十二門論宗致義記 2.23

2.23

初、釋名者，於自他四處求作之者不得，故以為名。二、來意者，前略以內外求，今廣於四處求，故來也。又一說上來九品已一遍破因果，自下三品是第二遍破因果。與前何異者，前廣此略故也。初二品破能生，後一破所生，故來也。三、品所明者，破此四作有二門：一、顯所破，亦二：初、約外道就人：一、我作；二、自在天作；三、如劫初一男一女共生眾生是共作；四、如無因外道等執自然生等是無因作，如烏鳥非染等。二、約小乘就法：一、自分因生；二報因，因是善惡，果是無記，故是他也；三、如共有因，謂七法共生；四、無因作，或云經部師無明支前託空而起，故亦無因（云云）。二、能破中亦二：初唯遮破，如《中論》及此文。二亦遮亦表，如《地論》云「因不生，緣生故；緣不生，自因生故；不共生，無知者故、作時不住故；不無因生，隨順有故。」又對法論云「自種有故不從他，待眾緣故非自作，無作用故不共生，有功能故非無因。凡諸緣起亡雙句者已為甚深，況總亡四句，是故緣起最極甚深。」解云：此二論意，以因為自，用緣為他。此因與緣相待故，各有二義：一、有力義；二、無力義。以因無為緣有故不自生，以緣無為因有故不他生，一有一無無二故不共生，二有二無不俱故亦不共生，則由此無性方得起此不起之果，故不無因，不無如此不自不他不共之因故也。若約顯法性緣起融通無礙門說者，四門俱有作。何者？謂因緣各有三義：一、有；二、無；三、亦有亦無。各別開初義故，自作亦他作，合第三義故共作，合第二義故無因作，以各無力故。此同從無住本立一切法，思之可見。此後論說非三論意，但同流類，故引說之耳。四、釋文中三：初、標；二、釋；三、類。釋中三：初、徵標開章；二、立頌略破，上半牒四門，下半顯俱非；三、依章廣釋中二：先釋頌正破，後引教證成。初中釋四章門，則為四：就初釋破自作中，初、牒非；二、釋破；三、喻破；四、結非，亦是立宗、出因、舉喻、結宗，並可知。二、釋破他作中二：先正破，後破救。初中先標非，二釋破。言他何能作者，謂自尚不能，他何能作？又自既未有，說誰為他？又離自無別他故、自無他亦無故，云何能作也。二、破救中，先救後破。救意：我以因望果為他，非是餘法之他。破中二：先正破，後「如是苦」下，結非。破中二：初同果非他破，於中先法，次喻，後合。謂若合眾緣以成果，豈得緣果為他也？二、他無自在破中，初正破，後引《中論》頌。謂此眾緣既還藉緣成，是則無自性之有，故不得自在；不自在故，不能生果。二、結文可知。三、破共作中三：一、牒非；二、正破，謂雙具前二失故，是故指同前；三、「是故」下，結。四、破無因作，於中二：先牒執總非有無量過者，以彼小乘宗亦同不許故。又諸法亂生等，故有多過也。二、引證中四：初、舉教；二、會意；三、外救；四、會破。初中，外以四句存生，不達苦之實性，故佛置而不答。二、「如是」下，會意明空，有二種所由：一、從緣生故空；二、佛不答故空。此中以苦體本無，何處得苦？從自他等生？如問：兔角為從自他等生耶？若答則墮負。何者？謂若答言不自生等者，彼則謂兔角是有，不從自他生等。若答無此兔角者，他本問從生，不問有無，問異答故亦不然。是故經中問佛：「若如來不能答十四難者，何名一切智？」佛言：「若如來答十四難，則非一切智。」是故當知不答意者，為明彼法空無故也。三、外救中三：初、非內會意；二、釋經顯意；三、結非成證。初中，外謂論主都不得佛意，佛何曾言：由不答故，說苦是空？但佛不答，自有別意。別意有二：一、但彼眾生宜應不答而得入法，故須不答，何必以明空耶？二、為破外道四邪說故，是故須爾。文中破四執則為四：初、舉執會經；二、「苦實非」下，以理正破。正破中二：初、我同無常破，於中二：先標，後釋。釋中二：先失能作破，謂若無常，則失我體，無能作也；二、「若我無常」下，失所作破，謂以無所依故也。二、苦無解脫破，於中二：初、標；二、「何以故」下，釋。謂若言我作苦者，能須在先，而實離所作苦之前，無能作苦之我。何以故？以未有所依陰身故，我何處住？若無此陰身，而我獨能作苦者，得解脫者亦是無身有我，亦應常是苦。此是前際無身而作苦，後際亦無身亦應恒是苦，以無異因故。結文可見。二、破他作中二：初破，後結。破中有十五番。初一、同體非他破，何有他人造苦授與此人，故云也。二、因果不相似破，此是邪因不平等因，於中先舉執會經；後「而實」下，以理正破。標釋可知。三、苦樂相違破，謂是父應與樂，何乃與苦耶？亦是乖失父子破。於中先正破，後顯救。謂若不能生子知恩之心，何名自在能生萬物？又若實能生而故不生者，則是無恩，何所識耶？又愚類供天，則是識恩，何不免苦？猶有貧窮等苦，故知不然也。文中初、約情縱破；二、「而實」下，就理奪破，可知。四、不應所所破，謂彼自在更何所須而作眾生等耶？若有所須而作者，是則非自在；若無所須作者，則同小兒戲也。五、逆窮作者破，謂自在若自作，眾生亦應爾。自在若他作，則不自在如眾生。二種比量可知。六、業乖自在破，於中三：先以正徵；二、引邪教；三、破邪教。以待苦行方能作物，明知不自在。又一種苦行，何不一種受果，然乃初作毒蟲等？當知由業，不關邪苦行也。初則以苦行奪自在，後則以正業奪苦行，可知。七、徵處失作破，於中三：先案定作處；二、以兩關責；三、釋二作失。初、自作不成破，謂處處無窮耳。二、他作乖宗破處，謂器世界等。八、求他無力破，準此應彼經中說自在處有所求，故非自在。又此文應倒，應云若是自在，何故有人苦行供養、從求所願？顯喜與願既受求等，明不自在也。九、所作不定破，謂如人作車成已，後時不可變作船；自在初作人，此人後時時應作畜等，而實隨業種種轉變，故非自在作也。十、舉果驗因破，於中初縱破，謂若自在作，皆應一種，不應有好醜等異，又罪福應俱無。二、奪破中而實有罪福者，以彼此俱許有故，以理奪破也。十一、憎愛違宗破，謂皆應愛，何得有憎？又以有憎愛，惑所縛故不自在，何能作萬物？十二、以事驗惑破，謂何以知彼有憎愛耶？以作苦樂二人，非但作樂故也。又為不能作一類，明不自在。十三、方便失作破，謂若自在作者，眾生不應更作衣食等事，又作諸善惡業。十四、無因失果破，於中初縱破，謂初果無從因得，後因無益果能，後以理奪破可知。十五、有無業齊破，於中三：先齊有；二、齊無；三、無窮。無窮則無始，無始則無因。上皆有比量，並可知。第二、「如是等」下，結非。二、「如是邪見」下，會經意。三、破共作中具前二失，故如二盲共，不成一見故。四、破無因中，以苦從眾緣生，故非無因也。三、「是故」下，外人結非，論主為證不成。四、「答曰」下，論主會經顯意。何者？謂佛說苦從緣生，有二意：一、為破邪見，如前說；二、為明苦是空，以苦從緣必無性故，汝但知一而不知二。又破邪見是淺意，顯真空是深意，汝但得淺不得深。又明法空是正，破邪見是兼，汝知兼不知正。文中三：初、印淺顯深；二、「說苦從眾緣」下，標起空宗；三、「何以故」下，釋顯空義；第三、類遣，可知。

First, explaining the title: an agent cannot be found when sought in the four alternatives of self, other, [both, or neither]; hence it is taken as the title. Second, on the reason for its coming: earlier, seeking was briefly done in terms of internal and external; now it is extensively done in terms of the four alternatives; therefore it comes. Another explanation says: the preceding nine chapters have already refuted cause and effect once; the following three chapters constitute the second cycle of refuting cause and effect. How do they differ from the preceding? The former was broad, while this is concise. The first two chapters refute that which can produce, and the last chapter refutes that which is produced; hence it comes. Third, regarding what the chapter clarifies: refuting these four kinds of agency comprises two aspects: First, showing what is refuted, which also has two parts: First, according to the non-Buddhists in terms of persons: (1) made by the self; (2) made by Īśvara; (3) like the one man and one woman at the beginning of the kalpa who jointly produced sentient beings, which is made by both; (4) like the non-Buddhists of no-cause who cling to spontaneous arising, which is uncaused making, like the crow not being dyed, and so on. Second, according to the Hīnayāna in terms of dharmas: (1) arising from equal-status cause (sabhāga-hetu); (2) retribution cause (vipāka-hetu), where the cause is wholesome or unwholesome and the fruit is indeterminate, hence it is "other"; (3) like the co-existent cause (sahabhū-hetu), referring