十二門論宗致義記 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

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Composed by the Śramaṇa Shi Fazang of Dayuan Monastery in the western capital.

Now, because the profound principle is free from duality, the ultimate and conventional are therefore mutually harmonized; because the pristine paradigm transcends sentiment, emptiness and existence thereby both vanish. Yet, since the emptiness of intrinsic nature has never been non-existent, it is precisely through existence that emptiness is discerned; since illusory existence has never been unempty, it is precisely through emptiness that existence is illumined. Because existence is empty, existence is not existence; because emptiness possesses emptiness, emptiness is not empty. When extreme attachments have perished, seeing and hearing are lost along with them. When the reservoir of errant sources has run dry, the four attachments melt like clouds; when the flawlessness of the true Dharma is made prominent, the two truths are present here. For this reason, when the Tathāgata was in the world, he shone the light of prajñā upon the dark paths; those of the highest capacity tallied with the mysterious crossing beyond all burdens. After the Great Master passed away, contrary attachments arose in confusion, some turning onto deviant paths, others rushing down the lesser trails. Thereupon, the ninety-five varieties vied in fanning the deviant winds; the eighteen sects competed in brandishing their sparks of fire. Consequently, the sun of wisdom of true emptiness concealed its brilliance within gloomy clouds, and the mysterious gem of prajñā was confused with fish eyes. Then there was a great being named Nāgārjuna, who ascended to the stage of Pramuditā-bhūmi, fulfilling the portent of the golden words. Lamenting this fallen standard and grieving over this drowning, he wished to ignite the torch of the true Dharma and overturn the banner of deviant views; therefore, he produced numerous works that overflowed throughout India. Nevertheless, among his essential and wondrous writings, this treatise takes precedence: it sets forth the twelve grand frameworks, smoothing the hidden path and revealing reality, causing one to return to the source through characteristics, harmonize the spirit in wondrous serenity, open one’s inclinations, and illuminate the principle; hence it is called a "gate." Inquiring back and forth with analytical critique, it is further termed a "treatise"; because the gates are twelve, it is named accordingly. The remaining meanings will be explained separately below.

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To explain this treatise, ten gates are briefly outlined: first, clarifying the causes for the arising of the teaching; second, subsumption within the Piṭakas and sections; third, revealing the scope of the teachings; fourth, the capacities addressed by the teaching; fifth, the essence of the teaching that expresses [the meaning]; sixth, the central theme and purport that are expressed; seventh, the era when the treatise was composed; eighth, the circumstances of its transmission and translation; ninth, explaining the title of the treatise; tenth, explaining [the text] following the passage.

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First, as for the causes for the arising of the teaching, there are briefly ten causes for composing treatises such as this: First, it is due to the power of the treatise master's original vows. Since this Nāgārjuna abided in the first bhūmi, by reason he ought, through the power of his vows, to propagate the Dharma and embrace sentient beings after the Buddha's extinction, this being what he had to do. Furthermore, the treatise master saw scriptures such as the Laṅkāvatāra, where the Buddha had already prophesied that I would in the future ignite the torch of the true Dharma and extinguish the banner of deviant views; therefore, by reason he ought to broadly compose various treatises to assist this auspicious proclamation. Second, because after the Buddha's extinction non-Buddhists vied in arising, deviant doctrines became confused, and they slandered the Buddha-Dharma, it was composed to refute them and lead them back to what is correct. Third, because the followers of the two vehicles did not believe in the Mahāyāna, it was composed to refute their divergent attachments and turn them toward the Mahāyāna. Fourth, because people erroneously understood true emptiness in the Mahāyāna and remained stuck in sentimental attachments, it was composed to cause them to break through sentiment and see the correct principle. Fifth, it was composed to reveal the truth and culmination of the Mahāyāna, so that they would faithfully accept it without doubt. Sixth, it was composed with the wish to briefly show that the true emptiness of Mahāyāna prajñā is the most essential and wondrous, and that only by relying on it can the myriad practices be accomplished. Seventh, it was composed with the wish to explain the deep and wondrous meanings within the Mahāyāna sūtras, making them manifest. Eighth, it was composed to cause those of a certain capacity, who attain awakening by relying on the explanations of treatises, to enter the true Dharma on this basis. Ninth, it was composed with the wish to assist the Buddha in propagating the transformation after the Buddha's extinction, to protect the Mahāyāna Dharma, and to make it abide for a long time. Tenth, it was composed to broadly propagate and disseminate this Mahāyāna Dharma with beautiful phrases and wondrous verses, thereby accomplishing an offering of Dharma to repay the Buddha's benevolence.

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Second, as for subsumption within the Piṭakas and sections: between the two Piṭakas of the Śrāvakas and the Bodhisattvas, it is subsumed under the Bodhisattva Piṭaka; among the three Piṭakas of Sūtra and so forth, it is subsumed under the Abhidharma Piṭaka; and among the twelve divisions, it is subsumed under the Upadeśa.

