十二門論宗致義記 2.15

2.15

初釋名者，以一異是所遣故，又說遣一異以造真空，故以為門。二、來意者，前以有無破相可相已盡，但以更有一異門重破，使執心永盡、正理堅固，是故結相可相一異及俱而重破也。三、所明者，以破相可相一異俱盡，令觀心照理故也。四、釋文中二：先一句標宗，後釋破。破中二：先正破，後破救。初中三：先頌，上半破一異，下半破相可相，亦是結無。二、釋，謂若一，則相無能表，同所相故；若異，不成表，不相因故、同餘法故，故云一異不可得。若一異不可得下，釋下半，可知。三、「是故」下，類遣結宗。二、破救中二：先外救，後釋破。救中以聞相法俱空，執情靡據，故將形似之事類救二關。又向釋頌遣事無不周，但人情多惑，故須假設外救，廣破所迷。於中三：初、牒破驚呵；二、立相救法；三、結破不然。第二立相救中二：先開三章，則翻上三句；後釋三事，則為三段。初、釋一中二：初、舉識受二例，如識以了別為相，亦以了別為體，受亦如是。二、「如是」下，結宗。二、釋異中亦二：初、舉滅信二例；後、「是名」下，結。前中，初外謂愛滅異於涅槃，後以三事在身口屬色蘊，信是心法屬識蘊。外見有此三，知內有信心，是故色與心作相，故知異。三、釋亦一亦異中二：初舉二例，後結。初中先舉正見例，謂如正見是道體，故少分是可相；復是八正中道支，故少分是能相。又正見是慧，正是道諦通體；然是八中一數，故云少分。是通故，是能相，是別故為可相。二、舉三相例。謂約小乘七十五法，分為二聚：前七十二是有為，後三是無為。就有為聚中，生、住、滅三通與一切有為法作相，自體復是有為法中數內少分。是故若與所相有為不是異者，不應於此有為法中開說此三；若與有為不是一者，自應非是有為法攝；是故當知亦一亦異。後「如是」下，結。三、「是故或相」下，總結非，破可知。第二、釋破中破上三計，文則為三。初破一中亦三：初法無自表破，於中三：先、牒執總非；二、釋非所以；三、「是故」下，結非呵止。就釋中，謂所相必以相而知，故名為可相。所用表示者，名為相也。是故相所相是非一。若一自能表示者，指應自觸等，反詰責也。二、「復次」下，相失能所破，若是一者，謂不應分別此是相、此是可相。若泯分別者，汝應是顛倒，有言無義故。三、「復次」下，因果雜亂破，於中先標、次釋、後結，並可知。二、破異中二：先正破，後破救。初中二：先牒計總非，後別破釋非。於中初別破二例，後總示無窮。前中先破初例，謂愛滅則無相，愛有復非涅槃相。二、破信者相有二：初、無異破，謂有詐善之人實無信心，而亦詐現有此三相，豈亦有信？以與信者不殊，故云俱不異信。又此論意似將三事與信不殊，故云不異，以破其異（云云勘）。二、不定破，謂汝以三事知有信，則信是可相、三是能相。今更以理推，乃由有信故，始能作此三事，是故三事反是可相，故云無信無三事。又責云：汝未施等前，有此信心不？若有，以何相而知？若無，後依何起施？故云也。二、示無窮破中，可相定有為，別有能相法；能相是有為，應亦別有能相法。如是則無窮。二、破救中，先救後破。破中二：先指同前破，後自語相違破。又亦可先破喻，後破法可知。三、破俱句中，初標非，後釋破，謂指同上二門破，以不離一異故。三、「如是」下，結非。四、「是故」下，類遣可知。

