十二門論宗致義記 2.17

2.17

一、釋名者，生住是有，滅相是無，求此有無理不成，故以為門也。二、來意者，以一異門重顯令理堅故、除盡執見故，此通來也。別者，前約相可相破，此就所相中相違破，故來也。三、所明者，謂就四相中，有無自相違，不得同一念，則失有為法，以辨真空，令成正觀故也。四、釋文中四：一、標；二、釋；三、結；四、類。初中二：先長行生起，有標釋；後立頌略辨。以薩婆多宗立四相體同時具，以成有為，故用先後發，以離相違故。破意云：先後非有為，同體相違失。又《成唯識》中，前三同一念，後念方至滅，爾者壞有為，一一念中以相不具故。頌中，初句破同時，次句破先後。謂離滅相之無，令生住之有亦不得有，故云離無有亦無也。「以非有為故」下，二句釋初句頌，以生住之有不離滅相之無故，則有當為無所害，故恒是無也。又亦應云不離有有無，無則應常有。又亦應有釋上第二句先後計云：若離無有有，有則非有為，但為頌迮故也。二、釋中二：初正破，後破救。前中四：一、釋初句。頌如《中論．成壞品》云「離成及共成，是中無有壞，離壞及共壞，是中亦無成。」二、「若謂」下，釋第二句頌。於中二：先牒執總非；二釋非中七法內滅相是無，餘皆是有。又有是法體共無常相生，無常中既具滅，明知離此無有不得生。三、「若不離」下，釋下二句頌，於中三：初舉失，後轉釋。轉釋中，以不離滅無故，此有常是無，以初生即壞滅，不能得至住，故云初無等也。又不曾暫有住，故云也。三、結非，可知。四、「若離」下，釋頌中所應有文。以離無常滅相等，而有有為法生等者，皆不可也。第二、破救中二：先外救，後釋破。救中三：初、立體同時，故無上不生之過；二、「如是」下，釋五事，明用前後故，謂勢用有時，豈容有常無之責？又生制滅不令斷，住能制生不令增，滅制住不令分，異通前後謂變生至住等。又彼計一剎那中，剎那初是生相用，剎那次是住相用，剎那後是滅相用，故用有前後也。言得者，是此四通名不相應行法，前得等如繩繫物等，謂大小相得，令四相常成就。三、「是故」下，結非。二、正破中，先破體同時具，後破用前後發。初中先破生滅，後破住老。前中二：先易奪互失破；二、「復次」下，明相違俱失破。有標釋可知。二、破住老中，先標後釋，亦有易奪相違破。三、「是故」下，總結錯亂，有標釋可知。二、「如能識」下，破用前後發。於中三：初舉事例破，謂彼外計云：生時雖已有，壞體而未發，滅時方發者，破云：如不能識，則不名識，餘六亦爾。如是不能壞生，不名有滅。二、舉法示過，於中初、舉法；二、「若生住」下，示過，謂先無用，後失無過；三、「是故」下，結非。第三、「如是」下，總結成；第四、類遣，並可知。

