瑜伽論記 13.68

13.68

第二相中，初問、次正釋。此相非正建立，但因外難，便破小執建立自宗。就問中，若準前後解，此文稍違，所以者何？且如前文，若有第八執受依止可得；若無第八依止執受不可得。今若準解，應言若有第八最初生起可得；若無第八最初生起不可得者，是言便失。但總應言小乘無第八諸識不並生，大乘理即云根境緣具，五識皆然，何緣一識最初生起，有第八識即許諸識並生，故有第八無最初起是應道理，汝既無於第八有最初生此不應理。今小乘問何故若無第八最初生起不應正理。可直按文，不可準前及後而興準解，此為問訖。

In the second characteristic, first is the question, followed by the direct explanation. This characteristic is not directly establishing [the thesis], but simply taking occasion from the outsider's objection to refute Hīnayāna attachments and establish our own school. Within the question, if assessed according to the preceding and succeeding explanations, this text slightly conflicts. Why is this? Take the preceding text, for instance: if there is the eighth, the appropriation of the support is observed; if there is no eighth, the appropriation of the support is not observed. Now, if assessed according to that explanation, one should say: if there is the eighth, initial arising is observed; if there is no eighth, initial arising is not observed—such a statement would be faulty. One should merely say in general that in the Hīnayāna there is no eighth and the consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously; while the Mahāyāna principle says that when faculty, object, and conditions are complete, the five consciousnesses are all so—for what reason would only one consciousness arise initially? When there is an eighth consciousness, simultaneous arising of the consciousnesses is accepted; hence having the eighth and having no initial arising is logical; since you lack the eighth, having an initial arising is illogical. Now the Hīnayāna asks: why is it that if there is no eighth, an initial arising is illogical? One may adhere directly to the text, and not generate an interpretation by analogy with what precedes and follows. This concludes the question.