瑜伽師地論略纂 13.25

13.25

論云「復次，阿賴耶識乃至一味了別而轉故」者，此中護法為正文，難護月云：若緣三界器相，此中何故唯言從初執受乃至命終？彼通曰：此但約一內身為論，而說外器，非據實義。　問曰：如此處業，還感此處界。如欲界死，生上界，即此界業盡故生。若未盡，如何生上界？若盡，何故生上界由緣下界外器？若生上由緣此外器，果應永不盡。義曰：若有情身及外別受用果，須業盡時果盡，有業時緣外器別果。其外共器果未必要須業一有方便，以一切時任運緣彼為境界故。　問曰：若爾，如論處說第四禪外器雖無三災壞，而隨身生滅，所隨生滅器既是共相果，如何有滅時？以一切時任運緣故。下諸界地，理雖應然，且據四禪，論文明故。義曰：且約勝緣，故為此說。其義者何？如一有情，感得一處舍宅等緣，其此外器，有情共感，雖共業招，而此一眾生業力從增，有別受用勝緣故。若此勝緣在，餘有情隨之得變，若無勝緣，此處亦滅。　問曰：若然，此一有情復餘有情所共緣者，亦隨勝緣說滅，諸有情所變勝緣既在，而彼有情亦應緣之。理既難妨，不可取之。又如地獄，必惡業招，若生人天，其何業感？若在色界亦得緣者，何故色界身由起地獄諸不善業而能感果？故有大妨。設護法菩薩，此義如何？義曰：若在上界，不緣下界，其理無妨。然欲界人天何時造彼業者？若人天所感之業必是善感，以人天不受彼生業，若惡感招必定受生，加以別惡業等，故於此中無妨。如見糞汁，名為美食，其理如此，《對法抄》說。又第八若不緣上界色等者，如其天眼通者，此眼根等豈非第八緣耶？答曰：不緣。若爾，如何名唯識？答曰：種子生故，名唯識，非識所緣故，如六、七識界為緣等。又云：緣若爾，何故不許緣上界耶？義曰：若往彼界，何緣不許不緣？其色界繫色非第八緣，見、相別繫故，依彼為門，自變為影像故。馬勝比丘事入淨土等，皆如是隨往所見即變，屬見分繫。然色界者，色界緣。

The treatise says, "Furthermore, the ālayavijñāna... operates with a single uniform cognitive discernment..." Here, Dharmapāla takes the main text as authoritative and challenges Candragupta, saying: If it takes the receptacle-world forms of all three realms as object, why does it state here only 'from initial upātta up until the end of life'? The latter replies: This is merely discussed with reference to a single internal body when speaking of the external receptacle-world, not based on the actual principle. Question: Karma of this realm brings about retribution in this realm. For instance, when one dies in the desire realm and is born into a higher realm, this occurs because the karma of this realm is exhausted. If it were not exhausted, how could one be born into a higher realm? If it is exhausted, why is one born into the higher realm still taking the external receptacle-world of the lower realm as object? If, being born above, one still takes this external receptacle-world as object, the retribution would never come to an end. The meaning is: As for the body of a sentient being and external particular fruition of enjoyment, the fruition must end when the karma ends; when there is karma, it takes the particular fruition of the external receptacle-world as object. But the external shared receptacle fruition does not necessarily require an identical karmic application, because at all times it spontaneously takes that as its objective domain. Question: If so, as stated in treatises, although the external receptacle-world of the fourth dhyāna is not destroyed by the three calamities, it arises and perishes in accordance with the body; since the receptacle that arises and perishes along with it is a fruition of shared characteristics, how could it have a time of destruction? For at all times it is spontaneously taken as object. Although by principle the lower realms and stages should also be so, it is stated primarily on the basis of the fourth dhyāna because the treatise text is explicit. The meaning is: It is spoken of provisionally with reference to dominant conditions. What does this mean? For instance, a single sentient being brings about conditions such as a house and dwelling in a certain place; this external receptacle-world is mutually brought about by sentient beings, and though produced by collective karma, the karmic power of this single sentient being increases progressively, having a dominant condition of particular enjoyment. If this dominant condition remains, other sentient beings transform it accordingly; if there is no dominant condition, this place is likewise destroyed. Question: If so, what this single sentient being and other sentient beings jointly take as object is also said to perish in accordance with the dominant condition; since the dominant condition transformed by the various sentient beings remains, those sentient beings ought also to take it as object. Since this principle is difficult to uphold, it cannot be accepted. Moreover, just as the hells are necessarily brought about by evil karma, if one is born as a human or deva, by what karma is it brought about? If one in the form realm can also take it as object, why would a body in the form realm, by giving rise to various unwholesome karmas of the hells, be able to bring about fruition? Hence there is a great difficulty. If Bodhisattva Dharmapāla holds this, how is this meaning explained? The meaning is: If one in a higher realm does not take the lower realm as object, the principle is free of difficulty. But when would humans and devas of the desire realm create such karma? The karma brought about by humans and devas must be brought about by good, for humans and devas do not experience birth-karma of that [realm]; if brought about by evil, one would definitely experience birth there, supplemented by particular evil karma and so forth; thus there is no difficulty here. Just as seeing pus and feces is regarded as delicious food, such is the principle, as explained in the Commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya. Furthermore, if the eighth does not take the rūpa and so forth of the higher realms as object, then regarding the supernormal power of the divine eye, would this eye-faculty and so forth not be taken as object by the eighth? The answer is: It does not take it as object. If so, how can it be called consciousness-only? The answer is: Because it is produced from seeds, it is called consciousness-only, not because it is taken as object by consciousness, just as the realms of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses serve as conditions, etc. It is also said: If taking as object is like this, why is taking the higher realm as object not accepted? The meaning is: If one goes to that realm, on what grounds would one not be allowed to take it as object? Rūpa bound to the form realm is not taken as object by the eighth, because the darśana- and nimittabhāgas belong to different bounds; relying on that as an avenue, it autonomously transforms into an image. The incident of the bhikṣu Aśvajit entering the pure land and so forth are all like this: whatever is seen upon proceeding there is immediately transformed, belonging to what is bound to the darśanabhāga. However, as for one belonging to the form realm, the form realm takes it as object.