十二門論宗致義記 2.25

2.25

初、釋名者，於現、已、未三時求法及時俱不可得，故以為門。二、來意者，通意如前；別意，前以四句求，今以三時責故來也。三、所明者，破法及時，以顯真空，成觀無寄故也。四、釋文中三：初、標宗；二、釋因；三、結類。就第二釋中三：初、徵標開章；二、立頌略顯；三、釋頌廣陳。初中有因法者是果法，為欲密顯因不先於果，要由果故，方說為因，是故說果名為有因，以令因成有是果法故。二頌中，上半舉正理，下半徵情。有謂：因果先後共現既不成者，從因生法云何得成？三、釋中二：先正破，後破救。初中釋破三時因果，文則為三：薩婆多說因先果後。又如來藏中先有果法體，後時待緣扶起，亦是果先因後。又如共有因及成實宗潤生煩惱與果俱時，亦是因果同時。又如《成唯識》等，本識中種前滅即生後，應死鳥能鳴等，比量可知。又先有種子因，後方生現行果，亦是先後。又如種子望種子等，是先後。又義理望是同時，如俱有義等。今細剋三時，並俱不成，縱欲安立，終竟無路，是故因果等法畢竟是空，文並可見。二、破救中有四：一、外人舉宗例破難；二、論主反破成宗答；三、外人舉現因事難；四、徵現無因答。初中外意以論主因果三時不成生，例論主破可破三時不成破，謂若汝三時得相破我，因果三時還得相生。若汝破可破三時不成破，復亦不得破我義，我義還則立。外意如此。二、答中有三：先反示過，汝今此難亦負此責，故云汝亦有是過。二、助成宗，謂汝若以三時責我能破令無破，我今受汝責，不執有能破。我能破若壞，汝生義寧存？是故無三時生、無三時破，明知是空。是空故助成我宗，何得成難？又汝若以三時破我破，汝已受三時不得生竟，已成我義訖，我更無所說。又《百論》云「破如所破等」，又《涅槃》云「以我不平，破汝不平。若平，則是我平。」皆同此例，故云若諸法空等也。三、揀非例，謂若我如汝定執三時生可得，如我責破汝，我今但為汝妄執，是故破汝，於我實無破，是故不例，汝不應難，故云若我說等也。三、外人舉現因事難，謂前據言說不立，今以眼見為真。於中二：先證有三因，後結非論主。前中三：初中外意以先有陶師為因，後作缾為果。二中以師為果，弟子為因。因作弟子得師名，則持此證有果先因後。三中如燈明雖一時起，然要因燈有明，是知同時而具有因果。二、結非論主，可知。四、論主徵現無因答。於中釋破前三文，則為三：初中先牒計總非；二、釋非正破；三、「如陶師」下，例破餘法。二中標、釋、結可知。三中同疑因者，既燈明一時有，則必知為因燈有明？為因明有燈？由此不定，故曰同疑因。又云燈明一時有，仍以燈為明因，不得明為燈因，反責燈明一時有。明既不能作燈因，燈亦不能作明因，彼竟不能決，故曰同疑因。又品初已破因果一時不立，汝已疑不成，今處引燈明一時為證，還同前疑，故云也。言燈明等者，決俱非因也。三、類遣可知。

