瑜伽論記 1.596

1.596

Furthermore, under "the spontaneous and distracted mental consciousness," it explains the temporal periods of the objects cognized by the five minds. Because it cognizes an unaccustomed object and does not arise by the power of attention, it is called the mind falling spontaneously; although it lacks attention, it arises spontaneously. The Tripiṭaka Master explains that in the West there are three views. The first master says: the spontaneous mental consciousness cognizes solely objects of the past that were previously cognized; if it is the two minds of inquiry and determination produced immediately after the five consciousnesses, they should only be said to cognize present objects of the same category as those cognized by the preceding five consciousnesses; if these two minds of inquiry and determination arise, they cognize those objects. Next, Jinaputra refutes the former master, saying: as with the minds of supernatural powers and so forth of buddhas and bodhisattvas, which arise spontaneously as spontaneous minds, they cognize either the present or the future; and as for saying that the spontaneous mind arising naturally cognizes solely the past, this does not cognize [properly]; therefore the spontaneous mind of the mental consciousness arising naturally comprehensively cognizes the three times and phenomena not included in time. From "cognizes solely the past" onward, it then clarifies that after the five consciousnesses, the two mental consciousnesses of inquiry and determination arise cognizing the objects of the past five consciousnesses; this text should be carried downward to connect, stating that cognizing solely past objects, the mental consciousness produced immediately after the five consciousnesses is either inquiry or determination. Because it retroactively cognizes the objects of the five consciousnesses, it arises cognizing solely past objects; or when it cognizes objects of the same category as the objects of the five consciousnesses, it should only be said to cognize present objects. The third master says: the spontaneous mental consciousness cognizes solely past objects because its cognition is not clear; next, the five consciousnesses arise, and simultaneously with the five consciousnesses, the discriminating mental consciousness either inquires into the five objects or determines the five consciousnesses; since it is a mental consciousness simultaneous with the five consciousnesses, it should only be said to cognize present objects; if it is this mental consciousness of inquiry and determination simultaneous with the five consciousnesses, it arises cognizing the objects previously cognized by those five consciousnesses; as for saying "immediately," because it is simultaneous with the five consciousnesses and arises intimately relying on the five consciousnesses, its condition is without interval; this is simultaneous non-interval, not non-interval of before and after. Supplementing the gaps, a fourth interpretation is added, stating: regarding the spontaneous mental consciousness and the two minds of inquiry and determination after the five consciousnesses, in terms of cognizing the fundamental object of the ālayavijñāna, it is called cognizing past objects; in terms of cognizing the aspect of the object of its own image, it cognizes solely present objects; therefore, speaking according to the principles of consciousness-only, when this mind arises, it arises cognizing the present object manifested by itself. Furthermore, regarding "consciousness can cognize the general characteristics of things," the Cheng weishi lun says: the mind grasps solely general characteristics with respect to the cognized object; mental factors with respect to it also grasp particular characteristics; therefore this says "that which is not yet cognized by this," and so forth. This statement expresses that mental factors also grasp the general characteristics of an object; on this general object, that which is not yet cognized is the cognized objective aspect of the particular characteristics of the object. That which is capable of cognizing is called attention; here it only speaks of what necessarily accompanies the arising of mind, hence it speaks solely of the modes of activity of universal mental factors; thereby, mentioning both universal and particular as common to the three natures, because the modes of activity of mind are intensified, it particularly explains their essence and activity, omitting the rest.