十二門論宗致義記 2.19

2.19

初、釋名者，性是體性，徵責非有，洞契真空，故為門也。所遣所託為名。二、來意者，通意如前。別者，初三品破法，次四門破能相，今更破體性故來也。又外人執義有二種：一、是事；二、是性。性據未成，事據現在。前有無門破現在事不立。但執情難祛，謂諸法未成，先有體性，藉現因緣，起性成事。若爾，諸法還立，何得云一切法空？此門破彼，故次來也。又上來破相，外人云：謂外相雖亡，內性猶實。為破此計，故有此門來也。三、所明者，破性明空，觀心無寄，以成正故也。四、釋文四：一、標；二、釋；三、結；四、類。就釋中三：初、生起；二、立頌；三、釋頌。頌中，上半破有性，下半破無性。三、釋中二：先釋破有性，後破無性。前中三：先破自；二、破他；三、雙結。初中二：先正破，後破救。初中三：先變異乖性破，破意：汝若未成先有性者，夫性是不改為義，汝許變異，性義安在？故云也。二、緣作失性破，初、順釋，謂性有天真，豈假緣成？今既緣作，明非性有。二、「不作」下，反釋，謂不作名性，故知作則非也。三、「是故」下，結宗。二、破救中二：先外人牒破示過難，後論主開章還過答。初中，外人聞現在事法已被責破，未成體性，又被破盡，則起智見，以過論主為大邪見。文中二：初、牒破示過。外以生滅無常為苦諦故，餘文可解。二、「是事」下，結非呵止。答中五：初、舉二諦法。先列名，後依俗得。真謂聖說，俗諦因緣之法，擬於此法上令會無性，以得真空，故說俗諦，非謂存此俗諦而不入真，故云也。二、「若人」下，明知法之益。於中，初知諦成二利，謂依俗說真為利他，照真得果為自利。又二利：一行成者，是共也；二、明二諦相資，以不二而二故，此明正知法益。三、「汝今」下，明迷法之失。謂汝聞說蘊、界等法，不知但是世諦虛假，謬取謂為第一義諦，是故聞破謂欲自墮失處，反此則無咎矣。四、釋顯法義，於中先標法甚深。就佛所說因緣法為深，非汝二乘所說之者。又約佛智論因緣法，方得稱彼因緣之法，故云諸佛因緣法名甚深也。二、「是因緣」下，釋成甚深所以。又此因緣法宜應正是俗諦，何故乃云是第一義？釋云：以無自性故，無性而說因緣，是故深也。問：前語外人，汝聞世諦謂是第一義，今論主亦云因緣則是第一義，而與彼何異？答：外人謂因緣之事是第一義，論主以因緣之理為真諦。又論主意，凡佛說因緣世諦法，意欲令知無性以悟真諦，非謂存此因緣之法，故上云：因世諦知第一義。故《地論》中隨順觀世諦，則入第一義諦，此之謂也。五、「若諸法」下，正還過於彼。謂若有性則不從緣，不從緣故則無諸法。是故《中論》云「以有空義故，一切法得成；若無空義者，一切法不成。」又應知有多諸過患，汝自不知，反來咎我。故《中論》云「汝今自有過，而以迴向我，如人乘馬者，自忘其所乘。」今此壞六事，還是汝之過。就中六：一、壞四諦；二、「若無四聖諦」下，明壞四行；三、壞八賢聖；四、壞三寶；五、壞世俗；六、壞因果。並可知。二、破他性中二：先牒計總徵，後正破。破中，初形自奪他破，謂對自名他。自既無矣，對誰名他？二、同自無他破，謂望自還是自，是故自無他亦無。有標釋可知。三、「若自性他性」下，雙結俱非。第三、「若有不成」下，總結成宗。第四、類遣可知。