First, explaining the title: Seeking dharmas and time in the three times of present, past, and future, neither can be found; hence it is taken as the gate. Second, the reason for following: The general purpose is as stated before; the particular purpose is that, having previously sought by means of the four propositions, it now proceeds by examining the three times; hence it follows. Third, what is elucidated: It refutes dharmas and time in order to reveal true emptiness and accomplish contemplation without locus. Fourth, explaining the text has three parts: first, stating the thesis; second, explaining the reason; third, concluding by analogy to other classes. Within the second, the explanation, there are three parts: first, questioning, identifying, and opening the section; second, establishing the verse to show it briefly; third, explaining the verse to expound it at length. In the first part, "a dharma having a cause" is a resultant dharma; in order to subtly reveal that the cause does not precede the effect, it is only through the effect that it is called a cause. Therefore, the effect is called "having a cause," because it establishes the cause as possessing this resultant dharma. In the second part, the verse, the first half presents the correct principle, while the second half queries ordinary sentiment: if cause and effect being prior, posterior, or simultaneous are all untenable, how could a dharma produced from a cause be established? In the third part, the explanation, there are two: first, directly refuting; second, refuting the defenses. Within the first, in explaining the refutation of cause and effect across the three times, the text has three: The Sarvāstivādins say that cause is prior and effect is posterior. Also, in the tathāgatagarbha, the substance of the resultant dharma exists beforehand, and later awaits conditions to be brought forth—this too is effect prior and cause posterior. Moreover, as in the case of the coexistent cause and the afflictions that moisten rebirth in the Tattvasiddhi school, which are simultaneous with the effect—this too is cause and effect being simultaneous. Also, as in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and so forth, when a seed in the basic consciousness ceases in the previous moment and immediately produces the next, this would entail that a dead bird could sing, etc., which can be known through inference. Furthermore, first having the seed as cause, and only later producing the manifest activity as effect, is also a matter of prior and posterior. Moreover, as when considering seed with respect to seed, it is prior and posterior. In terms of conceptual principle, it is simultaneous, as in the meaning of co-presence. Now, precisely interrogating the three times, none of them are established; even if one wished to establish them, in the end there is no way. Therefore, dharmas such as cause and effect are ultimately empty; all of this can be seen in the text. Second, within refuting the defenses, there are four: 1. the opponent raises the thesis by analogy to challenge the refutation; 2. the author of the treatise responds by turning the refutation back to establish his own thesis; 3. the opponent adduces empirical causal instances as a challenge; 4. the author of the treatise responds by examining the lack of cause in the empirical. In the first, the opponent's intention is to take the treatise master's claim that cause and effect are not established across the three times, and analogize it to the claim that the treatise master's refutation and what is refuted across the three times cannot establish a refutation: namely, if you in the three times can mutually refute me, then cause and effect across the three times can likewise mutually produce each other. If your refutation and what is refuted cannot establish a refutation across the three times, then you also cannot refute my position, and my position stands. Such is the opponent's intention. Second, the response has three parts: First, turning back to show the fault: your present challenge is also subject to this reproach; hence it says "you also have this fault." Second, assisting in establishing the thesis: if you use the three times to interrogate my refutation, making it so there is no refutation, I now accept your reproach and do not cling to having a refutation. If my refutation is destroyed, how could your position on production survive? Therefore, there is neither production across the three times nor refutation across the three times; it is clearly known to be empty. Because it is empty, it assists in establishing my thesis—how could it constitute a challenge? Moreover, if you use the three times to refute my refutation, you have already accepted that across the three times nothing can be produced; you have already established my position, and I have nothing further to say. Furthermore, the Śata Śāstra says: "The refutation is like what is refuted," and the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "With my lack of equilibrium I break your lack of equilibrium. If there is equilibrium, then it is my equilibrium." All follow this example; hence it says "if all dharmas are empty," and so forth. Third, setting aside the false analogy: if I, like you, were to fixate definitely on production across the three times being attainable, it would be as I reproached and refuted you; but I now merely refute you because of your deluded clinging. In me there is actually no refutation; therefore it is not analogous, and you should not challenge me; hence it says "if I were to say," and so forth. Third, the opponent adduces empirical causal instances as a challenge, meaning that previously, relying on verbal formulation, it was not established, but now what is seen with the eyes is taken as real. Herein are two: first, proving the existence of the three causes; second, concluding with the fault of the treatise master. Within the former there are three: First, the opponent's intention is that first having a potter is the cause, and later making a jar is the effect. Second, taking the teacher as the effect and the student as the cause: because of being a student, one obtains the name of teacher; thus this is adduced to prove that effect precedes cause. Third, just as a lamp and its light arise simultaneously, yet relying on the lamp there is light; thus one knows that they are simultaneous yet possess cause and effect. Second, concluding with the fault of the treatise master is evident. Fourth, the treatise master responds by examining the empirical lack of cause. In explaining the refutation of the previous three texts, there are three: In the first, it first reiterates the view and rejects it generally; second, it explains the rejection and directly refutes it; third, from "like a potter" onward, it refutes the remaining dharmas by analogy. In the second, the presentation, explanation, and conclusion are evident. In the third, regarding "equally a doubtful cause": since the lamp and light exist simultaneously, must one know whether light exists due to the lamp, or the lamp exists due to the light? Because of this indeterminacy, it is called "equally a doubtful cause." Furthermore, if one says that the lamp and light exist simultaneously, yet still takes the lamp as the cause of the light and cannot take the light as the cause of the lamp, one turns back to question their simultaneous existence. Since the light cannot serve as the cause of the lamp, the lamp also cannot serve as the cause of the light; they ultimately cannot resolve this, and so it is called "equally a doubtful cause." Moreover, at the beginning of the chapter, it was already refuted that cause and effect being simultaneous is untenable, and you already doubted that it could not be established; now adducing the simultaneity of lamp and light as proof returns to the previous doubt; hence it is stated. As for the words "lamp, light, etc.," it decisively settles that neither is a cause. Third, extending the elimination by analogy is evident.