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Question: Since it was not spoken by the Buddha, how can this be so? Answer: It is due to two meanings: First, because it belongs to that category, it is therefore subsumed under it. Second, the preaching of Dharma by the Buddhas is of three kinds: first, spoken by the Buddha himself; second, spoken through the empowerment of others; third, spoken with advance sanction. This treatise falls under the category of advance sanction. Because in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra and the Māyā Sūtra the Buddha prophesied that Nāgārjuna would ignite the torch of the true Dharma, one knows that he gave an advance prophecy permitting him to speak; therefore, it is also included within āptāgama and subsumed under the Dharma Piṭaka.

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Third, regarding determining the scope of the teachings: The diverse assertions of the various masters of the north and south in this land are turbulent and confused, so there is no need to record them here. For now, let us distinguish what was transmitted by the virtuous masters of the Western Realm. I personally inquired of the Central Indian Tripiṭaka Master Divākara (in Tang speech, Rizhao), who translated sūtras at Dayuan Monastery. He said: "In recent times at Nālandā Monastery in Central India, there were simultaneously two great masters of treatises: one named Śīlabhadra, and one named Jñānaprabha. Both had divine understanding surpassing their peers and reputations renowned throughout the five regions of India. The six teachers bowed their heads, the various sects took refuge in them, and Mahāyāna learners looked up to them like the sun and moon. Matchless in India, their standards set the rules; yet they each maintained their own school and were mutually contradictory." This means that Śīlabhadra distantly inherited Maitreya and Asaṅga, and recently followed Dharmapāla and Nanda. Relying on sūtras such as the Saṃdhinirmocana and treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi, he elucidated the Mahāyāna of dharma characteristics, extensively classified names and enumerations, and established his school by using the three teachings, showing that what he relied upon was the truly definitive meaning. That is to say, when the Buddha first turned the wheel of the Hīnayāna Dharma of the four truths in Mṛgadāva, although he taught the emptiness of the person to overturn the various non-Buddhists, he definitively declared that what arises from conditions is truly existent. In the second period, although he relied on parikalpita to teach that the intrinsic natures of all dharmas are empty to overturn that Hīnayāna, he had not yet taught the existence of paratantra and pariniṣpanna. In the third period, proceeding from the correct principle of the Mahāyāna, he fully taught the three natures, the three non-natures, and so forth, only then exhausting the principle. Therefore, regarding dharmas arisen from causes and conditions, teaching only existence in the first period fell into the extreme of existence; next teaching emptiness fell into the extreme of emptiness. Since each fell into an extreme, neither was definitive. Only in the later period, when he fully taught that the imagined nature is empty and that the other two are existent, tallying with the middle way, was it definitive. Therefore, according to this assertion, the prajñā and other sūtras that mostly teach the school of emptiness are judged to be subsumed under the second teaching, and are not of definitive meaning. This is judged by relying on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Second, the treatise master Jñānaprabha distantly inherited Mañjuśrī and Nāgārjuna, and recently received [the lineage of] Piṅgala and Bhāviveka. Relying on sūtras such as the Prajñā and treatises such as the Madhyamaka, he revealed the signless Mahāyāna and extensively analyzed true emptiness. He also established his school by using the three teachings, showing that what he relied upon was truly definitive. That is to say, when the Buddha first turned the wheel of the Hīnayāna Dharma of the four truths in Mṛgadāva for those of lesser capacities, he taught that both mind and objects exist. Next, in the second period, for those of middling capacity, he taught the Mahāyāna of dharma characteristics—that objects are empty while mind exists, which is the meaning of vijñapti-mātra and so forth. Because their capacities were still inferior, they were unable to enter fully into uniform true emptiness, and so he spoke in this way. In the third period, only then did he speak this signless Mahāyāna for those of superior capacity, revealing that both mind and objects are empty and of a single equal flavor, which is the truly definitive meaning. Furthermore, at first, in order to refute the intrinsic nature and so forth of non-Buddhists, he taught that dharmas arisen from causes and conditions are definitively existent. Next, in order to refute the real existence posited by the Hīnayāna, he taught that this conditioned arising is merely nominal existence; because he feared they would be terrified of this true emptiness, he still preserved existence to guide them. In the third [period], only then, proceeding from the ultimate Mahāyāna, did he teach that this conditioned arising is precisely the emptiness of intrinsic nature, a single equal characteristic; this is also the gradual progression for entering the Dharma. Thus, according to this assertion, the Mahāyāna of dharma characteristics, having an apprehension [of dharmas] and the like, is judged to be the second teaching, and is not definitive. Regarding this sequence of the three teachings, Master Jñānaprabha, in his Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā, cited what was spoken in the Mahāyāna-paramārtha-jñāna Sūtra. Therefore, according to this teaching and principle, the Prajñā and other sūtras are truly definitive, while the remaining dharma characteristics, names, and enumerations are merely expedient teachings.

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Question: Regarding what the two previous masters have stated, what are their merits and shortcomings? Answer: If one matches the teachings to the capacities, both assertions are valid, because each relies on sacred teachings as a valid standard. How so? It is that the sequences of the three teachings in these two assertions cannot be taken as definitively restricted by the chronological order of the three periods. How is this known? As stated in the Guhyakādhipatinirdeśa Sūtra: "When the Buddha first turned the wheel of the Dharma of the four truths in Mṛgadāva, immeasurable sentient beings attained the first fruit, the second fruit, up to the fruit of arhat; immeasurable sentient beings generated the bodhicitta; and immeasurable bodhisattvas attained the anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti and abided in the first bhūmi, the second bhūmi, and so forth," and so on extensively. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra also states the same thing; therefore, one cannot definitively speak of a chronological order. One only needs to know that when the Tathāgata instituted teachings, there are two approaches to the definitive and provisional meanings: First, clarifying the definitive and provisional according to the broadness or narrowness of the capacities embraced, and the completeness or deficiency of the verbal teaching. Second, clarifying the definitive and provisional according to leading capacities into the Dharma, and the increase or subtlety in revealing the principle. The first is what Śīlabhadra attained. How so? As in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, when he first established it in Mṛgadāva, he turned the wheel of the true Dharma with the characteristics of the four truths solely for those oriented toward the Śrāvaka vehicle, and so forth. In the second period, solely for those oriented toward practicing the Mahāyāna, based on all dharmas being without intrinsic nature, and so on, he turned the wheel of the true Dharma with hidden characteristics. In the third period, universally for those oriented toward all vehicles, based on all dharmas being without intrinsic nature up to the nature of non-intrinsic nature, he turned the wheel of the true Dharma with manifest characteristics. The explanation states: According to this sūtra text, the first only embraces Śrāvakas, and the second only embraces Bodhisattvas; because the capacities embraced are narrow, they are called non-definitive. The latter fully embraces both lesser and greater; hence it says it was spoken "universally for those oriented toward all vehicles." Furthermore, the first only taught the lesser teaching, and the next only the Mahāyāna; because these two verbal teachings were mutually deficient, they are called non-definitive. The latter fully taught both teachings to embrace both capacities; this represents completeness of teaching, and is therefore called definitive, not that the principle has shallowness and depth. Moreover, according to this text, one also cannot definitively judge the Prajñā and other sūtras to be the teaching of the second period. For the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Sūtra states: "If someone wishes to attain the fruit of a srotāpanna, they should train in the prajñāpāramitā; up to, if they wish to attain the fruit of an arhat and unexcelled bodhi, etc., it says in all cases that they should train in the prajñāpāramitā." Hence we know that the Prajñā Sūtra and others also fully embrace both the lesser and the greater, and are likewise spoken universally for those oriented toward all vehicles. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa also states: "In this Mahāyāna, both the assemblies of bodhisattvas and śrāvakas are fully embraced." The explanation states: Since it possesses both truths and embraces both capacities, how could it be definitively judged to be the second teaching? Therefore, if one definitively judges the Prajñā, it contradicts what is cited here; if one definitively adheres to chronological order, it contradicts the text of the Guhyakādhipatinirdeśa Sūtra. Therefore, if one merely judges these three teachings to have definitive and provisional aspects according to the broadness or narrowness of capacities embraced and the completeness or deficiency of the verbal teaching, there is no error in principle or teaching. Second, regarding the approach of leading capacities into the Dharma and the increase or subtlety in revealing the principle, this was inherited and established by Jñānaprabha. That is to say, first teaching that both mind and objects exist does not penetrate the emptiness of intrinsic nature; next revealing that objects are empty while mind exists already reveals one portion of the emptiness of intrinsic nature; finally, having both mind and objects empty, fully revealed in equality, is only then definitive. Furthermore, regarding conditioned arising, he first taught real existence, next taught apparent existence, and only later taught emptiness. All of these texts concern the gradual stages of entering the Dharma and the increase or subtlety in revealing the principle, so as to clarify the definitive and provisional meanings of the three teachings. If one definitively clings to chronological order in making definitive judgments, the sūtra texts will also be contradicted, as can be known accordingly. Furthermore, Śīlabhadra judged according to the teaching, taking completeness of teaching to be definitive; Jñānaprabha judged according to the principle, taking the profundity of principle to be definitive. Therefore, the bases of the two assertions are each different and their boundaries distinct; their superiority and inferiority, shallowness and depth, can be seen here.

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Fourth, regarding the faculties addressed by the teaching: within the Mahāyāna, there is an intrinsic division into two teachings. If according to the Initial Teaching of the Mahāyāna, all sentient beings have distinctions among the five natures. Among them, only those of the Bodhisattva lineage and the indeterminate lineage are what is primary addressed by this [text]; the others are not the primary target, yet there is no contradiction in their being addressed concurrently. This is because the thesis of this treatise is the same as the various prajñā [sūtras], concurrently benefiting [those of] the two vehicles as well as humans and devas. If according to the Final Teaching of the Mahāyāna, then all sentient beings without exception are what is addressed by this [text]. This is because, although nearby there is said to be a distinction among the five natures, from an ultimate perspective, all shall attain bodhi, since all that have a mind possess the Buddha-nature. In the Foxing lun (Treatise on the Buddha-Nature), it is said that those who slander the Mahāyāna cannot generate the mind [for bodhi] for immeasurable periods of time, and on that basis they are termed 'lacking the Buddha-nature'; it does not mean that they ultimately lack a pure nature, because all will attain unsurpassable bodhi. According to the Ratnagotravibhāga, the Anuttarāśraya Sūtra, and so forth, even if [followers of] the two vehicles enter into cessation, they afterwards receive a body of inconceivable transformation and receive the Buddha's transformation toward great bodhi. Therefore, according to the former Initial Teaching, the distinctions among the three vehicles are spoken of in terms of the differences among the five natures; according to this Final Teaching, it is spoken of in terms of all possessing the Buddha-nature and all being destined to attain buddhahood, and therefore on this basis the single vehicle alone is taught. The overarching intent of this treatise encompasses both of the former explanations, as can be known by inference.

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Fifth, discerning the ontological essence of the teaching that expresses: it takes names, sentences, phonemes, and the voice upon which they rely as its intrinsic nature. Alternatively, it is said that five dharmas constitute its nature: first, names; second, sentences; third, utterances; fourth, graphemes; and fifth, sounds. However, discussing this essence comprehensively, there are altogether four tiers: first, in terms of phenomena, it possesses both nominal and real dharmas, as distinguished above; second, in terms of reality, reducing the nominal to the real, it has only sound as its nature; third, in terms of similitude, it is manifested by consciousness-only, having similitude-sound and so forth as its nature; fourth, in terms of the nature, it means that these sounds and so forth are empty and without intrinsic nature, having neither-name-nor-sound and neither-non-name-nor-non-sound as their intrinsic nature, which refers to the nature that is free from nature.

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Sixth, regarding the thesis and purport expressed: that which words indicate is called the 'thesis' (zong), and that to which the thesis returns is called the 'purport' (qu). Thus, taking the twelve kinds of gates to refute attachments is the thesis, and revealing principle, perfecting practice, and entering into the Dharma is the purport; that is, turning [those of] the two vehicles and so forth around to cause them to enter the Mahāyāna is its intention. Although this is stated generally, within it we can make a brief division into four sections: 1. broadly explaining the norms of establishing and refuting; 2. specifically identifying what is refuted herein; 3. comprehensively presenting the meaning and intent of the Three Treatises; 4. harmonising the diverse explanations. First, broadly explaining the norms of establishing and refuting in the sūtras and treatises: the great framework of the Buddha's Dharma has two kinds: first, for the pure faculties of the superior grade, directly showing the teaching and meaning, neither establishing nor refuting; second, for the mixed faculties of the intermediate and inferior grades, expediently displaying, with both establishing and refuting. While the Buddha was in the world, he mostly made clear the former meaning and concurrently made clear the latter meaning, as distinguished in the various sūtras. After the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, [the masters] mostly made clear the latter meaning and concurrently made clear the former meaning, as distinguished in the various treatises. Concerning this presence of establishing and refuting, we briefly use three clauses to reveal its demarcations: 1. explaining refutation; 2. explaining establishing; 3. elucidating the unobstructedness of both. As for the first: out of great compassion, the Sage employs various discourses to refute views and attachments, striving solely to cure their sickness, with no fixed rule to his words. Here, in terms of their characteristics, there are five: 1. Refutation by mocking interrogation: as when the Buddha refuted the Long-nailed Renunciant, saying: 'If you accept nothing, do you accept this non-acceptance or not?' Those like this have faculties that are already mature; hence, feeling shame, they attain the fruit. 2. Refutation according to suitability: as when the Buddha sees what is suitable to the faculties of those sentient beings, and if by such an approach they can enter the Dharma, he then uses that to refute their theories and lead them to awaken to the path, without necessarily having to be fully equipped with all the principles and rules of inferential reasoning. This is for superior faculties slightly lower than the former, who require multiple words from the Buddha before they submit with faith, such as the refutation of the non-Buddhist Śreṇika and others. The above two kinds concern the refutation of non-Buddhists. If in terms of refuting the two vehicles, as in the Lotus Sūtra and elsewhere: 'The nirvāṇa you have attained is not true extinction,' and so forth, this constitutes a refutation. The refutation of the three and return to the one, and so on, are also to be understood accordingly. 3. Refutation according to attachment: as in the Three Treatises composed by Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, and others, confronting those non-Buddhists, Hīnayāna followers, and so on, following their particular attachments, they use various principles and rules to interrogate and refute their theories, striving to leave their clinging minds with no support so that they conformably enter into true emptiness, which constitutes the benefit; why must it be equipped with the principles of the three-membered or five-membered syllogism? Because their faculties are still superior and easily receive and enter, they do not rely on such a posture. 4. Refutation by indicating the pramāṇa: as in the Upāyahṛdaya Śāstra and the Vigrahavyāvartanī composed by Nāgārjuna, the *Tarkatattva composed by Vasubandhu, and so on; they each briefly indicate the worldly principles of the three-membered and five-membered syllogisms of Hetuvidyā, evaluating and refuting theories in order to reveal the correct Dharma, yet they also do not preserve these syllogistic methods, and therefore later in the treatises they refute them themselves. The faculties addressed by this are somewhat inferior to the former, and hence more effort is employed. 5. Refutation by normative pramāṇa: as in the treatises on Hetuvidyā composed by Dignāga, and the Prajñāpradīpa and Karatalaratna composed by Bhāviveka, and so on; all rely on the normative principles of determining the thesis, reason, and example, and so forth, pointing out the fallacies of the other traditions without contradiction or error, before they can be considered true refutations. If one is not skilled at pointing out fallacies in the thesis and so forth, it is called a pseudo-refutation and does not constitute a refutation. Because the faculties confronted here are the lowest and most inferior, and their clinging views are deep and heavy, making it difficult for them to receive and enter, one extensively uses the principles and rules of Hetuvidyā from among the five worldly sciences to weigh right and wrong before they finally submit with faith. If, having arrived at this stage, they still do not submit with faith, their folly is so extreme that it cannot be described, and therefore it does not proceed to a sixth gate.

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Second, establishing propositions: Dharma is fundamentally beyond words, and those with the capacity to understand it rarely awaken. Out of compassion, the Sage skillfully guides them, striving to bring them benefit, causing the establishing of propositions in accordance with conditions to take on varied postures and many shifts. Broadly speaking, there are also five: 1. Establishing in response to faculties: as in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], where non-Buddhists saw the Buddha's golden body and so forth, and said: 'Although Gautama is a good man, he perversely preaches emptiness, which is an annihilationist view.' The Buddha then told them: 'I do not speak of emptiness. Because all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature, there is permanence, bliss, self, and purity,' and so forth. Having heard this, they entered into the Dharma and later awakened to the tracks of the path; yet in reality, within the text, the Buddha-nature is named the ultimate emptiness, and so forth. In the Laṅkāvatāra, for those terrified of emptiness, he taught that the tathāgatagarbha possesses the thirty-two marks and so on; the text's meaning is likewise the same, fully as stated in the sūtra. 2. Establishing by rebuking and refuting: this refers to Nāgārjuna in the Three Treatises and elsewhere, where, as soon as he refutes those attachments until they are utterly eradicated, because the mind has no support, true emptiness is immediately manifested, which constitutes establishing; this is called establishing without establishing. 3. Establishing according to the occasion: as when Bodhisattva Āryadeva, on an occasion during a debate with a non-Buddhist, established two aggregates to provide an argument to match a load-carrier; just as a person has two shoulders to carry a load, the meaning was already fully established. Later, amidst a great assembly, he established the five aggregates. The original non-Buddhist then asked: 'If so, why did you previously establish two?' He replied: 'Previously, it was for the sake of confronting a load-carrier where there was no other person of wisdom; now, confronting a wise assembly, I explain it in full.' Such are cases of this. 4. Establishing by overturning heresy: as when Bodhisattva Āryadeva, confronting non-Buddhists of the eight directions, established the meaning of the Three Jewels, saying that if anyone found him bested, he would decapitate himself in apology; though the many opponents attacked, his principles did not collapse, and he thereupon caused the non-Buddhists to convert with faith and enter into the Dharma. What was established in cases such as these did not necessarily have the principles of three-membered or five-membered syllogisms; he simply used superior eloquence to reveal and explain according to the occasion, making the meaning firm so as to cause them to submit with faith; this too is because words have no fixed abode. 5. Establishing by normative pramāṇa: this requires relying on worldly Hetuvidyā, free from all classes of fallacies regarding the thesis, reason, and example, with the principles fully established, which is called true establishing. If there are fallacies and lapses regarding the thesis and so forth, it is called pseudo-establishing and is not established. It is also like using eight kinds of inferential principles to prove that the Mahāyāna sūtras are truly the Buddha's word, and so forth. Therefore, one should know that the meanings of establishing and refuting explained above are all expedients, striving to make the faculties addressed submit and give rise to faith; they do not necessarily embody the Buddha-Dharma's profound purport. For instance, as with Suchness, because it has no homogeneous example, it cannot be established [syllogistically]; yet how could Suchness be a non-dharma? Therefore, one must transcend these disputes of establishing and refuting before one accords with the real and ultimate meaning.

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Third, the unobstructedness of establishing and refuting: because conceptual attachment is contrary to principle, its very essence is empty, leading to a refutation of no refutation, where refuting is precisely no refutation. If one clings to there being a refutation, one is again identical to what is refuted; therefore it is not a refutation. Now, since it is not what is refuted, refuting through non-refutation means that subject and object are both extinguished, and with the mind having nowhere to rest, this is the ultimate refutation. Grasp the meaning and reflect upon it; do not become attached to the words. Furthermore, since the Dharma transcends conceptualisation, how could it admit of being established? Establishing it provisionally in relation to conceptualisation, establishing is precisely non-establishing. If one can understand that this establishing is non-establishing, then establishing through non-establishing is the ultimate establishing. If one grasps establishing according to words, that is conceptual fabrication, and because it is not what is established, there is no establishing. Therefore, there is also no establishing within conceptualisation, because it is not the Dharma; nor is there establishing outside conceptualisation, because there is no object of engagement. One can only harmonise conceptualisation into the Dharma: establishing is immediately non-establishing, and non-establishing is immediately establishing. Grasp the meaning and reflect upon it, and its principle will be evident. This is called: though establishing and refuting are rampant, nothing has ever been spoken; though subduing faculties to enter the Dharma, how has there ever been an opponent? Furthermore, because banishing conceptualisation never fails to tally with principle, in refutation there is nothing that is not established; because establishing Dharma never fails to dissolve conceptualisation, in establishing there is nothing that is not refuted. Hence, because refutation is precisely establishing, there is no refutation; because establishing is precisely refutation, there is no establishing. Neither establishing nor refuting does not obstruct establishing and refuting. Therefore, establishing and refuting are one yet always two, two yet always one; existence does not obstruct emptiness, and emptiness does not obstruct existence. This is the overarching meaning of the unobstructedness of establishing and refuting.

