十二門論宗致義記 1.39

1.39

初門中三：初、標起章門；二、立頌略示；後、釋頌廣顯。頌中上半舉法，下半徵情。又上半明緣生故無性，下半顯無性故即空。若具言，此中有兩重比量，以初成後。何者？上半明一切有為法皆無自性，宗；以從緣生故，因；喻，可知。下半明有為法定空，宗；以無自性故，因；喻，亦可知。三、釋頌廣顯中二：初、明有為空，後類顯我及無為一切皆空。前中三：一、牒舉果；二、「如是」下，破顯無性；三、「是故」下，結有為空。初中三：先開果有內外；二、開緣亦內外；三、釋顯內外緣果。此中先辨外事有五事，各有因緣及所生法，並可知。後顯內報，謂十二因緣。依小乘宗，皆前支為因，生後支故，具有因緣及所生法亦可知，亦是釋頌中初句竟。二、破顯無性中二：先總顯，謂內外法既各如是攬緣而成，豈非即是無自性耶？若有自體，豈更緣？故《涅槃經》云「譬如青黃，合成綠色」。當知是二本無綠性。若本有者，何須合成？二、「若法自性無」下，別顯無性。於中先外後內。外中二：先正破，後類結。前中，初標列自他共三章俱無；二、「何以故」下，徵釋。於中先徵後釋。釋中，先釋自性無、後釋他性無，不釋第三共生。以自他若破，無別共故。就釋初中，謂自性若有，則不因他，以因他故，自性無也。二、「若謂」下，釋他性無中有三：初、他成別體故非因；二、「若謂」下，因同果體故非他；三、「又蒲」下，因復無性失自他。又釋此三：初、約疏；二、約親；三、俱非。初中二：先約情縱破，謂若他生者，牛應生馬、種梨生柰等也。後「而實不然」者，就理奪破也。二、「若謂」下，就親破，亦是明因同果體故非他。於中三：初、牒救總非，謂外計云他有二種：一、非因之他，如牛於馬，可不相生；二、是因之他，如蒲於席，何得不生？前文但云他不言因，此中說因而不言他故也。此救非理，故云「不然」。二、徵不然所以。三、正釋破，於中初、存因失他故非因，是奪破也。若謂是因而非他者，因既於果而非他，則蒲席一體；體既是一，則失於因，因既失矣，他生之義安在？二、存他失因，是縱破也。謂若是他因非因故，前則以因為他不成，後則以他為因。又前由一故不成生，後由異故亦不生，是故他不生也。亦可前中量云：因定不生果，以與果法不別故，猶如果法。後義量云：因定不生果，以與果異故，猶如非因法。三、推因無性失他，於中遮外救云：上來或異同非因，或一同果法，俱不得生，而實生理非一非異，故得相生。今破意云：若有此因，可與果非一異，而能生於果。今推求此因亦無自性，以從眾緣成故，猶如果法，是故無體可能生也。文中有四：初、標；二、徵；三、釋；四、結。釋中，先釋蒲無自體，後辨無力成席。謂自體尚無，何有力用？「是故」下，結可知。二、「餘缾」下，類餘一切外因緣法皆不可得。第二、釋破內法緣果之中有二：初、略指同前破，亦是懸標後文破。二、引頌廣顯破，此中二：初引頌相傳，此《七十論》亦是龍樹所造，有七十頌故名也。頌中，初句顯正理，次句牒執，下二句徵破。又可初句奪破，後三句縱破。又可初句標無生，後三句釋無生。二、釋頌中，先釋文顯宗，後結因果俱空。釋中先立正義，亦是釋頌初句，就理奪破。二、「若謂」下，破外情計，亦釋下三句縱破。此中三：先、開兩關定；二、次第別破；三、雙結俱非。第二別破中二：先約一心破，俱縱其所立，謂正無明上心時，行等亦應同時。「又因果」下，奪其因果。文中先標舉，後釋成。二、約多心破，有三：初、因果別異破，以不相搆及故非緣生法也。二、後果無因破，謂先分無明與前心俱謝，後分行等，誰為其因？三、遮救重破，謂外救云：我前念無明雖滅，能引後行支故為因，如等無間緣；本識中種子，前滅後生等。今破云：汝前心為已滅？為未滅？若已滅，滅是無物，以何為因？若未滅，則果不得生，以前心破故。三、「十二因緣」下，雙結，可知。第三、「是故」下，結緣果皆空，可知。二、類破中四：初、結有為法空，可知；二、「有為尚空」下，以法空故，顯我無依，故亦空也。論說法執為因，人執為果，本因既亡，末果隨喪也。以此論明人、法二空故。先辨法空者，以正破二乘兼破外道故。此中三：一、標況破；二、釋法破；三、引證破。釋中二：先、順釋，謂因三科有為法積聚故，假說為我。有為既空，假我安在？可然是薪，然是火，反釋可知。引證中，如經說因我故有我所，如因法有我相似。又釋前法空故我空，此明我空故所空，以所是我之用故，此乃從本向末以說空也。三、類顯無為空中先標類，謂涅槃名寂滅也。二、「何以故」下，釋成。釋成中三：初、無法可滅故無滅；二、無能得滅故無滅；三、「復次」下，明闕生待對故無滅；四、「是故」下，結三空，可知。

In the first gate there are three [parts]: first, raising the opening theme of the section; second, setting forth a verse to briefly indicate [the meaning]; third, explaining the verse to fully reveal [the meaning]. In the verse, the first half adduces phenomena, and the second half cross-examines the attachments. Furthermore, the first half clarifies that because they arise from conditions they lack intrinsic nature, and the second half reveals that because they lack intrinsic nature they are therefore empty. In full detail, there are two syllogistic inferences (anumāna) here, establishing the latter by means of the former. How so? The first half clarifies that all conditioned phenomena lack intrinsic nature: this is the thesis (pratijñā); because they arise from conditions: this is the reason (hetu); the example (dṛṣṭānta) may be known. The second half clarifies that conditioned phenomena are definitely empty: this is the thesis; because they lack intrinsic nature: this is the reason; the example may likewise be known. In the third [part], explaining the verse to fully reveal [the meaning], there are two [sections]: first, clarifying that conditioned [phenomena] are empty; second, analogously revealing that the self and unconditioned [phenomena]—all of them—are empty. In the former [section] there are three [subdivisions]: 1. adducing the result; 2. from "Like this" onward, refuting and revealing the lack of intrinsic nature; 3. from "Therefore" onward, concluding that conditioned [phenomena] are empty. In the first of these there are three: first, opening up results into external and internal; second, opening up conditions also into external and internal; third, explaining and revealing external and internal conditions and results. Herein, first distinguishing external matters, there are five matters, each having causes and conditions as well as produced phenomena, all of which may be known. Next, revealing the