First, as for explaining the title: "nature" is intrinsic essence. When questioned and challenged, it is not existent; thoroughly penetrating it accords with true emptiness, hence it is taken as a gate. The title is taken from that which is eliminated and that upon which it relies. Second, as for the reason for its coming: the general intent is as before. Specifically: the first three chapters refuted dharmas, the subsequent four gates refuted that which characterizes, and now it further refutes intrinsic essence; hence it comes forward. Furthermore, the external opponents grasp two kinds of meaning: first, concrete things; second, nature. Nature pertains to what is not yet accomplished; concrete things pertain to the present. The preceding Gate of Existence and Non-existence refuted present concrete things as unestablished. However, grasped attachments are difficult to dispel, and they claim that before phenomena are accomplished, intrinsic essence exists beforehand, and relying on present causes and conditions, it gives rise to nature and accomplishes concrete things. If so, phenomena would still be established, so how could it be said that all dharmas are empty? This gate refutes that; hence it comes next. Furthermore, having refuted characteristics above, the external opponent says: Although external characteristics perish, internal nature remains real. To refute this imputation, this gate therefore comes forward. Third, as for what is clarified: by refuting nature, it clarifies emptiness, so that the contemplating mind has no reliance, thereby accomplishing correctness. Fourth, as for explaining the text, there are four [parts]: 1. stating the premise; 2. explaining; 3. concluding; 4. generalizing. Within the explanation, there are three: first, introduction; second, presenting the verse; third, explaining the verse. In the verse, the first half refutes having a nature, and the second half refutes having no nature. In the third [part], explaining, there are two: first, explaining the refutation of having a nature; next, refuting having no nature. In the former, there are three: first, refuting self; second, refuting other; third, concluding both. In the first, there are two: first, the direct refutation; next, refuting the rescue. In the first, there are three: first, refutation through variation contradicting nature. The intent of the refutation: If you hold that before accomplishment there is already a nature, nature by definition means unalterable; if you accept variation, where is the meaning of nature? Hence it says this. Second, refutation through being conditioned and made losing nature. First, the direct explanation: Nature is inherently natural; how could it depend on conditions to be accomplished? Now since it is made by conditions, it is clearly not existentially a nature. Second, beginning with "not made," the converse explanation: What is not made is called nature, so one knows that if it is made, it is not [nature]. 3. Beginning with "therefore," concluding the premise. In the second [section], refuting the rescue, there are two: first, the external opponent cites the refutation to present objections of fault; next, the author of the treatise opens the chapters to return the faults in reply. In the first, the external opponent, hearing that present concrete dharmas have already been challenged and refuted, and that the unaccomplished intrinsic essence has also been completely refuted, gives rise to intellectual views and accuses the author of the treatise of great wrong view. In the text there are two: first, citing the refutation to show the fault. The opponent regards arising, cessation, and impermanence as the truth of suffering; the remaining text is intelligible. Second, beginning with "this matter," concluding with denial and rebuking it to cease. In the reply, there are five: 1. Adducing the teaching of the two truths. First listing the names, and next obtaining the ultimate based on the conventional. The ultimate refers to the noble discourse; conventional truth refers to dharmas of causes and conditions, intended to bring about comprehension of the absence of nature upon these dharmas in order to attain true emptiness. Thus conventional truth is spoken, not meaning that one preserves this conventional truth without entering the ultimate; hence it says this. 2. Beginning with "if a person," clarifying the benefit of knowing the dharmas. Therein, first, knowing the truths accomplishes the two benefits: speaking the ultimate based on the conventional is benefiting others, while illuminating the ultimate to attain the fruit is benefiting oneself. Furthermore, regarding the two benefits: one is the accomplishment of practice, which is shared; second, clarifying that the two truths support each other, because they are dual yet non-dual; this clarifies the benefit of rightly knowing the dharmas. 3. Beginning with "you now," clarifying the error of being deluded about dharmas. It means: hearing the dharmas of aggregates, realms, and so on spoken, you do not know that they are merely worldly, conventional, and nominal, and erroneously take them to be the truth of the primary meaning. Therefore, hearing the refutation, you think [the treatise] intends to plunge itself into a state of ruin; conversely, [if understood rightly] there is no fault. 4. Explaining and revealing the meaning of the Dharma. Therein, first, stating that the Dharma is extremely profound. In terms of the dharmas of causes and conditions spoken by the Buddha, they are profound, not what is spoken by you of the two vehicles. Furthermore, only when discussing the dharmas of causes and conditions in terms of the Buddha's wisdom can they be truly called dharmas of causes and conditions; hence it says that the Buddhas' dharmas of causes and conditions are called extremely profound. Second, beginning with "these causes and conditions," explaining the reason why it is extremely profound. Furthermore, should not these dharmas of causes and conditions strictly be conventional truth? Why then say they are the primary meaning? The explanation says: Because they lack intrinsic nature, causes and conditions are spoken of in the absence of nature; therefore it is profound. Question: Previously you told the external opponent, "Hearing worldly truth, you think it is the primary meaning"; now the author of the treatise also says that causes and conditions are themselves the primary meaning, so how does this differ from them? Answer: The external opponent thinks that the concrete phenomena of causes and conditions are the primary meaning; the author of the treatise takes the principle of causes and conditions as the ultimate truth. Furthermore, the intent of the author of the treatise is that whenever the Buddha spoke of the conventional truth of causes and conditions, the intent was to cause one to know the absence of nature so as to awaken to the ultimate truth, not meaning to preserve these dharmas of causes and conditions. Thus it was said above: "Relying on conventional truth, one knows the primary meaning." Hence in the *Daśabhūmivyākhyāna*, contemplating conventional truth in accordance [with it], one enters the truth of the primary meaning; this is what it means. 5. Beginning with "if all dharmas," directly returning the faults upon them. That is, if there were a nature, they would not derive from conditions; because they would not derive from conditions, there would be no phenomena. Therefore the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* states: "Because there is the meaning of emptiness, / all dharmas are able to be accomplished; / if there were no meaning of emptiness, / all dharmas would not be accomplished." Furthermore, one should know there are many faults and perils which you yourself do not recognize, yet conversely you come to blame me. Therefore the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* states: "You yourself now have faults, / yet you turn them back toward me, / like a person riding a horse / who forgets the one he rides." Now this destroying of the six things is still your own fault. Therein are six: 1. destroying the four truths; 2. beginning with "if there are no four noble truths," clarifying the destruction of the four practices; 3. destroying the eight worthy and noble ones; 4. destroying the Three Jewels; 5. destroying conventional conventions; 6. destroying cause and effect. All these can be understood. In the second [section], refuting other-nature, there are two: first, citing the imputation to question generally; next, the direct refutation. In the refutation, first, refutation through comparing to self to eliminate other: Other is named in contrast to self; since self is already non-existent, in contrast to what is it called other? Second, refutation through being identical to self and thus lacking other: Viewed from self, it is still self; therefore, if self is non-existent, other is also non-existent. This has a statement and an explanation, which can be understood. 3. Beginning with "if self-nature and other-nature," concluding that both are erroneous. The third [part], beginning with "if existence is not accomplished," generally concludes the establishment of the premise. The fourth [part], generalizing the elimination, can be understood.