瑜伽論記 19.255

19.255

備云：心法有二種。一者、影像，即是相事；二者、本法，若有漏即是分別事。然此論文據通相，故有等無間緣，即以五事名通相故，何故真如非增上緣？自有二解。一解，如論上云增上緣者，能與涅槃作增上緣，與增上法能作緣故從果得名，今此真如望於諸法皆非增上，故非增上緣。一解，增上緣有二義。一、有力緣，如眼於識等；二、但有緣以不障故。今且約勝者為論，是故不說。

Bei says: Mental phenomena are of two kinds: first, images, which are the matter of signs; second, fundamental phenomena, which, if contaminated, are the matter of discrimination. However, this treatise text is based on the general characteristic; hence there is the immediately preceding condition, taking the five matters as the general characteristic. Why is tathatā not a dominant condition? There are two explanations. One explanation: as the treatise above says, a dominant condition is able to serve as a dominant condition for nirvāṇa; because it can serve as a condition for dominant phenomena, it derives its name from the fruit. Now, this tathatā, when viewed in relation to all phenomena, is not dominant; therefore it is not a dominant condition. Another explanation: dominant condition has two meanings: first, an efficacious condition, like the eye for visual consciousness; second, merely having a condition by not obstructing. For now, the discussion is based on what is superior; therefore it is not stated.