瑜伽論記 19.234

19.234

第七明異不異門。補闕云：於中，五法將前望後作一行門對辨一異，於相中初將相對後四，次將名對後三，次將分別對後二，真如對正智正智即無所對，相與名異有何過名應云有者，名於相中聲上假立，若異相有名之應實有，不異有何過若取相時，應亦取名者，如眼見色亦應見名餘法例名。相與分別，異有何過？分別，應非相為性者，道理分別及他心法所緣亦是相攝，若相異分別者，分別應非所緣相也。不異有何過？離分別外所有諸相，應以分別為性者，據有體邊五法皆相。若相與分別定不異者，正智真如皆應以彼分別體，相與真如若異不異俱不可說。於中初將相對真，後類名與分別對真如亦爾。前中，有三：法、喻、引說。法中，異有三過、一、相之勝義應非真如；二、應捨相別求真如；三、覺如時應不覺相。不異，亦有三過。一、相亦同如無差別過；二、凡夫得相應證真如；三、真如同相不清淨過。喻中，有四。一、以諸行上有無常苦等不可說異不異為喻；二、以身心有麁重輕安異不異喻；三、據隨轉理門，三性法有諸法種子與法不定一異，亦可以現行三性之法望所熏種，種生現行種望賴耶若異不異皆不可說；四、以虛空望色若異不異皆不可說，異有何過色與空異，是別色處無空，空不遍過，又色處無空，除色方始有空，空應無常，不異有何過，離色之外應無有定，雖知大乘不立有虛空體，然假小乘所立實有虛空以之為喻，此中道理乃至當知亦爾者，合喻。

Seventh, clarifying the section on difference and non-difference. Buque says: Therein, among the five dharmas, comparing the preceding with the following constitutes one line of practice to distinguish identity and difference. Among marks, first marks are compared to the latter four; next, names are compared to the latter three; next, discrimination is compared to the latter two; and tathatā is compared to correct knowledge, while correct knowledge has nothing to be compared with. If marks and names are different, what fault would there be? Names would have to be existents: names are conventionally established upon sounds within marks; if they were different from marks and existent, names would have to be real existents. If they are not different, what fault would there be? When grasping marks, one would also have to grasp names: just as when the eye sees visible matter, it would also have to see names, and the remaining dharmas follow the case of names by analogy. If marks and discrimination are different, what fault would there be? Discrimination would have to not have marks as its nature: in principle, discrimination and the cognition of others' minds are also subsumed under marks; if marks were different from discrimination, discrimination would not be an objective mark. If they are not different, what fault would there be? All marks outside of discrimination would have to have discrimination as their nature: in terms of having an entity, all five dharmas are marks. If marks and discrimination were definitively not different, correct knowledge and tathatā would both have to have that discrimination as their entity. Whether marks and tathatā are different or not different cannot be stated in either case. Therein, first marks are compared with tathatā, and subsequently names and discrimination are analogously compared with tathatā in the same way. In the former, there are three: doctrine, similes, and citing teachings. In the doctrine, difference has three faults: 1. the ultimate of marks would not be tathatā; 2. one would have to abandon marks and separately seek tathatā; 3. when awakening to tathatā, one would not be aware of marks. Non-difference also has three faults: 1. marks would also be identical to tathatā without difference; 2. ordinary persons attaining marks would realize tathatā; 3. tathatā would be identical to marks in having the fault of being impure. In the similes, there are four: 1. taking the fact that impermanence, suffering, and so forth on formations cannot be said to be different or not different as a simile; 2. taking whether heaviness and pliancy in body and mind are different or not different as a simile; 3. based on the method of progressive doctrine, the seeds of all dharmas in dharmas of the three natures and the dharmas are not definitively identical or different, or one may compare active dharmas of the three natures to the seeds perfumed, seeds producing active dharmas, and seeds compared to the ālaya, where being different or not different cannot be stated in either case; 4. taking space compared to form, where being different or not different cannot be stated in either case. If different, what fault would there be? If form and space are different, then where distinct form exists there is no space, incurring the fault that space is not all-pervasive; further, if there is no space where form is, and space only begins to exist when form is removed, space would have to be impermanent. If not different, what fault would there be? Outside of form, there would be no definite [space]. Although it is known that the Mahāyāna does not establish a substance for space, it borrows the really existent space established by the Hīnayāna to serve as a simile. ‘The principle here up to: one should know that it is also thus’ is the synthesis of the simile.