瑜伽論記 2.229

2.229

The fourth interrogation challenges: ‘If it grasps a directly perceived referent, only the aggregates such as form are directly perceived referents, and the self is not a directly perceived referent; therefore it is illogical.’ A referent is an object. That system asserts the self is not an object of direct perception. Saying now ‘a directly perceived object’ is a hypothetical refutation: only the five aggregates are directly perceived referents, which is established by both parties; that the self is not a directly perceived referent is your own system’s account. To say now that it is a directly perceived object would contradict your own school. Only the Sāṃkhya in the *Śataśāstra-vaipulya* asserts that the self is not an object of direct perception; whereas the Vaiśeṣika master holds that the self is an object of direct perception. If this awareness grasps an object of inference, this awareness of a self also arises in young children; they are not yet able to deliberate or infer, so the awareness of self should not abruptly arise. The syllogism is: The awareness of self in an infant should not be able to arise; because of the absence of deliberation; like the son of a barren woman.