瑜伽論記 20.205

20.205

若言佛說因緣所生我說即是空，雖從因生何廢空者，即應返問，為從因生空，為從因生有，生空，龜毛兔角應從因生，以俱無故。若生有者，即是有法，云何名空，應知經意因緣生法者，即是依他，依他法上無決定無自然生性，故云我說即是空。若唯名言世俗有，名言世俗無事而有，不應道理者，若言世俗不從因生，即無因果，無因果法無，就何施設名言世俗，故云名言世俗無事而有，不應道理。又應告言：長老！何緣諸可得者；此無自性者，此重徵問現可得法何緣無性。彼若得言：顛倒事故者，外人答曰：雖現可得以顛倒故皆無自性。復應告言：此顛倒事、為有為無？者，重二問定。若言有者；說一切法由勝義故皆無自性，不應道理者，汝若許有彼顛倒事，即有苦集因果法性，而言諸法由勝義故皆無自性，不應道理。若言無者；顛倒事故諸可得者，此無自性，不應道理者，若顛倒事畢竟無者，應不可得猶如兔角，今現可得而言無者，不應道理。

If one says, 'The Buddha said that what arises from causes and conditions is what I call empty; although it arises from a cause, how does that preclude emptiness?', then one should turn the question back: Does emptiness arise from a cause, or does existence arise from a cause? If it is emptiness that arises, then a turtle's fur and a hare's horns ought to arise from causes, since both are non-existent. If it is existence that arises, then it is an existent entity—how could it be called empty? One should know that the intended meaning of the sūtra regarding 'phenomena arisen from causes and conditions' refers to the paratantra [nature]. On the paratantra phenomena, there is no definitively non-existent nor naturally existent nature; therefore it says, 'I call it empty.' Regarding 'If it exists merely as conventional designation, then that conventional designation exists without a referent reality is not reasonable': if one says that the conventional does not arise from a cause, then there would be no cause and effect. If phenomena of cause and effect are non-existent, based on what could conventional designation be posited? Therefore it says that conventional designation existing without a referent reality is not reasonable. Furthermore, one should say to them: 'Venerable Sir! For what reason are all apprehensible [phenomena] devoid of intrinsic nature?' This re-examines by asking: for what reason are presently apprehensible phenomena devoid of intrinsic nature? If they reply, 'Because of deceptive states of affairs', the opponent replies: 'Although they are presently apprehensible, because of deception they are all devoid of intrinsic nature.' One should further say to them: 'Is this deceptive state of affairs existent or non-existent?' This is a twofold question to pin them down. Regarding 'If one says it is existent, then to say that all phenomena are devoid of intrinsic nature due to the ultimate truth is not reasonable': if you admit that that deceptive state of affairs exists, then there is the real nature of cause and effect belonging to suffering and its origin; to say that all phenomena are devoid of intrinsic nature due to the ultimate truth is not reasonable. Regarding 'If one says it is non-existent, then that all apprehensible [phenomena] are devoid of intrinsic nature because of deceptive states of affairs is not reasonable': if deceptive states of affairs are completely non-existent, they should be unobtainable just like a hare's horns; to say that what is now presently apprehensible is non-existent is not reasonable.