瑜伽論記 20.203

20.203

景云：言於大乘中乃至一切皆無者，彼初學者作如是言，依他圓成依世俗門一切皆有，依勝義諦一切皆無，以依他無生圓成無性故。次下論主重徵定之。應告彼言乃至而起說故者，外人答言。依他圓成皆無自性，是勝義諦，於無性法假名建立為起言說更相教示，名為世俗。下論主徵。名言世俗，為從因有自性所得為，唯名言世俗說有者，且據依他色心等法世俗說有，為從因生自性可得，為無因生唯名言中世俗說有，此兩問定。

Jing says: Regarding 'in the Mahāyāna... all are non-existent': those beginners make such a statement: 'Paratantra and pariniṣpanna, in terms of the conventional approach, all exist; in terms of ultimate truth, all are non-existent, because paratantra has no arising and pariniṣpanna has no intrinsic nature.' Next, the author of the treatise investigates and establishes this again. As for 'One should address them... and therefore gave rise to the explanation': the outsider answers: 'Both paratantra and pariniṣpanna lack intrinsic nature; this is ultimate truth. Over dharmas lacking intrinsic nature, nominal designations are established in order to give rise to discourse and mutually instruct; this is called the conventional.' Below, the author of the treatise interrogates: 'As for the nominal conventional, is its intrinsic nature obtained as having an origin from causes, or is it stated to exist merely as nominal conventional?' Taking for now paratantra dharmas such as form and mind that are conventionally said to exist: do they arise from causes with an intrinsic nature that can be obtained, or do they arise without causes, being conventionally said to exist merely within conventional designation? These two questions settle the matter.