瑜伽論記 18.119

18.119

答中，初舉四種計我總以非之。何以故已下，別破四計。初中，言遠極彼岸，不過四種等者，泰云：至於極處彼岸不過唯有此四也。一者、即蘊計我；二者、異蘊計我我住蘊中；三者、俱非前二。非即諸蘊，而異諸蘊者，不同初執。非即諸蘊者，正非初執也。而異諸蘊者，立宗也。非住蘊中者，非第二執也。而住異蘊離蘊法中者，立宗也，謂住無為中是離蘊法也。依成實解，彼假者非實五蘊名離蘊法，如彼諸論羅地經所。

In the answer, it first adduces the four kinds of imputed self and negates them in general. From "For what reason?" below, it refutes the four imputations individually. In the first part, regarding "pursued to the utmost extreme, they do not exceed four kinds, and so forth": Tai says: reaching the ultimate limit and far shore, there are only these four. First, imputing the self as identical to the aggregates; second, imputing the self as distinct from the aggregates and dwelling within the aggregates; third, both being neither of the previous two. "Neither identical to the aggregates, yet distinct from the aggregates": this differs from the first attachment. "Neither identical to the aggregates" directly negates the first attachment. "Yet distinct from the aggregates" establishes the thesis. "Not dwelling within the aggregates" negates the second attachment. "Yet dwelling in phenomena distinct from the aggregates and separate from the aggregates" establishes the thesis—meaning dwelling in unconditioned phenomena, which are phenomena separate from the aggregates. According to the explanation in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, that nominal entity is not the real five aggregates and is called a phenomenon separate from the aggregates, as found in their various treatises and the *Luo-di jing* (*Rāṣṭrapāla-sūtra*?).