habitual propensities and the ignorance beyond the realms.
4. Persons of the Mahāyāna: they fully sever the afflictions of the five entrenchments.
Combining the above four kinds of persons, there are two classes: worldlings abide together with afflictions; the latter three kinds are designated as "severing defilements." If so, they are all rebuked by Vimalakīrti. Now, by understanding that afflictions are fundamentally unarisen, one does not abide with them; since they also have no cessation now, there is nothing to sever, and thus one avoids being rebuked. Now, this chapter searches for afflictions and finds no source, which extensively explains the meaning of neither severing nor abiding together with them; hence this chapter comes next.
Sixth: Furthermore, just as the various abhidharma schools hold that afflictions fundamentally exist and then engage in all kinds of conjectural elaborations, giving rise to disputes, this means giving rise to further afflictions on top of afflictions; thus the old defilements are not eliminated, and new encumbrances arise again. Now, this chapter contemplates afflictions as ultimately empty in all respects; thus, old defilements are eliminated and new defilements do not arise, which is called attaining liberation; therefore this chapter is spoken.
Seventh: It comprehensively explains the profound and essential contemplations of the various Mahāyāna sūtras. As the Wuxing jing says: "Lust is itself the Path; anger and delusion are likewise. Within these three dharmas are the immeasurable Paths of all Buddhas." The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "The mind arises together with greed, but does not perish together with greed." If one can correctly contemplate afflictions according to this chapter, that is "the mind arising together with greed, but not perishing together with greed"; if one does not contemplate according to this chapter, then the mind arises together with greed and perishes together with greed. Furthermore, the Lotus Sūtra calls the severing of fetters the work of an outcast dung-cleaner. Now the insiders, outsiders, Mahāyāna, and Hīnayāna say: "There are afflictions to be severed, and there is wisdom able to sever them." Are they not dung-cleaners? The treatise master, pitying such people, wishes to enable them all to become the noble sons of the elder and abandon the occupation of dung-cleaning; therefore he speaks this chapter.
Question: The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: "With wisdom corresponding to a single thought, one severs afflictions and habitual propensities." It also says: "Bodhisattvas practice in the path of non-hindrance; Buddhas practice in the path of liberation." All Mahāyāna sūtras explain the severing of defilements. Furthermore, the Bodhisattvabhūmi says: "Bodhisattvas sever the affliction-obstacle completely; Buddhas sever the knowledge-obstacle completely." How can all severing of defilements be dung-cleaning?
Answer: When the Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises explain severing, they speak of "eradicating" simply because one realizes that defilements are fundamentally unarisen; it does not mean that defilements exist first and are afterwards eradicated to make them nonexistent. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra also says: "If they existed first and became nonexistent later, then all Buddhas and bodhisattvas would incur fault and guilt." Furthermore, at the end of the twenty-sixth fascicle, it says: "Are all phenomena fundamentally existent and now nonexistent?" Deduce from this that there is nothing to sever; having nothing to sever is itself severing. One can also attain the non-hindered and liberation: the preceding thought-moment knowing that defilements do not arise is the non-hindered, and the subsequent thought-moment of non-arising is liberation.
Eighth: It comprehensively explains the meaning of the universal repentance of the vaipulya sūtras throughout the Mahāyāna. As the Guan Puxian pusa xingfa jing says: "The Buddhas of the ten directions expound the method of repentance: the bodhisattva's practice neither severs the fetters nor abides in the sea of fetters." When one realizes that these afflictions are themselves the true reality, there are no afflictions in which to abide and no defilements to sever; causing this mind to accord with true reality, in the snap of a finger one can eliminate the sins of birth-and-death accumulated over hundreds of thousands of koṭis of asaṃkhyeya kalpas, not to mention over a long time.
Question: Why is that so?
Answer: Going against principle constitutes sin, and sin is false and unreal; if one accords with true reality, one immediately conforms to principle. Principle is real; because the real cures the unreal, all sins are eliminated. With unconditioned great compassion, the treatise master pities sentient beings of heavy sin in the final age and reveals the dharma-gate of the true vaipulya great repentance that swiftly eliminates the three obstacles; therefore he speaks this chapter.
Explanations of passion and the impassioned differ. First, worldly people only know that the three poisons exist, and do not understand how to trace their origin. Non-Buddhists also explain the three poisons: for instance, in the Sāṃkhya intellect truth (buddhi-tattva), the impure division contains tamas, rajas, and sthūla. In the Vaiśeṣika guṇa category, among the twenty-one phenomena there is delusion (moha); delusion is one of the three poisons. One should know that non-Buddhists likewise explain the three poisons. However, since there are four positions regarding whether intellect and spirit (puruṣa) are identical or different, etc., there are likewise four views on whether passion and the impassioned are identical or different, etc.
