瑜伽師地論略纂 14.53

14.53

論云「復次，一切色蘊當言皆是剎那滅性」等者，下更有釋：第一、舉正義，言任運滅，異正量師計等；二、正非邪執生滅因緣，如薩婆多火為滅薪緣，亦為生薪緣，此中破之。又不應謂能生因即是滅因，生滅相異故，因不可同。此中有量：若轉言生滅相違，生因非滅因；住滅不相返，住因即滅因。今破云：又法若停住，可待滅緣方滅，而不任運滅。住既無因，何能待滅緣？以任運滅故，故知諸行不待緣滅。此住無因有量。上來總非訖。外乃救云：現見火為薪滅緣，如何滅無緣？今牒之云：若謂火等是滅壞因，不應正道。以若火不滅，有法可為滅因，火既與薪俱生俱滅，如何火等為薪滅緣？伏難云：若爾，火等於薪復何所作？又俱生滅何妨為因？今云：唯能為彼變異後法生緣，訖於薪作用；非為滅緣，是薪作用。如《顯揚》日、光、雪、酢。《俱舍》大同此。外人既見此徵，不計火為滅緣，乃云滅相為法滅因。今非云「又謂壞滅是壞滅因」等者，若滅相為滅因，如火等與薪俱滅，故不得為緣，此亦應爾。生滅不同，若彼體生時即有滅相，便成相續斷壞過失。以諸法體無滅相故，諸生時即有滅故，法應不生，不生故，無斷壞。又滅相即自性是滅壞法，而能為因滅諸法者，不然。若救之云：法滅唯是無，滅相自性別有者。離彼法外別有滅，不可得故，不應理。若別救云：別有滅小相小滅相者，離彼大滅相法外，而更有小滅壞自性者，不可得故，不應理。又解：以法任運自滅，無別滅相，而言法外別有滅相，畢竟不可得故，不應道理。前解為勝。外人既雖見滅相自性是滅壞，不能為滅緣，為復云滅相自性滅壞，不能獨為滅因者，火等為助伴方能滅。今論主於心、心所任運滅中，更無物為助緣故滅，如何乃言色等中火為滅緣？外人伏救云：心、心所生及色生時，各有別別功能，如何以心、心所例其色法？心、心所亦不待助伴方能滅。今論主云：此差別功能不可得，徒虛有言而無法體，不應道理。以上皆應有量。若謂二種於一處所有滅功能，即應二種俱於二處有滅功能，或無功能，有過失故者。此意上來以滅相為正滅因，火為助伴。今牒之云：若謂滅相、火等二種於一法處所總而言之有滅功能故，即應二種俱於兩分有滅功能，或無功能。火為助伴，滅緣是有，何能不能為正滅因？故無功能相亦如是，有正滅功能，無助滅功。以此二望法皆是滅緣。以火例滅相，應成正滅因，以滅相例火，應正助滅緣，皆是法滅緣故。二種既皆不成，故知不得以火等為助，滅相為正滅。又如太師別抄，不能煩解。下諸文雖有四，上來總是相乘義來分四。

The treatise says: "Furthermore, it should be said that all form aggregates are of a momentary nature..." Below there are further explanations: First, it presents the correct view, stating spontaneous cessation, which differs from the views of the Saṃmatīya masters and the like; second, it rectifies the mistaken clinging to causes and conditions of arising and cessation, as when the Sarvāstivādins hold that fire is the condition for the cessation of firewood and also the condition for the arising of firewood—here it refutes this. Moreover, one should not say that the cause capable of producing is the cause of ceasing, because the characteristics of arising and ceasing are different; hence their causes cannot be the same. Here there is an inference: If one turns around and says that arising and ceasing are contradictory, so the cause of arising is not the cause of ceasing, but persisting and ceasing are not mutually opposed, so the cause of persisting is the cause of ceasing. Now we refute this: Furthermore, if a dharma remained, it might await a condition for cessation before ceasing and not cease spontaneously. Since persisting has no cause, how could it await a condition for cessation? Because it ceases spontaneously, we therefore know that conditioned processes do not await conditions to cease. This uncaused nature of persisting has an inference. The general refutations above are concluded. The opponent then rescues their view, saying: "We visibly see that fire is the condition for the cessation of firewood; how can cessation lack a condition?" Now we cite it and say: If one claims that fire and the like are the cause of destruction and cessation, it does not accord with the correct path. For if fire did not cease, there would be a dharma that could serve as the cause of cessation; but since fire arises and ceases together with the firewood, how could fire and the like serve as the condition for the cessation of firewood? An implicit objection says: If so, what do fire and the like do to the firewood? And what prevents what arises and ceases together from being a cause? Now we say: It can only serve as the condition for the arising of the subsequent modified dharma of that [firewood], ending with an operation upon the firewood; it does not serve as a condition for cessation, which is an operation upon the firewood. As in the *Prakaraṇāryavācā*: the sun, light, snow, and vinegar. The *Kośa* is largely identical to this. The opponent, having seen this questioning, does not posit fire as the condition for cessation, but instead says that the characteristic of cessation is the cause of a dharma's cessation. Now we refute this: "Furthermore, if it is said that destruction is the cause of destruction..." If the characteristic of cessation is the cause of cessation, then, just as fire and the like cease together with the firewood and therefore cannot be the condition, this should be the same. Arising and ceasing are not identical; if when its substance arises it already possesses the characteristic of cessation, it falls into the fault of a rupture of continuity. Because the substances of dharmas lack the characteristic of cessation, and because if at the time of arising there were already cessation, dharmas should not arise; and because they do not arise, there would be no rupture. Furthermore, if the characteristic of cessation, whose own-nature is a destructible dharma, could serve as a cause to make dharmas cease, this is not so. If they rescue it by saying: "The cessation of a dharma is merely nonexistence, while the characteristic of cessation has a distinct own-nature," because a cessation existing separately apart from that dharma is unapprehensible, it is unreasonable. If they rescue it by another means, saying: "There is separately a minor characteristic of cessation, a secondary characteristic of cessation," because apart from that major characteristic of cessation a secondary own-nature of destruction is unapprehensible, it is unreasonable. Another explanation: Because dharmas cease spontaneously by themselves and have no separate characteristic of cessation, to say that there is a separate characteristic of cessation apart from dharmas is ultimately unapprehensible, so it does not accord with reason. The former explanation is superior. Although the opponent sees that the own-nature of the characteristic of cessation is destruction and cannot be the condition for cessation, they might further say that although the characteristic of cessation is destructive by own-nature and cannot alone be the cause of cessation, it is capable of ceasing only with fire and the like as an assistant companion. Now the author of the treatise argues: regarding the spontaneous cessation of mind and mental factors, they cease without any other thing serving as an assisting condition; how can you say that in matter and the like, fire is the condition for cessation? The opponent implicitly rescues their view: "When mind and mental factors arise, and when matter arises, each has distinct functions; how can one use mind and mental factors as an analogy for material dharmas? Mind and mental factors also do not await an assistant companion to be able to cease." Now the author of the treatise says: These differentiated functions are unapprehensible; they are merely empty words without any real dharmic entity, which does not accord with reason. The above should all have inferences. "If it is said that two kinds have the function of cessation in one locus, then both kinds should either both have the function of cessation in both loci, or have no function, because there would be a fault." The meaning here is: above, the characteristic of cessation was taken as the primary cause of cessation, and fire as the assistant companion. Now citing it, we say: If one claims that the two kinds—the characteristic of cessation and fire, etc.—generally speaking have the function of cessation with respect to one dharma, then both should have the function of cessation in both parts, or neither should have the function. Fire is an assistant companion, and the condition for cessation exists; why could it not serve as the primary cause of cessation? Therefore, the characteristic of having no function is also like this: having the function of primary cessation, but no function of assistant cessation. Because these two, relative to the dharma, are both conditions for cessation. If one analogizes fire to the characteristic of cessation, it should become the primary cause of cessation; if one analogizes the characteristic of cessation to fire, it should be the assistant condition for cessation, because both are conditions for the cessation of dharmas. Since neither is established, we therefore know that one cannot take fire and the like as the assistant and the characteristic of cessation as the primary cessation. Furthermore, as in the Great Master's separate notes, we cannot elaborate in detail. Although the subsequent texts have four parts, the above generally divides into four based on sequential implications.