瑜伽師地論略纂 13.64

13.64

論云初靜慮有心、無心定，無心定即是也。方及名等三唯有色界，餘通一切地。六、三性者，異生性，不善及無記。無想、滅定唯善，無想報唯無記。命根、名、句等通善、無記。方亦可然，依色立故，此據本質。餘通三性，可知。如《對法》第二抄。解四相中，如〈菩薩地〉四十六卷。薩婆多法外四相，《成成論》即法。大乘不一異，無別體故不異，蘊攝別故不一。上座部心有二相，謂生、滅；色有三，除老。經部等同。《顯揚》十八云：六事能起言論，如生等為屬主言論故，如言色生、受生等。彼并破實生，由此因故。前明老後名住者，即生時即異時故，非由有住故身異，又令生厭故先說異，住濫常法故。又約色法生已，即異前住相，一期皆是，所以先老後異；若心法，剎那速疾，先住後異。故下三相中，住、異合中，先住後異。此乃別通論。此有少難，思之可知。餘如前第三及《對法》第二。下破中，總立量云：未來世法定無所有，現在無為所不攝故，如兔角等；汝言未來世生者定無所有，未來攝故，如未來色；又未來生不能生，法體無有故，如兔角等。外人云：經中說有未來色生等，故知別有生生諸法。若爾，論云所謂若生、若起、若現在乃至成現在性。此答外難云：經言有生，即別有體；經言有現在，應別有現在現在令法現在。應立量云：無別能生生諸色等，生、起、現在三法，經中說故，如起及現在；又現在應別有能現在現在諸法，經說生、起、現在三中攝故，如汝之生。即法是生。量云：生離色中外，無別有體，色有有故，猶如色等。不然，俱違宗過。破生因中云且先破小生，云：小生應無有體，於大能生及所生法無為等中不可得故，或別不說故等二因，如兔角等。小生既破，即破大生。汝言大生非諸法之生因，說是能生法故，如小生等。故彼致二生是為大過，一生尚不許有，何論二生？又此破抑他為論，何得有二生？抑他宗失。此文以更有餘卷解處，待至後當說。謂生者是小生，自從緣起故；能生者是大生，能生他故。解經三相中云：言由未來生者，此是將生，現在正生；滅中，現在將滅，過去正滅。故論生約將生，論滅約正滅，論亦互相顯。經中唯有生滅中，上座部以此證心唯有二相，色等如前文有三相。此師如何心法二相，色說三相？如何緣慮？如前四十二有多復次解，大精。

The treatise says that the first dhyāna has absorption with mind and absorption without mind; the absorption without mind is precisely this. Direction and the three [factors] such as names exist only in the form realm; the rest apply to all stages. Sixth, the three natures: the status of an ordinary being is unwholesome and indeterminate. The non-conception [absorption] and the absorption of cessation are exclusively wholesome; the retribution of non-conception is exclusively indeterminate. The life-faculty, names, phrases, and so forth apply to the wholesome and indeterminate. Direction may also be so, being established on form; this is based on the substance. The rest apply to the three natures, as can be known, like the second commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya. In explaining the four characteristics, it is like the forty-sixth fascicle of the "Bodhisattva Bhūmi". For the Sarvāstivādins, the four characteristics exist outside the dharmas; for the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*, they are identical to the dharmas. In the Mahāyāna, they are neither identical nor different: not different because they have no distinct essence, and not identical because they are subsumed under different aggregates. The Sthavira school holds that mind has two characteristics, namely arising and cessation, while form has three, omitting aging; the Sautrāntika and others are the same. Fascicle eighteen of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states: six things can give rise to verbal expressions, as arising and so forth are genitive expressions, such as saying the arising of form, the arising of feeling, and so forth; it also refutes real arising on account of this reason. Explaining aging before staying is because the time of arising is immediately the time of difference; it is not due to the presence of staying that the body differs, and also to evoke disgust it mentions difference first, since staying could be confused with permanent dharmas. Furthermore, regarding material dharmas, once arisen, they immediately differ from the preceding characteristic of staying throughout a single period, which is why aging comes before difference; but for mental dharmas, which are momentary and rapid, staying comes before difference. Therefore, among the three characteristics below, in combining staying and difference, staying comes before difference. This is a distinct, comprehensive treatise. There is a slight difficulty here, which can be understood upon reflection. The rest are like the third fascicle before and the second of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. Below in the refutation, a general syllogism is established: dharmas of the future are definitely non-existent, because they are not subsumed under the present or the unconditioned, like a rabbit's horn and so forth; what you call future arising is definitely non-existent, because it is subsumed under the future, like future form; furthermore, future arising cannot cause arising, because the essence of the dharma does not exist, like a rabbit's horn and so forth. The opponent says: sūtras speak of the arising of future form and so forth, therefore we know there is a distinct arising that produces dharmas. If so, the treatise says: so-called if arising, if originating, if present, up to constituting present nature. This answers the opponent's objection: if the sūtra's statement of arising implies a distinct essence, then because the sūtra speaks of "present", there should be a distinct "presenting" that makes dharmas present. One should establish the syllogism: there is no distinct producer that gives rise to form and so forth, because arising, originating, and present are three dharmas spoken of in the sūtra, like originating and present; also, the present should have a distinct presenter that presents dharmas, because it is subsumed under the three—arising, originating, and present—spoken of in the sūtra, like your arising. Thus the dharma itself is arising. The syllogism is: arising has no distinct essence apart from form and the rest, because it exists when form exists, just like form and so forth. Otherwise, both incur the fault of contradicting their own thesis. In refuting the cause of arising, it first refutes secondary arising, stating: secondary arising should have no real essence, because it is not found among primary producers, produced dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and so forth, or because it is not separately stated, through these two reasons, like a rabbit's horn and so forth. Once secondary arising is refuted, primary arising is then refuted: what you call primary arising is not the cause of arising of dharmas, because it is stated to be an active producing dharma, like secondary arising and so forth. Therefore, their positing of two arisings is a great fault; when even one arising is not admitted, how could one discuss two arisings? Moreover, this refutation merely presses the opponent's argument: how could there be two arisings? It is an error of pressing the opponent's doctrine. Since this passage is explained in other fascicles, it will be treated below. What is called "arisen" is secondary arising, because it originates from conditions; what is called "producer" is primary arising, because it can produce others. In explaining the three characteristics in the sūtras, it states: speaking of being caused by future arising refers to what is about to arise, while the present is actively arising; in cessation, the present is about to cease, while the past has actively ceased. Therefore, discussing arising refers to what is about to arise, while discussing cessation refers to what has actively ceased; the treatise also illuminates them mutually. In sūtras that mention only arising and cessation, the Sthavira school takes this as proof that mind has only two characteristics, while form and so forth have three characteristics as in the preceding text. How does this master explain two characteristics for mental dharmas and three for form? How do they reflect cognitively? As explained in many alternative answers in the forty-second fascicle before, it is exceedingly subtle.