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瑜伽論記 10.55

English (machine translation) 10.55

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English

10.55

The text explaining the ten causes generally explains the meaning of the ten causes across the three natures. Among them, the three factors—name, conception, and verbal expression—constitute the conventional cause (anuvyavahāra-hetu). Because one conceives of the name of a dharma, verbal expression arises; and because the meaning is revealed through expression, this dharma is revealed in accordance with expression—hence it is called the conventional cause. Kuiji says: For example, because the name 'form' existed first, upon hearing this name later one subsequently gives rise to conception and grasps the image as good or bad; because of this grasping of an image, one subsequently gives rise to verbal expression, taking it as the cause for uttering words such as 'form'. Furthermore, as the fourth fascicle of the Samuccaya states: 'The conventional cause refers to name, conception, view, and verbal expression, jointly using them with the former [three] as its nature.' What is the intention behind this treatise not mentioning 'view' while that treatise does? Because by grasping the image of form through conception one subsequently gives rise to clinging, and clinging to what is good is called 'view'; and because of clinging, one gives rise to verbal expression. One asks: If it is a cause of purity, how can it be called clinging? The view that is a cause of purity is right view; knowing in accord with that dharma, although not clinging, is also called 'view'. That treatise mentions it because its function is distinct while shared with conception; that this and other treatises do not mention it is because, when clinging arises upon grasping an image, view is subsumed within the similar conception of a single thing, which is why it is not discussed. Furthermore, generally whenever there is something expressed, there is only conception, and it does not necessarily give rise to view; that treatise speaks according to the combined functioning where clinging arises concurrently, whereas this treatise speaks solely based on non-clinging, so there is no contradiction. Next, because one regards this dharma as a cause and therefore seeks and grasps that [result], it is called the cause of dependency (apekṣā-hetu). As for 'all seeds, in relation to their own subsequent fruits, are called the propelling cause (ākṣepa-hetu)': according to the text here, it comprehensively includes the habit energy of the factors of existence propelling subsequent retribution fruits, and it also includes the habit energy of conventional designations leading to subsequent fruits of the same kind—both are called the propelling cause. The remaining three conditions, excluding the cause-condition seeds, are called the receiving cause (parigraha-hetu). This comprehensively subsumes both types of seeds—those of the factors of existence and those of conventional designations. The own fruit of the very first moment is called the generating cause (abhinivṛtti-hetu), which means simultaneous generation. Tai says: As the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī says, 'The propelling cause is designated based on the support-basis of the habit energy of pure and impure actions among all formations; the generating cause is designated based on the causal support-basis of moisturized seeds.' Why is this? Because dharmas bound to the form and formless realms each arise from their own seeds, craving is called 'that which can moisturize'; through these moisturized seeds, the respective individual substances previously propelled will be generated in the future. As a sūtra says: 'Karma is the cause of thriving rebirth; craving is the cause of arising.' The commentary explains: Because craving seeds moisturize karma, the retribution can then arise; when it first arises, it requires craving to moisturize its arising, so craving seeds are called the generating cause in relation to the first-arisen fruit. At later times, continuation no longer relies on craving—just as an arhat has no craving yet their retribution can still continue—the retribution that arises later simply continues due to the power of karma. Therefore it says that all seeds, in relation to their own subsequent fruits, are called propelling. These two causes are precisely the meaning of the generating and propelling causes in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Master Yuān of the Western Region has three explanations. The first explanation states: All seeds, in relation to the arising of the first moment of retribution, are called the generating cause; in relation to the arising of retribution from the subsequent moments onward, they are called the propelling cause. The second explanation states: In relation to the body born of a single retribution at the beginning, they are called the generating cause; in relation to the subsequent corpse, they are called the propelling cause. Therefore the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'Death still continues.' The third explanation states: Ignorance and formations, in relation to future birth, aging, and death, are called the propelling cause; craving, grasping, and existence, in relation to birth, aging, and death, are called the generating cause. Therefore, among the twelve links of dependent origination, ignorance and formations are the propelling limbs, while craving, grasping, and existence are the generating limbs. Next, comprehensively taking all actualities generated by prior seeds in relation to actualities generated by subsequent seeds is called the inducing cause (udbhāvana-hetu). Comprehensively taking the individual cause-conditions of internal and external dharmas of the three natures is called the distinct cause (pratiniyama-hetu). Whatever dharma arises, it must rely on these causes such as the cause of dependency before it can be generated—this is called the co-functioning cause (sahakāri-hetu). All conditioned things that obstruct the arising of dharmas are the contradictory cause (virodha-hetu); the non-contradictory cause (avirodha-hetu) can be known [by implication]. According to the explanation in the old Bodhisattvabhūmi, the first two causes and the last two causes are shared, matching the explanation here, while the middle six causes are explained solely with reference to external indeterminate causes. Below, six kinds of contradiction are cited; taking specifically the contradiction of arising is called the contradictory cause. In 'hostile contradiction,' where it says 'poisonous snakes, weasels, cats, mice, and harvest mice': here they are mutually hostile enemies, up to harvest mice in turn fearing poisonous snakes; in this sequence they are mutually hostile, having no kindness when meeting one another.

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