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Second, determining that which is refuted: some masters state that this Three Treatise tradition only refutes the real self and real dharmas fabricated as parikalpita by the Hīnayāna, non-Buddhists, and so on; it does not refute the paratantra nature of the Mahāyāna, because it is illusory existence and not a fault. If this were also refuted, it would be subsumed under nihilistic and wrongly grasped emptiness, and would not be the correct Dharma. Others state: the Three Treatises refute everything without exception. Even if it is the paratantra established in treatises such as the Yogācāra of the Mahāyāna, it is also refuted here, because among all conditionally arisen phenomena, there are none that are not empty. If this were not refuted, views would not perish, and the principle would not be exhaustively realised.

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Question: Can these two views be harmonized? Answer: Some masters say they cannot be harmonized, nor is there any need to force a harmony, because these represent different schools within the Mahāyāna, which gives rise to dispute. Just as among the arhats in the Hīnayāna the different schools did not communicate, one should know that it is the same with the different schools of bodhisattvas; thus it is not strange. Truly, because the Buddha Dharma is exceedingly profound, each [view] has its scriptures and reasoning to account for their differences, and their meanings are inherently well-established; therefore they cannot be harmonized. Now, to explain further: they are by no means incapable of being harmonized, because the principles are intrinsically congruent. How so? If one does not refute the illusory existence of the paratantra so as to bring it to non-existence, then that parikalpita attachment will not be eternally exhausted. This is because this illusory existence is an existence that is non-existent; if one does not accept its non-existence, it is precisely what is attached to. Therefore, when refuting attachment with the intention of sweeping it away completely, one must arrive at the juncture where illusory existence is non-existent; and it is only when one necessarily refutes illusory existence to exhaust it eternally that one reaches the juncture where what is attached to is non-existent. Hence the meanings of the two views do not contradict each other. Furthermore, that Hīnayāna is the half-letter teaching, whose principles and meanings are not exhaustive, so differences and disputes may arise; but the Mahāyāna is the complete teaching, possessing fully comprehensive principles and meanings—how could it likewise have sectarian divisions like them? Moreover, the arhats had not attained the one-taste dharmadhātu of all dharmas; grasping at dharmas, they generated views and composed treatises, which is why there were contradictions. But how could bodhisattvas who have entered the bhūmis and fully penetrated the true mark of the middle way of all dharmas likewise contradict one another with grasping views like them? Therefore, that great treatise masters such as Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga do not contradict each other is fine proof of this.