to seven dharmas arising together; (4) uncaused making, or as some say, the Sautrāntikas hold that the link of ignorance arises by leaning upon emptiness prior to it, hence it is also without cause, and so forth. Second, in [explaining] that which can refute, there are also two parts: First, mere negation and refutation, as in the Madhyamaka Śāstra and this text. Second, both negation and affirmation, as the Daśabhūmika Śāstra states: "It does not arise from cause, because it arises from conditions; it does not arise from conditions, because it arises from its own cause; it does not arise from both, because there is no conscious agent and at the time of acting it does not abide; it does not arise without cause, because it exists in accordance [with them]." Also, the Abhidharma Śāstra says: "Because its own seed exists, it is not from another; because it depends on multiple conditions, it is not made by itself; because there is no operation, it does not arise from both; because it has efficacy, it is not uncaused. Whenever dependent origination negates two lemmas it is already extremely profound, how much more so when it negates all four lemmas; therefore dependent origination is the most extremely profound." The explanation says: The intention of these two treatises is to take the cause as the self and the conditions as the other. Because this cause and conditions are mutually dependent, each has two meanings: (1) the meaning of being efficacious; (2) the meaning of being non-efficacious. Because the cause is inactive and the conditions are active, it does not arise from itself; because conditions are inactive and the cause is active, it does not arise from another. Since one exists and one does not, there are not two; hence they do not arise together. Since two existences and two non-existences do not coincide, they likewise do not arise together. Thus, through this lack of intrinsic nature alone can this fruit that does not arise come to arise; therefore it is not uncaused, because it is not without such a cause that is neither self, nor other, nor both. If we speak according to the gate of dependent origination revealing the unobstructed fusion of dharma-nature, all four gates possess agency. How so? Cause and conditions each have three meanings: (1) existence; (2) non-existence; (3) both existence and non-existence. Opening the first meaning separately for each, there is making by self and also making by other; combining the third meaning yields making by both; combining the second meaning yields uncaused making, because each is devoid of efficacy. This is identical to establishing all dharmas upon the root of non-abiding; by contemplating it, this can be seen. This latter explanation from the treatise is not the intention of the Sanlun school, but being of the same class, it is merely cited and discussed. Fourth, in explaining the text, there are three parts: first, stating the thesis; second, explaining; third, categorising and eliminating. Under the explanation, there are three: first, prompting and setting forth the chapter; second, presenting the verse to concisely refute, where the first half cites the four gates and the second half reveals that all are negated; third, extensively explaining according to the headings, which has two parts: first, explaining the verse to directly refute, and later citing scriptures as proof. In the first part, explaining the four chapter-headings consists of four parts: In the first, refuting self-making: first, citing the fault; second, explanatory refutation; third, refutation by analogy; fourth, concluding the fault; these are also establishing the thesis, providing the reason, offering an analogy, and concluding the thesis, all of which are understandable. Second, in explaining the refutation of other-making, there are two parts: first, direct refutation; second, refuting the defense. In the first part, first marking the fault, and second, explanatory refutation. The phrase "how could another make it?" means that if the self cannot even do so, how could another? Moreover, since the self does not yet exist, who can be called the other? Furthermore, because apart from the self there is no distinct other, and because if the self does not exist the other also does not exist, how could it make it? Second, in refuting the defense, first is the defense and