瑜伽論記 2.202

2.202

The fourth challenge has three parts: 1. Originally lacking activity, it now has activity, which means it originally existed and now exists, etc.: that is, its substance originally exists and only now has function; this incurs the same second fault as in the production by conditions above, where the present activity is not produced from the future, and thus does not exist in the future—the syllogism is the same as before. 2. It says: Activity and the dharma have different characteristics. Even if they are different, the future and present are identical in being substantially existent; stating that only the present exclusively possesses activity is logically unobtainable. The syllogism is: In your school, the future should possess activity, because it is not unconditioned and its substance is substantially existent, just like the present. 3. It says: Activity and the original dharma have no different characteristics. The challenge states: If activity is the substance, then since the substance originally exists, that it originally lacked activity and only now has it is unreasonable. The syllogism is: Activity should originally exist, because it is identical with the substance, like the substance; the substance should originally not exist, because it is identical with activity, like activity. In the parallel refutation of the remaining three: