瑜伽論記 8.69

8.69

The meaning is: With respect to joy and pleasure, investigation and reflection are not mutual hindrances; hence one cannot speak of a distinction in joy because of abandoning investigation and reflection. Because the joy of the first dhyāna still has the faculty of pain, its superior benefit has not yet been spoken of; because the joy of the second dhyāna has already abandoned pain, its joy is pure and supreme. If one spoke of a distinction based on the presence or absence of investigation and reflection, existing and non-existing dharmas differ immeasurably, so what distinction would there be in dhyāna? Now, turning the objection around: the feelings of pleasure and joy should have no distinction, but because the faculty of pain, like joy and pleasure, is a feeling, they are mutual hindrances. If one did not take the abandonment of the faculty of pain as the distinction between the joy of the first and second dhyānas, where would the distinction lie in the joy and pleasure of the first and second dhyānas? Previously, at the time of the first dhyāna, pain [as active manifestation] was already abandoned, so here its unserviceability is abandoned; its seeds are not said to be abandoned, as they still exist even for an arhat.