First, explaining the name: because identity and difference are what is dismissed, and because it is said that dismissing identity and difference leads to true emptiness, it is taken as the gate. Second, the purpose of introduction: previously, through existence and non-existence, the mark and the marked were already exhausted; however, because there is further the gate of identity and difference to refute them again so that clinging minds are forever ended and correct principles become firm, it therefore concludes the mark and the marked as identical, different, or both, and refutes them again. Third, what is clarified: by completely exhausting identity and difference between the mark and the marked, it causes the contemplative mind to illuminate the principle. Fourth, explaining the text has two parts: first, a single sentence stating the thesis, and then the refuting explanation. In the refutation there are two parts: first, the direct refutation, and next, refuting the defense. In the former there are three parts: first, the verse; the first half refutes identity and difference, and the second half refutes the mark and the marked, which also concludes with their non-existence. Second, the explanation: that is, if identical, then the mark has no capacity to indicate, being the same as the marked; if different, it does not accomplish indication, not being dependent on each other and being the same as other dharmas; hence it says identity and difference cannot be found. From 'If identity and difference cannot be found' onward, it explains the second half, which can be understood. Third, from 'Therefore' onward, the analogical dismissal concludes the thesis. Second, in refuting the defense there are two parts: first, the opponent's defense, and next, the refuting explanation. In the defense, having heard that both mark and dharma are empty, the clinging disposition has nothing to rely upon; hence it takes analogous matters of similar appearance to defend the two dilemmas. Furthermore, although the earlier explanation of the verse dismissed matters without omission, human sentiment is prone to confusion; thus it is necessary to postulate the opponent's defense and extensively refute their delusions. In this there are three parts: first, restating the refutation in shock and reproof; second, establishing the mark to defend the dharma; third, concluding that the refutation is not so. In the second, establishing the mark to defend, there are two parts: first, opening three topics, which reverses the three lines above; next, explaining the three matters, which forms three sections. First, in explaining identity there are two parts: first, adducing the two examples of consciousness and feeling: just as consciousness has discrimination as its mark and also has discrimination as its substance, feeling is also like this. Second, from 'In this way' onward, concluding the thesis. Second, in explaining difference there are also two parts: first, adducing the two examples of cessation and faith; and then, from 'This is called' onward, the conclusion. In the former, first the opponent claims that the cessation of craving is different from nirvāṇa; next, because the three matters [of giving, speech, and demeanor] are in the body and speech, belonging to the form aggregate, while faith is a mental dharma belonging to the consciousness aggregate. The opponent sees that these three exist and knows that internally there is a mind of faith; therefore form serves as a mark for mind, so one knows they are different. Third, in explaining both identical and different there are two parts: first, adducing two examples, and then the conclusion. In the former, it first adduces the example of right view: just as right view is the substance of the path, a small portion is the marked; it is also a limb of the eightfold noble path, so a small portion is the marking. Furthermore, right view is wisdom, properly the general substance of the truth of the path; yet it is one member among the eight, hence called a small portion. Being general, it is the marking; being particular, it is the marked. Second, adducing the example of the three characteristics: dividing the seventy-five dharmas of Hīnayāna into two groups, the first seventy-two are conditioned and the last three are unconditioned. Within the conditioned group, the three of arising, abiding, and cessation generally serve as marks for all conditioned dharmas, while their own substance is also a small portion within the count of conditioned dharmas. Therefore, if they were not different from the conditioned dharmas that are marked, one should not distinguish and explain these three within these conditioned dharmas; if they were not identical with the conditioned, they should not themselves be subsumed under conditioned dharmas; therefore one should know they are both identical and different. Next, from 'In this way' onward, the conclusion. Third, from 'Therefore whether mark...' onward, the general conclusion of error, the refutation of which can be understood. In the second part, the refuting explanation refutes the above three claims, and the text forms three parts. First, in refuting identity there are also three parts: first, refuting on the grounds that a dharma lacks self-indication, in which there are three parts: first, restating the claim and generally rejecting it; second, explaining the reason for the error; third, from 'Therefore' onward, concluding the error and reproving it. In the explanation, it means that the marked is necessarily known through the mark, hence called the markable. That which is used to indicate is called the mark. Therefore, the mark and the marked are not identical. If being identical it could indicate itself, a finger should touch itself, and so on, which is a counter-investigation and interrogation. Second, from 'Furthermore' onward, refuting on the grounds that the mark loses its subject and object: if they are one, one should not distinguish 'this is the mark' and 'this is the markable.' If distinctions are obliterated, you must be inverted, having words without meaning. Third, from 'Furthermore' onward, refuting on the grounds of confusing cause and effect, in which first is the statement, next the explanation, and then the conclusion, all of which can be understood. Second, in refuting difference there are two parts: first, the direct refutation, and next, refuting the defense. In the former there are two parts: first, restating the claim and generally rejecting it; next, individually refuting and explaining the error. In this, first it individually refutes the two examples, and then generally demonstrates infinite regress. In the former, it first refutes the first example: when craving is extinguished, there is no mark, while the presence of craving is not the mark of nirvāṇa. Second, refuting the mark of a person with faith has two parts: first, refutation on the grounds of non-difference: that is, there are deceitful persons who actually lack a faithful mind yet deceptively display these three marks—do they also have faith? Because they are no different from one who has faith, it says 'both are not different from faith.' Furthermore, the intent of this treatise seems to be taking the three matters as not different from faith, hence saying 'not different,' in order to refute their difference (investigate this further). Second, refutation on the grounds of indeterminacy: you know there is faith through the three matters, so faith is the marked and the three are the marking. Now investigating further through reason, only because there is faith can one perform these three matters; therefore, the three matters are conversely the marked, hence it says 'without faith there are no three matters.' Furthermore, it interrogates: before you gave and so forth, did you have this faithful mind or not? If you did, by what mark was it known? If you did not, on what basis did giving subsequently arise? Hence it says this. Second, in refuting by demonstrating infinite regress: the marked is definitely conditioned and has a separate marking dharma; the marking is conditioned, so it should also have a separate marking dharma. In this way there is infinite regress. Second, in refuting the defense, first is the defense and then the refutation. In the refutation there are two parts: first, pointing to the same refutation as before, and next, refuting on the grounds of self-contradiction. Alternatively, one may also first refute the simile, and then the dharma can be understood. Third, in the clause refuting both, first it states the error, and then explains the refutation, meaning it points to the same refutations as the two gates above, because they do not depart from identity and difference. Third, from 'In this way' onward, concluding the error. Fourth, from 'Therefore' onward, the analogical dismissal can be understood.