瑜伽論記 9.184

9.184

景云：復以問答辨二性是有，問如彼後代三論師說，一切法依他圓成同彼遍計所執皆是虛妄顛倒之法自性皆空，有何等過而說為惡取空耶？解云：遍計所執倒情計有性非因果，猶如兔角其性是空，依他依緣起，即是染淨因果，由染因緣久處輪迴，由淨因果起登彼岸成應化兩身，圓成實性即是真如理，若迷此理廣積塵劫，由悟此理究竟出纏成佛法身，若二性同遍計執空者，應同遍計性非因果，若依他非染因果，是即眾生從本已來應無流轉，若非淨因果即無出凡三乘聖道，若汝計有染淨因果凡聖等異，云何執同遍計所執畢竟無計其性空耶？若汝復執從本已來無流轉事亦無出凡聖道者，是即世間亦無謗信，云何經說無三寶四諦說名為謗，又若汝執無因無果一切空者，云何得有人畜不同貴賤等異，既有此等世所同知，驗知因果依他不無，又若依他同彼遍計是虛誑法畢竟空者，諸菩薩等緣結後智，云何但依他因果自利利他，寂絕不緣遍計所執性，若俱空即應俱緣，或俱不緣，既有緣不緣別，將知因果定有不空，又若圓成真如亦同遍計畢竟空者，是即空理最為究竟，云何證智正證入時不作空解，所證理空能證之智不作空解，解與理違，云何名證，若言此智證空理還作空解境智相稱名為證者，既作空解即有分別，云何得名無分別智證無分別理平等平等此智生耶？是故真如不可說空，故善戒經及舊地持皆云：有為名為有為，即是依他圓成有也，我及我所名非有，即是遍計所執空非有也，如此義門雖昔已有人不能解，由念三藏㔁堀方出故，瑜伽等論皆言二空所顯真如，由在加行推尋二空，根本智生顯證真如，真如不空，又舊翻攝論云：遣於三性入三無性，故知二性亦空，此亦不可，所以云何，遍計所執但倒本無有法，為捨倒情義說為遣，依他圓成非情立，云何名遣，問若正證不遣，云何依他云何在觀不見依他，解云：即依他性有真如理，復有因果差別事法，正入證時但見依他如，不觀依他事不如，證智不緣事法，即言遣言，言事以理事二法恒並行故，何以得知，即如二智雙觀二諦，無分別智正證真如同時後智即緣俗境依他性，若正入證必遣依他同時後智應無俗境，若同時後智雖緣依他望無分別智仍得名遣，若言後智不緣遍計所執，可許真觀遣於遍計，同時後智恒緣依他，云何執同遍計俱遣。