First, as for explaining the title: arising and abiding are existence, while the characteristic of cessation is non-existence. When one seeks this existence and non-existence, their principle cannot be established; hence it is taken as a gate. Second, as for the reason for its coming: it is brought forward comprehensively because re-revealing [the truth] through the gate of oneness and difference strengthens the principle and completely eliminates grasped views. Specifically, the preceding [gate] refuted in terms of characteristics and the characterised, whereas this [gate] refutes in terms of contradiction within that which is characterised; hence it comes forward. Third, as for what is clarified: within the four characteristics, existence and non-existence are mutually contradictory and cannot occur in the same single moment; thus conditioned phenomena are forfeited. It clarifies true emptiness in order to bring about right contemplation. Fourth, as for explaining the text, there are four [parts]: 1. stating the premise; 2. explaining; 3. concluding; 4. generalizing. In the first [part], there are two [sections]: first, the prose introduction, which contains a statement and an explanation; next, the verse is presented to briefly discern it. Because the Sarvāstivāda school posits that the essences of the four characteristics are simultaneously complete to constitute the conditioned, and that their functions arise successively to avoid mutual contradiction, the intent of the refutation is: succession does not constitute the conditioned, and possessing the same essence entails the fault of mutual contradiction. Furthermore, in the *Cheng Weishi Lun*, the first three are in the same single moment, and only in the subsequent moment does cessation arrive; in that case, conditioned phenomena are destroyed, because in each single moment the characteristics are incomplete. In the verse, the first line refutes simultaneity, and the second line refutes succession. That is, apart from the non-existence of the characteristic of cessation, the existence of arising and abiding cannot exist either; hence it says: "apart from non-existence, existence does not exist either." Beginning with "because it is not conditioned," the [next] two lines explain the first line of the verse: because the existence of arising and abiding is not apart from the non-existence of the characteristic of cessation, existence must be harmed by non-existence, and therefore is constantly non-existent. Furthermore, it should also say that not being apart from existence, there is no non-existence; and non-existence should therefore be permanently existent. Furthermore, there should also be an explanation of the second line above concerning the imputation of succession, saying: "If existence exists apart from non-existence, existence would not be conditioned"; but this was omitted merely due to the constraints of the verse. In the second [part], explaining, there are two: first, the direct refutation; next, the refutation of the rescue. In the former, there are four: 1. explaining the first line. As the verse in the "Examination of Arising and Cessation" of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* states: "Apart from arising and together with arising, / there is no destruction herein; / apart from destruction and together with destruction, / there is also no arising herein." 2. Beginning with "if one says," it explains the second line of the verse. Therein are two: first, citing the attachment and generally denying it; second, in explaining the denial, among the seven dharmas the characteristic of cessation is non-existence, and the rest are all existence. Furthermore, existence is the essential substance of dharmas, which arises together with the characteristic of impermanence; since impermanence already contains cessation, one clearly knows that apart from this non-existence, existence cannot arise. 3. Beginning with "if not apart," it explains the lower two lines of the verse. Therein are three: first, citing the flaw; next, explaining it further. In the further explanation, because it is not apart from the non-existence of cessation, this existence is constantly non-existent, because upon initial arising it is immediately destroyed and ceased, unable to reach abiding; hence it says "initially non-existent," and so forth. Furthermore, it has never for a moment had abiding; hence it says this. 3. Concluding the error, which can be understood. 4. Beginning with "if apart," it explains what ought to be present in the verse text: that conditioned dharmas arise, etc., apart from the cessation characteristic of impermanence, etc., are all inadmissible. In the second [section], refuting the rescue, there are two: first, the opponent's rescue; next, explaining the refutation. In the rescue there are three: first, positing that the essences are simultaneous, so there is no fault of non-arising above; second, beginning with "such," explaining the five things to clarify that their functions are successive, meaning that dynamic functions have their times, so how could there be room for the accusation of being constantly non-existent? Furthermore, arising checks cessation so that it is not severed; abiding can check arising so that it does not increase; cessation checks abiding so that it does not disperse; difference connects prior and subsequent, meaning transforming arising to reach abiding, and so on. Furthermore, they impute that within a single kṣaṇa, the beginning of the kṣaṇa is the function of the characteristic of arising, the middle of the kṣaṇa is the function of the characteristic of abiding, and the end of the kṣaṇa is the function of the characteristic of cessation; hence the functions have prior and subsequent. The term "attainment" (prāpti) is a general name for these four conditioning dharmas non-associated with mind; prior attainment and so forth are like a rope tying things together, meaning that primary and secondary characteristics attain [their objects], causing the four characteristics to be constantly established. 3. Beginning with "therefore," it concludes with the denial. In the second [section], the direct refutation, first it refutes that the essences are simultaneously complete, and then it refutes that the functions arise successively. In the former, first it refutes arising and cessation, and then it refutes abiding and decay. In the former, there are two: first, refutation through mutual loss by replacement; second, beginning with "furthermore," refutation through mutual loss by contradiction. This has a statement and an explanation, which can be understood. In the second, refuting abiding and decay, first it states the premise and then explains it; there are also refutations through replacement and contradiction. 3. Beginning with "therefore," it generally concludes the confusion; this has a statement and an explanation, which can be understood. Second, beginning with "like being able to cognize," it refutes that functions arise successively. Therein are three: first, refuting by adducing an example, meaning the opponent imputes: "Although it already exists at the time of arising, its destructive essence has not yet arisen, and only arises at the time of cessation." The refutation says: If it cannot cognize, it is not called cognition, and the remaining six are also like this. In this way, if it cannot destroy arising, it cannot be called having cessation. 2. Adducing dharmas to show the fault. Therein, first, adducing dharmas; second, beginning with "if arising and abiding," showing the fault, meaning that previously lacking function, later it loses [it] without fault; third, beginning with "therefore," concluding with the denial. The third [part], beginning with "such," generally concludes the establishment; the fourth [part], generalizing the elimination—both can be understood.