瑜伽師地論略纂 13.52

13.52

論破去來實有論中，此文為欲明三世自法，先破於彼因。決擇前〈尋伺地〉第六卷文，非正決擇，此依他等決擇故。下難中，「何以故」，總徵。　「非無方無處，法有從異方轉趣異方義」者，此破第一。應立量云：未來世色應有方所，有轉異故，如現在色；又未來世法不能移轉至現在世，無方所故，如兔角等。　「亦非未生已生法」等者，此破第二。謂汝未來法定無有死，以無生故，如虛空等、兔角等。　「若彼為緣而得生者，便異法生」等者，此破第三。謂未來法自住不壞，用此為緣，現在別法生，此法未來無故，便違宗過，如何言一切法未來本有？應立量云：此現在生法非未來見有，以離生故，如住滅等相用。　「又一切法，第一義中無作用」等者，此破業用師第四義。業用離體必不可得，體有法起故，如體自體。設許異者，未來亦應有業用，依體生故，如現在業。又此業用便應本無而今得生，即符順他宗，然違自宗，彼宗一切法未來有故。若不爾，即亦應立量云：一切體相，未來非有，不離業故，由如現業等。　「又與世尊言相違」下，破未來體有。應立量云：未來世體，體應是常，本有今有故，如虛空等。　「等於一相，若相異分得是有名等者」，此破第五、未來相未滿，現在相滿。此中云：若未滿一分，未來有者，此圓滿之分，未來何故不有？應立量云：現在一分圓滿之，未來還有，有彼不同一一分故，如現在相。　「又相異分本無今有」等者，應破未來不圓非本有。量云：未來一分不圓滿相，應本無今有，相一分故，如現世一分圓滿相。　「又離色等一切行相，餘未來分」等者，此破第六、未來別有分不是色等，現在亦爾，故三世別者。應立量云：汝所言離色等外有未來分，決定是無，現、比二量不可得故，如兔角。又應未來無有果相，現在方有者，此果相亦本無今有，如何言一切皆未來有？又彼宗許未來有果相，若爾，前云唯未來有自分，何處有世相？前解為勝。應立量云：未來世時，應有果相，有世分故，如現在世。世分者，即未來分等是。此等有六師，前第六〈本地〉有七解。此勘問，如別會。

In the treatise's refutation of the theory that the past and future are real entities: in this text, in order to clarify the specific dharmas of the three times, it first refutes their causes. This is an inquiry into the text of Fascicle 6 of the earlier Chapter on Investigation and Reflection; it is not a direct inquiry, because it inquires on the basis of other doctrines. In the objection below, 'Why is this so?' is a general inquiry. 'It is not that a dharma without direction or location has the meaning of moving from a different direction to another direction'—this refutes the first. One should formulate a syllogism: 'Color-form in the future time must possess a spatial location, because it moves and changes, just like present color-form.' Also: 'Dharmas of the future time cannot move into the present time, because they lack spatial location, like rabbit horns and the like.' 'Nor is it that unarisen and already arisen dharmas...'—this refutes the second. It means that your future dharmas definitely have no death, because they have no arising, like empty space or rabbit horns. 'If it arises by taking that as a condition, then a different dharma arises...'—this refutes the third. It means that future dharmas abide of themselves without perishing, and using them as a condition, a distinct present dharma arises; since this dharma did not exist in the future, it commits the fault of contradicting one's own thesis. How can you say all dharmas originally exist in the future? One should formulate a syllogism: 'This presently arising dharma is not observed to exist in the future, because it is separate from arising, like the characteristics and functions of abiding and perishing.' 'Furthermore, in the ultimate truth, all dharmas have no operational function...'—this refutes the fourth position of the function theorists. Operational function separate from substance is definitely unobtainable, because when substance exists the dharma arises, just like substance itself. If you grant that it is different, then the future should also have operational functions, because they arise relying on substance, like present operations. Furthermore, this operational function would then have to arise now without originally existing, which would conform to other traditions but contradict your own, since in your tradition all dharmas exist in the future. If not so, one should also formulate a syllogism: 'All substantial characteristics do not exist in the future, because they are not separate from action, just like present action and so forth.' From 'Furthermore, it contradicts the words of the World-Honoured One' downward, it refutes the substantial existence of the future. One should formulate a syllogism: 'The substance of the future time must be permanent in substance, because it exists originally and exists now, like empty space and so forth.' 'Equally in one characteristic, if a distinct portion of the characteristic receives the name of existence...'—this refutes the fifth: that future characteristics are incomplete while present characteristics are complete. Here it says: if an incomplete portion exists in the future, why does this complete portion not exist in the future? One should formulate a syllogism: 'The presently complete portion must also exist in the future, because it is one of those distinct portions, like the present characteristic.' 'Furthermore, a distinct portion of the characteristic would arise now without originally existing...'—this refutes the claim that the future's incompleteness is not an original existence. The syllogism: 'The incomplete characteristic of a portion in the future must arise now without originally existing, because it is a portion of a characteristic, like the complete characteristic of a portion in the present time.' 'Furthermore, apart from all cognitive aspects of color-form and so forth, another future portion...'—this refutes the sixth: that the future has a distinct portion that is not color-form and so forth, and the present is likewise, so that the three times are distinct. One should formulate a syllogism: 'The future portion that you assert to exist apart from color-form and so forth is definitively nonexistent, because it cannot be apprehended through either direct perception or inference, like rabbit horns.' Furthermore, if the future has no characteristic of result and only the present has it, this characteristic of result must also arise now without originally existing; how then can you say everything exists in the future? Moreover, their school grants that the future has the characteristic of result; if so, as was said before that only the future has its own portion, where is the characteristic of time? The former interpretation is superior. One should formulate a syllogism: 'In the future time, there must be a characteristic of result, because it has a temporal portion, like the present time.' Temporal portions are the future portion and so forth. There are six masters of this kind; in the earlier Chapter 6 of the Maulī Bhūmi there were seven explanations. These cross-examinations are as harmonized separately.