then the refutation. The meaning of the defense: "I consider the cause with respect to the fruit as 'other', not an 'other' of extraneous dharmas." In the refutation, there are two parts: first, direct refutation, and later from "Suffering being like this" downward, concluding the fault. In the refutation, there are two parts: first, the refutation that it is identical with the fruit and not other, wherein first is the dharma, next the analogy, and finally the application. It means that if conditions combine to produce the fruit, how could conditions and fruit be 'other' to each other? Second, under the refutation that the other lacks autonomy: first is the direct refutation, and later citing a verse from the Madhyamaka Śāstra. It means that since these conditions also rely on conditions to be established, they are existents lacking intrinsic nature, and hence cannot have autonomy; because they lack autonomy, they cannot produce the fruit. Second, the concluding text is understandable. Third, in refuting making by both, there are three parts: (1) citing the fault; (2) direct refutation, meaning that it possesses both of the preceding faults, and is therefore indicated to be the same as before; (3) from "Therefore" downward, the conclusion. Fourth, refuting uncaused making has two parts: first, citing the attachment and generally negating it as having immeasurable faults, because that Hīnayāna school likewise rejects it. Furthermore, because all dharmas would arise chaotically, there are many faults. Second, under citing proof, there are four parts: (1) adducing the teaching; (2) reconciling the intention; (3) the opponent's defense; (4) reconciling and refuting. In the first, the non-Buddhist retains arising through the four lemmas, failing to penetrate the true nature of suffering, so the Buddha sets it aside without answering. Second, from "Like this" downward, reconciling the intention to clarify emptiness, there are two reasons: first, it is empty because it arises from conditions; second, it is empty because the Buddha did not answer. Here, since the substance of suffering is fundamentally non-existent, from where could suffering be obtained to arise from self, other, and so forth? It is like asking: does a rabbit's horn arise from self, other, and so on? If one answers, one falls into defeat. Why? If one answers saying that it does not arise from itself and so forth, they will think that the rabbit's horn exists, and merely does not arise from self or other. If one answers that this rabbit's horn does not exist, their original question was about arising, not about existence or non-existence; since the answer diverges from the question, this is also improper. Therefore, in the sutra it is asked of the Buddha: "If the Tathāgata cannot answer the fourteen unanswerable questions, how can he be called omniscient?" The Buddha said: "If the Tathāgata were to answer the fourteen unanswerable questions, he would not be omniscient." Therefore, one should know that the intention of not answering is to clarify that the dharma is empty and non-existent. Third, in the opponent's defense, there are three: (1) denying the internal reconciliation of intention; (2) explaining the sutra to reveal its intention; (3) concluding the fault to establish proof. In the first, the opponent thinks that the treatise master does not grasp the Buddha's intention at all: when did the Buddha ever say that because of not answering, suffering is said to be empty? Rather, the Buddha's not answering had a different intention of its own. The different intention has two aspects: (1) it was merely that those sentient beings would enter the Dharma only through his not answering, so he had to refrain from answering; why must it be to clarify emptiness? (2) It was to refute the four erroneous assertions of the non-Buddhists; hence it had to be so. In the text, refuting the four attachments comprises four parts: first, citing the attachment to reconcile with the sutra; second, from "Suffering is truly not" downward, directly refuting through reasoning. In the direct refutation, there are two parts: first, the refutation that the self would be impermanent, within which are two: first, stating the thesis, and later explaining. In the explanation, there are two: first, the refutation through losing the capable agent, meaning that if it were