internal retribution, this refers to the twelve links of dependent origination. Relying on the Hīnayāna school, each preceding link is the cause that generates the subsequent link; thus their complete possession of causes, conditions, and produced phenomena may also be known, which also concludes the explanation of the first line of the verse. In the second [subdivision], refuting and revealing the lack of intrinsic nature, there are two: first, a general revelation, meaning that since internal and external phenomena are each thus constituted by relying on conditions, how are they not devoid of intrinsic nature? If they had an intrinsic substance, why would they further depend on conditions? Therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Just as blue and yellow combine to form green, one should know that these two originally lack the nature of green. If it were originally present, why would they need to combine?" Second, from "If a phenomenon lacks intrinsic nature" onward, individually revealing the lack of intrinsic nature. Therein, first [are] external and next [are] internal [phenomena]. In the external, there are two: first, the direct refutation; second, analogously concluding. In the former, first, listing the three positions of self, other, and both, [showing that] all are nonexistent; second, from "Why is this?" onward, cross-examining and explaining. Therein, first cross-examining and then explaining. In the explanation, first explaining the nonexistence of self-nature, and next explaining the nonexistence of other-nature, without explaining the third, arising from both; because if self and other are refuted, there is no separate "both." As for explaining the first, if self-nature existed, it would not depend on another; because it depends on another, self-nature does not exist. Second, from "If it is said" onward, in explaining the nonexistence of other-nature there are three: 1. because the other constitutes a distinct substance, it is not a cause; 2. from "If it is said" onward, because the cause is identical to the substance of the result, it is not other; 3. from "Furthermore, rushes..." onward, because the cause again lacks nature, both self and other are lost. These three are also explained as: 1. in terms of being remote; 2. in terms of being direct; 3. both being refuted. In the first of these there are two: first, conceding according to common assumption and refuting, meaning that if it is produced by another, a cow should produce a horse, planting a pear should produce a crabapple, and so forth. The subsequent "Yet in truth this is not so" is a direct refutation based on principle. Second, from "If it is said" onward, refuting in terms of direct [causation] also clarifies that because the cause is identical to the substance of the result, it is not other. Therein are three: 1. repeating the defense and generally refuting it, meaning the externalist posits that there are two kinds of "other": first, an "other" that is not a cause, like a cow to a horse, which may well not produce each other; second, an "other" that is a cause, like rushes to a mat—how could they fail to produce it? The earlier text merely said "other" without mentioning "cause"; here "cause" is mentioned without saying "other." This defense is unreasonable, hence it says "not so." 2. Cross-examining the reason why it is not so. 3. Direct explanatory refutation. Therein, first, maintaining the cause while losing the "other," hence it is not a cause; this is a direct refutation. If one says that it is a cause and not other, since the cause is not other than the result, rushes and mat are one substance; since their substance is one, the cause is lost; and since the cause is lost, where does the meaning of arising from another stand? Second, maintaining the "other" while