The Vibhāṣā and the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya present three schools within inner Buddhist learning: the three-established school, the two-established school, and the one-established school. The Vātsīputrīya possesses all three established: because there are the objects of the six sense-fields capable of producing the three poisons, "things" are established; because there is a person capable of giving rise to the three poisons, the "person" is established; because there are afflictions given rise to by the person, the "fetters" are established. The Sarvāstivāda has two established: the six sense-fields truly exist, so "things" are established; there are the three poisons produced, so the "fetters" are established; but there is no person, so the person is not established. The Dā郊tāntikas have neither person established nor things established, but only the fetters established: because there is no person, the person is not established; the external objective field is indefinite—just as with a single woman's physical form, a greedy person sees it as pure, a practitioner of the contemplation of impurity regards it as impure, an indifferent person has no attraction or repulsion and thus sees it as neither pure nor impure, a person of compassionate heart sees it and gives rise to compassion, and a practitioner of the contemplation of emptiness sees it as empty—thus, because the objective field is indefinite, the objective field is not established. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha explain that there are no external objective fields, which is the meaning of the objective field not being established; there is only consciousness, which is merely the establishment of fetters. Now, in refuting passion and the impassioned, this chapter completely refutes all three established positions, for although the three schools differ, they do not go beyond person and dharmas. Master Zhuangyan held that there is a provisional personal entity, which falls under the three-established school. Master Guangzhai held that there is no person, which falls under the two-established school. Kaishan held that having no entity falls under the two-established, and having function falls under the three-established, reproving and equating the views of both masters.
Question: Since they are called "passion" and "the impassioned," does it mean that because the mind-nature is fundamentally pure, it becomes defiled, or because it is impure, it becomes defiled?
Answer: The Mahāsāṃghika and the Daśabhūmika-śāstra say: The mind-nature is fundamentally pure, just like the sun in the sky; its fundamental nature is clear and pure, but adventitious defilements stain it so that it becomes impure. The Tattvasiddhi masters say: The mind possesses the principle of attaining Buddhahood and is not defiled by afflictions, hence it is said to be pure; as for the expression "adventitious defilement," although afflictions are stubborn, they can ultimately be severed and do not abide forever, hence they are called "adventitious." The Sarvāstivādins say: Fundamentally there are impure minds as well as pure minds, but there are the senses of simultaneous defilement and non-simultaneous defilement: when a greedy mind arises together with the mental factors, it binds the simultaneous mental factors, which is called simultaneous defilement; there is also the sense of anterior-posterior defilement, which is object-binding, meaning that a greedy mind takes the objective fields of the three times as its object and binds the objective fields of the three times. The Tattvasiddhi masters explain: When the prior three minds have not yet given rise to greed or anger, they are merely indeterminate, and are called pure; afterwards, the formation skandha gives rise to afflictions that defile the prior three minds, which is called impure. This is merely defilement in anterior-posterior succession; there is no simultaneous defilement. Although there are simultaneous and non-simultaneous [theories], both ultimately explain that there is affliction defiling the mind, which is refuted by the present treatise master.
Question: The Śrīmālādevī Sūtra says: "The intrinsically pure mind is defiled by adventitious afflictions; this is difficult to understand." Is this not identical to the old view?
Answer: This explains that the sentient being's mind is fundamentally pure, yet in sentient beings it becomes impure; although in sentient beings it becomes impure, it has never been impure—this is undefiled yet defiled, defiled yet undefiled—hence it is said to be "difficult to understand." It does not mean there are real afflictions that defile the mind.
Question: Are afflictions the mind, or not the mind?
Answer: The Sarvāstivādins and the Tattvasiddhi both explain that afflictions are mental dharmas, associated with the mind. The Vibhajyavādins explain that afflictions are not associated with the mind, as stated at the end of the "Chapter on Fetters" in the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. Now, whether associated or unassociated, both ultimately hold that afflictions defile the mind, and are likewise refuted by the present treatise.
Question: The text refutes all three poisons; why is the chapter titled only refuting passion and the impassioned?
Answer: The three poisons all blacken practitioners, hence they are called "passion" (raja/rāga). Furthermore, passion is the foremost of the three poisons. Moreover, the fundamental limits of birth-and-death are two: ignorance and craving. Ignorance is the root of the prior part, which having already arisen cannot be treated; craving is the root of the posterior part. The treatise master, out of compassion, wishes to prevent [sentient beings] from giving rise to the three causes so that they may escape the two effects; therefore he specifically refutes passion.
Question: The first among the three poisons is greed (lobha); why is it now called passion (rāga)?
Answer: Although greed is defiling, passion pervades the three realms, whereas greed is only in the desire realm. Now, wishing to cure the defilements of the three realms comprehensively, he refutes passion. Furthermore, greed impassions persons, hence it is called passion.
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