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Third, in generally stating the essential import of the school: generally clarifying the Three Treatises, they take the middle way of the two truths as their overarching purport. Now, in explaining this meaning, three gates are briefly made: first, showing the principles and doctrines; second, explaining the cultivation of contemplation; third, revealing the virtues and functions. Within the first gate, there are again three points: first, clarifying the middle way of the two truths in terms of the paratantra nature; second, in terms of the other two natures; third, comprehensively in terms of the three natures. Regarding the first point: the arising of all dharmas never fails to proceed from conditions; because they exist through conditions, they must lack intrinsic nature; and because they lack intrinsic nature, they proceed from conditions. Between conditioned existence and the lack of intrinsic nature there are no two separate dharmas: it is merely in terms of the myriad distinctions of conditioned existence that it is named the conventional truth, and in terms of the single taste of non-nature that it is named the ultimate truth. Therefore, on a single dependent origination, the two principles are not conflated; this is called the two truths. Dependent origination being non-dual and doubly detached from the two extremes is called the middle way. This is the general explanation. If we explain it further in detail, three gates are briefly made: first, in terms of opening and combining; second, in terms of identity and difference; third, in terms of existence and non-existence. In the first of these, we first open and then combine. As for opening: within a single dependent origination, it opens into two meanings: first, the meaning of dependent origination as illusory existence; second, the meaning of the lack of intrinsic nature as true emptiness. Within the first meaning, there are also two meanings: first, the meaning of non-existence, meaning that its entire substance is completely empty and without anything existing; second, the meaning of non-non-existence, meaning that it does not await the destruction of those differentiated marks. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'All dharmas, being without anything existing, exist in this way.' Therefore, being neither existent nor non-existent is called illusory existence. Second, within true emptiness, there are also two meanings: first, the meaning of non-emptiness, meaning that emptiness has no mark of emptiness; second, the meaning of non-non-emptiness, meaning that all other marks are without exception exhausted. Therefore, being neither empty nor non-empty is called true emptiness. A sūtra says: 'Emptiness and non-emptiness are unobtainable; this is called true emptiness.' The Madhyamaka Śāstra says: 'Dharmas without intrinsic nature are also non-existent, because all dharmas are empty.' As for combining, there are five tiers to this: First, that non-existence is precisely non-non-existence; because these are non-dual, it constitutes illusory existence. Therefore the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra says: 'Without substance, yet not without substance; being not without substance is precisely substance. Substance and the lack of substance are non-dual; therefore it is said to be an illusion.' The intention of this text takes the lack of substance to be the substance of illusion, and thus speaks of non-duality. Because of this non-duality, it does not fall into one extreme, and is therefore called the middle way; this is the middle way of the conventional truth. Second, within the ultimate, non-emptiness is precisely non-non-emptiness; taking this non-duality as true emptiness, it doubly departs from the two extremes and is called the middle way; this is the middle way of the ultimate truth. Third, non-existence within illusion is precisely the meaning of non-non-emptiness within the ultimate, and non-non-existence within illusion is precisely the meaning of non-emptiness within the ultimate, because they are entirely non-dual. Because this non-duality is further non-dual with the previous non-duality, the two truths completely interfuse and do not fall into one extreme, which is called the middle way; this is the middle way of the two truths. Fourth, non-existence within illusion and non-emptiness within the ultimate interfuse without duality, which is called the middle way; this is the middle way of neither existence nor emptiness. A sūtra says: 'Neither existence nor non-existence is called the middle way.' Fifth, non-non-existence within illusion is precisely non-non-emptiness within the ultimate; this is the middle way of neither non-existence nor non-non-existence, meaning the middle that transcends the middle. Therefore, the two truths interfusing and marvelously transcending middle and extremes is its import.

1.17

Second, concerning the gate of identity and difference, there are four propositions. First, regarding the meaning of non-difference: if [dharmas] did not arise dependently, they would not lack intrinsic nature; that is, existence through conditions shows that they do not exist of themselves, and not existing of themselves is precisely lacking intrinsic nature. Moreover, lacking intrinsic nature shows that they do not exist of themselves, and not existing of themselves is precisely existence through conditions. Therefore a sūtra says: 'Form is precisely emptiness, and emptiness is precisely form.' A treatise says: 'The cognitive hindrance is exceedingly dark and blind, grasping at the ultimate and conventional as distinct.' This is what it refers to. Nor can one disallow conditioned arising on account of the emptiness of intrinsic nature, because without conditioned arising, emptiness cannot be established. A treatise says: 'Conditioned dharmas are empty, because they arise from conditions.' Furthermore, this is true emptiness, not an annihilationist emptiness. If one were to await the destruction of conditioned arising before it becomes empty, then that would be an evil grasping at emptiness within conceptual sentiment. Nor can one, by allowing conditioned existence, contradict and impair true emptiness, because if [a dharma] were not empty it would not exist through conditions; if it existed of itself, it would not arise from conditions. Furthermore, only the emptiness that is not different from existence is true emptiness, and only the existence that is not different from emptiness is illusory existence; therefore, these two being non-dual, they are not different. A sūtra says: 'Form and the emptiness of form are dual; form is precisely emptiness, not that form is destroyed to make emptiness, for the nature of form is intrinsically empty. One who thoroughly penetrates within this enters the Dharma gate of non-duality.' Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'It is not because of emptying form that it is called the emptiness of form; it is simply that form is precisely emptiness and emptiness is precisely form.' Furthermore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, fascicle 389, says: 'Subhūti! Because causes and conditions are not different from primordial emptiness of nature, primordial emptiness of nature is not different from causes and conditions; causes and conditions are precisely primordial emptiness of nature, and primordial emptiness of nature is precisely causes and conditions.' It also says: 'Subhūti! Because all dharmas produced from conditions are not different from primordial emptiness of nature, primordial emptiness of nature is not different from all dharmas produced from conditions; all dharmas produced from conditions are precisely primordial emptiness of nature, and primordial emptiness of nature is precisely all dharmas produced from conditions.' Passages such as these clarify this gate of non-difference.

1.18

Question: If that is so, it should destroy the two truths, because cause and effect being identical with emptiness loses illusory existence and destroys the conventional truth, while emptiness being identical with cause and effect loses true emptiness and destroys the ultimate truth. Answer: It is precisely because they are not different that the two truths are preserved; if it were not so, then the two truths would be lost. How so? Cause and effect different from emptiness would not be illusory dharmas, and thus would lose the conventional truth; emptiness different from cause and effect would not be true emptiness, and thus would lose the ultimate truth. Therefore, that the two truths are preserved is due to non-difference; non-difference is the equality of the middle way; and thus it is by the middle way that there are two truths, which is precisely the two truths of the middle way.