losing the cause; this is a concessive refutation. This means that if it is other, the cause is a non-cause; thus, in the former case taking the cause as other failed, and in the latter case taking the other as cause [fails]. Furthermore, in the former case, production is not accomplished due to oneness; in the latter case, there is also no production due to difference; therefore there is no production from another. Alternatively, the syllogism (anumāna) for the former would be: A cause definitely does not produce a result; because it is not distinct from the phenomenon that is the result; just like the phenomenon that is the result. The syllogism for the latter meaning would be: A cause definitely does not produce a result; because it is different from the result; just like a phenomenon that is a non-cause. Third, investigating that the cause lacks intrinsic nature and losing the "other"; therein, blocking the externalist defense, which says: Above, whether different and thus like a non-cause, or one and thus like the phenomenon of the result, in both cases production cannot occur; yet the principle of production is in reality neither one nor different, hence they can produce each other. Now the intention of the refutation says: If this cause existed, it could be neither one nor different from the result and capable of producing the result. Now, investigating this cause, it also lacks intrinsic nature, because it is formed from multiple conditions, just like the phenomenon of the result; therefore it has no substance capable of producing. In the text there are four: 1. indicating; 2. cross-examining; 3. explaining; 4. concluding. In the explanation, first explaining that rushes lack intrinsic substance, and next discerning that they lack the power to make a mat. That is, if intrinsic substance is still absent, how could there be power and function? From "Therefore" onward, the conclusion may be known. Second, from "Remaining pots..." onward, all other external causes and conditions are analogously non-apprehensible. In the second [part], explaining the refutation of the conditions and results among internal phenomena, there are two: first, briefly referring to the same refutation as before, which also presages the refutation in the subsequent text; second, quoting a verse to fully reveal the refutation. Herein there are two: first, quoting the verse; by tradition, this Seventy [Verses] (Yuktiṣaṣṭikā / Vigrahavyāvartanī / Śūnyatāsaptati) was also composed by Nāgārjuna, named because it has seventy verses. In the verse, the first line reveals the correct principle, the next line repeats the attachment, and the lower two lines cross-examine and refute. Alternatively, the first line is a direct refutation, and the latter three lines are concessive refutations. Alternatively, the first line indicates non-arising, and the latter three lines explain non-arising. Second, in explaining the verse, first explaining the text to reveal the doctrine, and next concluding that both cause and result are empty. In the explanation, first establishing the correct doctrine, which is also explaining the first line of the verse, a direct refutation based on principle. Second, from "If it is said" onward, refuting external attachments, which also explains the latter three lines as concessive refutations. Herein there are three: first, opening two alternatives to fix [the position]; second, sequentially refuting each; third, jointly concluding that both are wrong. In the second, the individual refutations, there are two: first, refuting in terms of a single thought-moment, conceding what is established by them, meaning that at the very moment the mind is on ignorance, conditioning factors and the rest should also be simultaneous. From "Furthermore, cause and result..." onward, depriving