impermanent, one loses the substance of the self, and there would be no capable agent; second, from "If the self were impermanent" downward, the refutation through losing what is made, meaning because it lacks a basis. Second, the refutation that there would be no liberation from suffering, within which are two: first, stating the thesis; second, from "Why is this?" downward, explaining. It means that if one says that the self makes suffering, the capable agent must precede it, but in reality, prior to the suffering that is made, there is no self that can make suffering. Why? Because the skandha-body that serves as its basis does not yet exist; where would the self abide? If without this skandha-body the self alone could make suffering, then one who attains liberation would also be without a body yet have a self, and should likewise always experience suffering. This means that if without a body in the past it made suffering, then in the future when it is also without a body it should also perpetually suffer, because there is no different cause. The concluding text is understandable. Second, in refuting other-making, there are two: first, the refutation, and later the conclusion. In the refutation, there are fifteen rounds: The first is the refutation that being of the same substance, it is not other; how could another person create suffering and bestow it upon this person? Hence it is said. The second is the refutation that cause and effect are dissimilar; this is an erroneous cause and an unequal cause, wherein first citing the attachment to reconcile with the sutra, and later from "Yet in reality" downward, directly refuting through reasoning. The thesis and explanation are understandable. The third is the refutation that suffering and pleasure are contradictory: it means that being a father he ought to bestow pleasure; why would he bestow suffering instead? This is also the refutation through violating the relationship of father and son. Therein, first direct refutation, and later revealing the defense. It means that if he cannot cause the son to generate a mind that recognizes kindness, how can he be called autonomous and able to produce all things? Moreover, if he is truly able to produce them but deliberately does not, he is without kindness; what would there be to recognize? Furthermore, when foolish folk worship the deva, this is recognizing kindness; why are they not spared suffering, and still have the sufferings of poverty and the like? Therefore, we know this is not so. In the text, first is the refutation granting the opponent's premise; second, from "Yet in reality" downward, the refutation eliminating it through reasoning, which is understandable. The fourth is the refutation of unneeded action: it means, what further need does that Īśvara have to create sentient beings and so forth? If he creates with a need, he is not autonomous; if he creates without a need, he is just like a child at play. The fifth is the refutation by reversing the inquiry onto the creator: it means that if Īśvara is made by himself, sentient beings should also be so; if Īśvara is made by another, he would lack autonomy just like sentient beings. The two syllogisms are understandable. The sixth is the refutation that karma contradicts autonomy, within which are three: first, directly interrogating; second, citing the false teaching; third, refuting the false teaching. Because he must rely on ascetic practices before he can produce things, it is clear that he lacks autonomy. Moreover, with one kind of asceticism, why is there not one kind of fruit received, yet at the beginning venomous insects and the like are produced? One should know that it is due to karma, having nothing to do with false ascetic practices. First, asceticism is used to strip away autonomy; later, correct karma is used to strip away asceticism, which is understandable. The seventh is the refutation through investigating the location and losing agency, within which are three: first, fixing the location of action; second, challenging with two alternatives; third, explaining the faults of the two actions. First, the refutation that self-making fails means that locations would be infinite. Second, the refutation that other-making violates the doctrine regarding location refers to the physical world and the like. The eighth is the refutation that seeking from