1.19

Second, concerning the gate of non-identity: these dependently arisen dharmas, due to the emptiness of intrinsic nature, cause that illusory existence also to be unable to exist; therefore, everything is exclusively true emptiness. A sūtra says: 'All dharmas are ultimately empty, without the slightest mark; emptiness is without conceptual differentiation, identical to empty space.' Another sūtra also says: 'All dharmas are empty, like the conflagration at the end of an eon,' and so forth. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'Because form and the rest are empty, within emptiness there is no form.' Passages such as these rely on that gate of illusory existence being non-existent, and rely on the gate of true emptiness being non-non-empty, to say that true emptiness eternally negates illusory existence; therefore, they cause conventional marks to be eternally exhausted, constituting the ultimate truth. Furthermore, these dependently arisen dharmas, due to their marks of illusory existence, cause that true emptiness also to become non-empty, being exclusively the distinctions of dependently arisen illusory existence. Therefore the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says: 'It is not that cessation gives rise [to things] again, but rather the continuous arising from causes and conditions,' and so forth. Furthermore, in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the Yogācārabhūmi, and elsewhere, it is clarified that dependently arisen dharmas are never non-existent, and so forth. Passages such as these all rely on the gate of true emptiness being non-empty and rely on the gate of illusory existence being non-non-existent to say that conditioned existence is eternally not empty; and only because it is eternally not empty does it constitute the conventional truth. In this way, the two truths thoroughly define and appropriate each other, and only then do they establish their true nature. As the Yingluo jing says: 'Because worldly truth exists, it is not empty; because ultimate truth is empty, it does not exist.' All such explanations are clarified based on the gate of non-identity.

1.20

Question: If, according to the former gate, true emptiness extinguishes illusory existence to make it non-existent, this annihilates the conventional truth and destroys karmic cause and effect, which is an evil grasping at emptiness. Furthermore, since this emptiness of intrinsic nature derives from illusory existence, if one also makes illusory existence non-existent, then because illusory existence is absent, based on what could that doctrine of emptiness of intrinsic nature be established? Then it would also lose its own meaning of true emptiness. Moreover, the previous gate of non-difference clarified that it does not destroy illusory existence; now this gate destroys it again—how are the two statements not mutually contradictory? Furthermore, if according to the latter meaning existence deprives emptiness and makes emptiness non-empty, this would be real existence and not illusory existence, and by violating true emptiness, it would be conceptualized existence. Furthermore, since this conditioned existence derives from the emptiness of intrinsic nature, if this is also absent, conditioned existence is also destroyed, and the meaning of conditioned existence is lost. Moreover, the previous gate of non-difference clarified that it does not impair true emptiness; now this gate destroys it again—how is this not contradictory? Answer: In resolving these objections, clarifying the granting and depriving, preserving and destroying, of the ultimate and conventional, emptiness and existence, there are two gates with four propositions each. First, regarding true emptiness alone, there are four meanings: 1. By virtue of this emptiness, it does not destroy conditioned existence, because if intrinsic nature existed, it would not exist through conditions. 2. By virtue of being emptiness, it thoroughly destroys conditioned existence, because emptiness must negate conditioned existence, and if existence were not exhausted, it would not be true emptiness. 3. By virtue of emptiness, it also destroys true emptiness, because since this emptiness of intrinsic nature derives from conditioned existence, when conditioned existence is preserved there is no true emptiness; and this absence of true emptiness is due to true emptiness. 4. By virtue of emptiness, it does not destroy true emptiness, because it is only by destroying conditioned existence and exhausting that mark of emptiness that it is true emptiness. Second, regarding illusory existence alone, there are also four meanings: 1. By virtue of conditioned existence, it does not impair the emptiness of intrinsic nature, because existence proceeding from conditions must be empty of intrinsic nature, definitively lacking intrinsic nature. 2. By virtue of conditioned existence, it must contradict the emptiness of intrinsic nature, because conditioned existence is not non-existent. 3. By virtue of conditioned existence, it destroys conditioned existence, because existence proceeding from conditions must be empty of intrinsic nature, and when the emptiness of intrinsic nature manifests it must negate conditioned existence; that which negates conditioned existence is due to conditioned existence. 4. By virtue of conditioned existence, it does not destroy conditioned existence, because existence proceeding from conditions must negate emptiness and exhaust existence before it can constitute conditioned existence, as it is not non-existent. In this way, conditioned existence and the emptiness of intrinsic nature either mutually deprive and are completely exhausted, or mutually grant and are completely preserved, or self-destroy and self-preserve, without obstruction. Therefore, if viewed from the gate of mutual granting, the emptiness that does not destroy existence and the existence that does not destroy emptiness are not conflated in principle; hence it is the gate of non-identity. Second, if viewed from the gate of mutual depriving, this emptiness that destroys existence and this existence that exhausts emptiness completely deprive each other; hence they are not identical. Third, if viewed from the gate of individual self-preservation, they do not affirm each other; hence they are not identical. Fourth, if viewed from the gate of individual self-destruction, there is no unity that can be unified; hence they are not identical. Because preservation and destruction are unobstructed and the two principles are not conflated, neither falling into extremes nor losing the middle way, this is called the middle way of the two truths.

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十二門論宗致義記 — Classical Chinese