Jing says: Furthermore, through question and answer he clarifies that the two natures are existent. Question: As the Madhyamaka masters of later generations said, all dharmas, both the other-dependent and the consummate, are, like that imagined nature, deceptive and inverted dharmas, and their intrinsic natures are all empty. What fault is there that this is called grasping emptiness wrongly? It is explained: The imagined nature is conceived by the inverted mind as having existence, but its nature is not cause and effect; like a rabbit's horn, its nature is empty. The other-dependent arises dependent on conditions; that is the cause and effect of defilement and purity. Due to defiled causes and conditions, one long dwells in saṃsāra; due to pure causes and effects, one arises and ascends to the other shore, accomplishing the two bodies of response and transformation. The consummate nature is the principle of tathatā. If one is deluded about this principle, one accumulates dust for extensive kalpas; by awakening to this principle, one finally emerges from bondage and becomes the Buddha's Dharmakāya. If the two natures were empty like the imagined nature, they should, like the imagined nature, not be cause and effect. If the other-dependent were not defiled cause and effect, then sentient beings from the beginning would not transmigrate. If it were not pure cause and effect, there would be no holy paths of the three vehicles that transcend the ordinary state. If you accept that there are defiled and pure causes and effects, and differences between ordinary and noble, how can you grasp them as being identical to the imagined nature, which is ultimately non-existent, and conceptualize their nature as empty? If you further grasp that from the beginning there has been no transmigration and no holy path transcending the ordinary, then in the world there would also be no slander or faith. Why do the sūtras say that denying the Three Jewels and the Four Truths is called slander? Furthermore, if you grasp that there is no cause and no fruit and everything is empty, how could there be the differences between humans and beasts, or high and low? Since these exist as common knowledge in the world, by examination we know that the cause and effect of the other-dependent is not non-existent. Furthermore, if the other-dependent were, like that imagined nature, a deceptive dharma and ultimately empty, why would the bodhisattvas and others, when their subsequent wisdom binds conditions, only rely on the causes and effects of the other-dependent to benefit themselves and others, quietly cutting off and not cognizing the imagined nature? If both were empty, they should cognize both, or cognize neither. Since there is a distinction between cognizing and not cognizing, we must know that cause and effect are definitely existent and not empty. Furthermore, if the consummate tathatā were also ultimately empty like the imagined, then the principle of emptiness would be the most ultimate. Why is it that when the realizing wisdom directly realizes it, it does not form an understanding of emptiness? If the realized principle is empty while the realizing wisdom does not form an understanding of emptiness, the understanding and the principle would contradict each other; how could it be called realization? If you say that this wisdom realizes the principle of emptiness and also forms an understanding of emptiness, so that the object and the wisdom correspond and this is called realization, then once it forms an understanding of emptiness, there is conceptualization. How could it be called non-conceptual wisdom realizing the non-conceptual principle, equally and identically, when this wisdom arises? Therefore, tathatā cannot be said to be empty. Thus the Bodhisattvacaryānirdeśa and the old Bodhisattvabhūmi both say: "The conditioned is called the conditioned," which is the existence of the other-dependent and consummate; "self and what belongs to self are called non-existent," which is the emptiness and non-existence of the imagined nature. Although there was such an approach in the past, people were unable to understand it; it was only through the Tripitaka master [Xuanzang] delving deeply into the caverns [of texts] that it emerged. Therefore treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi all say that tathatā is revealed by the two emptinesses. Because in the preparatory stage one investigates the two emptinesses, the fundamental wisdom arises and manifestly realizes tathatā; tathatā is not empty. Furthermore, the old translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Discarding the three natures, one enters the three nature-less-nesses"; therefore we know that the two natures are also empty. This is also unacceptable. Why? The imagined nature is merely an inverted dharma that originally does not exist; for the sake of abandoning the inverted mind, it is conventionally said to be discarded. The other-dependent and consummate are not established by delusion; how could they be said to be discarded? Question: If in direct realization they are not discarded, why does one not see the other-dependent in contemplation? It is explained: Upon the other-dependent nature itself there is the principle of tathatā, and there are also differentiated phenomenal dharmas of cause and effect. When directly entering realization, one only sees the tathatā of the other-dependent, but does not contemplate the phenomenal facts of the other-dependent as not suchness. The realizing wisdom does not cognize phenomenal dharmas, which is expressed as "discarding"; as for the expression "phenomenal facts," it is because the two dharmas of principle and phenomena always run parallel. How do we know this? Just as the two wisdoms simultaneously contemplate the two truths: when the non-conceptual wisdom directly realizes tathatā, at the same time the subsequent wisdom cognizes the conventional realm of the other-dependent nature. If directly entering realization necessarily discarded the other-dependent, the simultaneous subsequent wisdom would have no conventional realm. If, although the simultaneous subsequent wisdom cognizes the other-dependent, in comparison with the non-conceptual wisdom it can still be called "discarded," then if you say that the subsequent wisdom does not cognize the imagined nature, one can grant that the true contemplation discards the imagined. But the simultaneous subsequent wisdom constantly cognizes the other-dependent; how can you cling to it as being discarded together with the imagined?