another implies lack of power: according to this, in that scripture it should be said that within Īśvara's realm something is sought, hence he is not autonomous. Also, this text should be inverted; it should say: if he is autonomous, why do people perform asceticism to make offerings and seek their wishes from him? Revealing that taking pleasure in granting wishes since he receives requests and the like clearly shows he lacks autonomy. The ninth is the refutation that what is made is unfixed: it means that just as when a man makes a cart, once completed it cannot later be turned into a boat; when Īśvara first makes a human, this human at a later time should not be made into an animal and so forth, yet in reality it transforms into various states according to karma; therefore it is not made by Īśvara. The tenth is the refutation by examining the cause from the fruit, wherein first is the refutation granting the premise, saying that if Īśvara made them, they should all be of one kind, and should not have differences such as fair and ugly; moreover, both transgression and merit should be non-existent. Second, in the refutation eliminating the premise: yet in reality transgressions and merit exist, because both sides accept their existence; this refutes and eliminates it through reasoning. The eleventh is the refutation that hatred and love contradict the doctrine: it means that he should love all; how could there be hatred? Furthermore, possessing hatred and love, he is bound by defilement and therefore lacks autonomy; how could he make all things? The twelfth is the refutation by verifying defilement through facts: it means, how is it known that he has hatred and love? Because he creates the two types of persons, of suffering and pleasure, and does not merely create pleasure. Furthermore, because he cannot make them of one type, it is clear he lacks autonomy. The thirteenth is the refutation through expedient means losing agency: it means that if Īśvara were the creator, sentient beings should not further engage in matters such as food and clothing, nor should they perform wholesome and unwholesome karma. The fourteenth is the refutation that being uncaused, results are lost, wherein first is the refutation granting the premise, meaning that the first fruit is not obtained from a cause, and subsequent causes have no efficacy to benefit fruits; later, the refutation eliminating it through reasoning is understandable. The fifteenth is the refutation equating the presence or absence of karma, within which are three: first, equating existence; second, equating non-existence; third, infinite regress. Infinite regress implies no beginning, and no beginning implies no cause. Syllogisms apply to all the above, and are understandable. Second, from "Such as these" downward, concluding the fault. Second, from "Such wrong views" downward, reconciling the sutra's intention. Third, in refuting making by both, because it possesses both of the preceding faults, it is like two blind people joining together who cannot form a single vision. Fourth, in refuting uncaused [making], because suffering arises from multiple conditions, it is not uncaused. Third, from "Therefore" downward, the opponent concludes the fault, asserting that the treatise master's proof is unestablished. Fourth, from "The answer is" downward, the treatise master reconciles the sutra to reveal its intention. What is it? The Buddha stated that suffering arises from conditions with two intentions: (1) to refute wrong views, as stated before; (2) to clarify that suffering is empty, because suffering from conditions must lack intrinsic nature; you only know the first and do not know the second. Moreover, refuting wrong views is the shallow intention, while revealing true emptiness is the profound intention; you have only grasped the shallow and not the profound. Furthermore, clarifying dharma-emptiness is primary, while refuting wrong views is secondary; you know the secondary but do not know the primary. In the text, there are three parts: first, confirming the shallow and revealing the profound; second, from "Saying that suffering arises from multiple conditions" downward, stating and raising the thesis of emptiness; third, from "Why is this?" downward, explaining and revealing the meaning of emptiness; the third, categorising and eliminating, is understandable.