them of cause and result. In the text, first presenting the premise, and next explaining to establish it. Second, refuting in terms of multiple thought-moments, there are three: 1. refuting through the difference of cause and result, because they do not reach or contact each other and therefore are not phenomena produced by conditions; 2. refuting through the subsequent result lacking a cause, meaning that if the prior part, ignorance, passes away together with the preceding thought, for the subsequent part, conditioning factors and the rest, what would be their cause? 3. Blocking the defense and refuting again: the externalist defense says that although our preceding thought of ignorance perishes, it can induce the subsequent link of conditioning factors and thus serves as a cause, like the equal and immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya), or like seeds in the fundamental consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) perishing prior and arising subsequently. Now we refute them: Has your preceding thought already perished, or has it not yet perished? If it has already perished, that which has perished is non-existent—how could it serve as a cause? If it has not yet perished, then the result cannot arise, because of the refutation by the preceding thought. Third, from "Twelve links of dependent origination" onward, the joint conclusion may be known. Third, from "Therefore" onward, concluding that conditions and results are both empty may be known. In the second [major section], the analogous refutation, there are four: first, concluding that conditioned phenomena are empty may be known; second, from "Conditioned [phenomena] are still empty" onward, because phenomena are empty, revealing that the self has no basis and therefore is also empty. The treatise says that attachment to phenomena is the cause and attachment to the person is the result; since the root cause has already perished, the branch result is lost along with it. Because this treatise clarifies the two emptinesses of person and phenomena, first discerning the emptiness of phenomena directly refutes the two vehicles and concurrently refutes non-Buddhists. Herein are three: 1. indicating and analogously refuting; 2. explaining phenomena to refute; 3. citing scriptural proof to refute. In the explanation there are two: first, explaining in regular order, meaning that based on the aggregation of the conditioned phenomena of the three categories (skandha, dhātu, āyatana), a "self" is conventionally designated. Since conditioned [phenomena] are already empty, where can the provisional self exist? That which can be burned is fuel; that which burns is fire; the reverse explanation may be known. In citing scriptural proof, just as the sūtras say that because of the self there is what belongs to the self, it is similar to there being a self because of phenomena. Furthermore, the earlier explanation showed that because phenomena are empty the self is empty; this clarifies that because the self is empty what belongs to it is empty, because what belongs to it is the function of the self; thus this explains emptiness by proceeding from the root to the branch. Third, analogously revealing the emptiness of the unconditioned: first, indicating the analogy, meaning that nirvāṇa is called quiescence and extinction. Second, from "Why is this?" onward, explaining and establishing it. In explaining and establishing it there are three: 1. because there is no phenomenon that can be extinguished, there is no extinction; 2. because there is no one who can attain extinction, there is no extinction; 3. from "Furthermore" onward, clarifying that because it lacks arising to be paired against, there is no extinction; 4. from "Therefore" onward, concluding the three emptinesses may be known.